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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Business Cycles, Disturbances, and Imbalances
By
Nikolaos Charalampidis
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Irvine, 2019
Fabio Milani, Chair
Chapter 1 studies the e↵ects of cyclical changes in U.S. income and wealth inequality on
macroeconomic gyrations, shifts in aggregate demand, debt swings, and on the e↵ectiveness
of monetary policy. It does so though the lens of a structural model with heterogeneous
agents that is brought to the data to jointly explain a set of macroeconomic series and a
time-varying dimension of inequality, namely the evolution of the U.S. income and wealth
inequality since the 1950s to 2009. The paper shows that changes in income and wealth
inequality explain a small fraction of output cycles, operate through persistent changes
in Aggregate Demand, and cause large swings in household indebtedness. Despite that
influence, changes in income and wealth inequality since the mid-80s to 2009 cannot explain
the cyclical debt pileup of that period which is accounted for by credit relaxation. Despite the
imbalances of the model in terms of the time-varying and unequal distribution of income and
wealth, monetary policy has a small e↵ect on income and wealth inequality, and e↵ectively
stabilizes the economy by responding aggressively to inflation even if the observed economy
wide fluctuations emanate from changes in income and wealth inequality.
Although the recent dramatic decline of the labor share has attracted a lot of attention,
the origins and implications of the historical swings of that share during 1964–2016 still
remain unexplored. Chapter 2 fills that void. More specifically, Chapter 2 investigates the
xii
driving forces and the implications of the fluctuations in the U.S. labor share. To that end,
it considers a structural model featuring various potential drivers of the labor share, such
as the relative price of investment, labor unionization, measurement errors etc. To that set
of potential drivers, the present work adds production automation aiming to encapsulate
routine-biased technological shifts, and shows how to bring the model to the data in order
to explain the labor share – something that is not straightforward. The analysis shows
that changes in production automation explain about 10% of output fluctuations, a third
of the labor share across time, about the entire decline in the labor share since the 1990s,
and trigger a countercyclical response in labor hours that cannot be matched by any other
conventional aggregate shock in a structural framework.
Chapter 3 sheds lights on the unexplored determinants of the notoriously persistent Euro-
Area unemployment from a macroeconomic perspective. More precisely, it quantifies the
relative importance of a plethora of drivers of unemployment swings by jointly examining
unemployment and wage fluctuations through the lens of a structural model estimated on
several wage series to strengthen the identification of shifts in labor market competitiveness.
I find that these shifts determine long-run unemployment cycles, but their short-run e↵ect
depends on the unemployment–wage co-movement: the stronger the co-movement – as it is
in Portugal and Spain compared to Greece and Italy – the lower their e↵ect. Furthermore,
the low degree of labor market competitiveness is catalytic for the unemployment spike of
the Great Recession. Nevertheless, reforms boosting competition during the recovery period
generate subdued wage growth. It is worth mentioning that this paper contributes in the
Bayesian estimation of DSGE models as well by applying an e cient treatment of the state
space dimensionality. In particular, it borrows an approach from the econometrics literature
considering reduced-form models, and operationalizes it within the context of a DSGE model.
Finally, Chapter 4 tackles two unresolved issues in the literature on subdued wage growth.
First, not all contributions use the same wage measure, sample period, or economies. Sec-
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ond, all contributions employ reduced-form models impeding a general equilibrium approach
that would quantify the relative importance of various driving factors of wage growth. I ad-
dress those issues by studying the big four Euro-Area economies in a structural framework
involving a plethora of disturbances extracted from the data through Bayesian estimation
on five wage indicators since the 1990s. More importantly, I pin down the influence of those
factors during a particular period of time, namely during output recoveries from troughs. I
find a cyclical real wage recovery in Germany after the sovereign debt crisis that is statisti-
cally di↵erent from the past and is driven by a weakening in firms’ pricing power despite a
productivity slowdown. In contrast, a cyclical (real) wage-less output recovery is observed in
France and Italy. In France, the productivity slowdown dominates the weakening in firms’
market power. In Italy, the latter e↵ect along with a demand pick up boosting wages do not
su ce to exceed the weakening in workers’ market power. In Spain, cyclical wage growth is
positive – the sizable weakening in firms’ pricing power and rising demand exceed the weak-
ening in workers’ market power – only in real terms and not in nominal terms, highlighting
the importance of jointly examining price and wage inflation.
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Chapter 1
Distributional Imbalances, Monetary
Policy, and the U.S. Business Cycle
Despite rising interest in U.S. inequality, still little is known about its macroeconomic impli-
cations. A relatively older literature finds mixed evidence about the implications of inequality
for long-term growth [Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and
Perotti, 1996; Banrejee and Duflo, 2003; Barro, 2000], while recent studies show that the
origins of soaring U.S. household debt can be found on the coincidently rising top income
share [Kumhof et al., 2015] and volatility of earnings [Iacoviello, 2008] since the 1980s. Such
findings urge the study of the financial markets and inequality nexus [Stiglitz 2014, 2015].
Nevertheless, the above studies adopt a long-run perspective on the macroeconomic implica-
tions of inequality leaving unexplored their short- to medium-run e↵ects. The present paper
fills this void by examining the implications of changes in income and wealth inequality
for macroeconomic cycles, aggregate demand gyrations, debt swings, and monetary policy.
More specifically, the present work quantitatively evaluates a long-time-held view suggesting
that distributional shifts do not influence the business cycle, and identifies the response of
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aggregate demand that is missing from the above studies. Studying the implications for
debt swings sheds light on the portfolio adjustments of households in the face of fluctuations
in inequality. Jointly examining monetary policy and inequality allows to address concerns
about the policy e↵ectiveness in the presence of inequality [Greenspan, 1998; Bullard, 2014;
Bernanke, 2015; Coeure´, 2012; Mersch, 2014; Panetta, 2015; Draghi, 2016].
The present work, therefore, identifies the business cycle implications of inequality by study-
ing the evolution of income and wealth inequality, household debt, and macroeconomic
conditions jointly over a period of five decades (1954-2009) in U.S. through structural lenses.
It introduces heterogeneous agents and imbalances in a medium-scale model building on the
workhorse model for policy analysis [Christiano et al. 2005; Smets and Wouters 2007], and
estimates it. Agent heterogeneity is projected in two fixed groups – the top and the mid-
dle class. The two dimensions su ciently approximate reality where a disconnect between
the top and the rest of the distribution is well-documented1. The imbalances pertain to
two facts. First, at each point in time, the model features distributional imbalances – an
unequal distribution of income and wealth – which di↵er from the equitable distribution
of the representative agent (RA) model. Second, due to inequality, macroeconomic condi-
tions in response to aggregate shocks can potentially di↵er from those implied by the same
shocks in the RA model. The sources of imbalances entail an exogenous and an endogenous
component.
The exogenous component pertains to three “distributional” shocks generating dispersion in
wages, wealth, and credit availability between the top and the middle class. Wage polariza-
tion shocks introduce time-varying incomplete wage insurance, and build on Walsh (2016)
who introduces a similar, albeit deterministic, scheme2. In a similar spirit, Lansing and
Markiewicz (2016) consider shocks in a labor aggregator reflecting changes in the skill pre-
1As argued by Kumhof et al. (2015), the stable or slightly declining income mobility in the U.S. since the
1950s [Kopczuk et al., 2010] provides some support to the consideration of two agent groups.
2 See Alichi et al. (2016), Phillippon and Reshef (2012), and Heathcote et al. (2010) for empirical evidence.
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mium. Wealth shocks, modeled as disturbances in preferences for wealth, are similar to those
considered in [Fisher, 2015; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Iacoviello and Neri,
2010; Iacoviello, 2005]. The interaction of wealth shocks with heterogeneous preferences for
wealth, however, leads to heterogeneous shock influence reflecting unequal investment oppor-
tunities and returns. The latter are documented by Fagereng et al. (2018) using tax records,
while Lee (2012) models partial insurance of returns. Credit supply shocks are modeled as
stochastic variations in the borrowing limit [Justiniano et al., 2015].
The endogenous component of imbalances pertains to the heterogeneous household responses
spurred by all shocks that are filtered through the channels of imperfect financial insurance
and heterogeneous marginal propensities to consume (MPC). Intra-family loans provide par-
tial insurance since the borrowing middle class (due to a lower discount factor than the top)
can renege on its obligations as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). As a
result, lenders ask for collaterals that are met by the assets of the middle class (firm owner-
ship), and distributional shocks are rendered relevant for equilibrium dynamics. Moreover,
heterogeneous preferences over wealth, encapsulating Carroll (2000)’s argument that wealth
confers social status, amplify the MPC di↵erentials.
Through a full-information Bayesian approach, the model explains the U.S. top income
and wealth deciles, household debt, and seven aggregate series jointly over a period of five
decades. Parameters are estimated, and both aggregate and distributional shocks are ex-
tracted within the model. Since the inequality series are in annual terms whereas all other
data are available in a quarterly frequency, mixed frequency estimation is conducted. Mul-
tiple series for debt and a latent factor approach strengthen identification. To deal with the
large state space dimensionality, I borrow an e cient treatment of it from the econometrics
literature and operationalize it in a DSGE and mixed frequency context.
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1.0.1 Findings.
The findings corroborate the view that changes in income and wealth inequality have limited
e↵ect on output cycles. The combined e↵ect of distributional shocks, which explains the
majority of the swings in income and wealth inequality, accounts for about 10/6% of output
cycles in the short/medium run: polarization, wealth, and credit shocks account for 3/2%,
4/2%, and 3/2% of those cycles, respectively. Moreover, that influence does not have a time-
varying size, is robust across a battery of checks, and operates through shifts in aggregate
demand: when distributional shocks hit the households’ optimization, they trigger persistent
consumption responses across the population that do not net out entirely to zero.
The distributional shocks, however, explain a sizable part of the swings in household indebt-
edness: 75/52% in the short/medium run3. Inequality swings and fluctuations in household
debt positions are, therefore, connected as in Kumhof et al. (2015) and Iacoviello (2008).
Contrary to Kumhof et al. (2015), however, rising income inequality weakens the collateral
channel and, hence, does not su ce to explain the debt pileup prior to the Great Reces-
sion. Neither does rising wealth inequality accounted for to a large extent by wealth shocks
that generate a negative correlation between wealth inequality and debt. The heterogeneous
dynamics induced by the triplet of distributional shocks, therefore, render credit supply
shocks a major force behind the debt pileup during the decades prior to the Great Reces-
sion. Credit relaxation, thus, has a pronounced role in debt accumulation in line with Mian
and Sufi (2018), but limited implications for output in line with Justiniano et al. (2015).
As for the transmission of distributional shocks, wage polarization shocks entail a positive
output elasticity reflecting the pro-cyclicality of the top income decile in the data. They
contract middle-class consumption, and lead to pro-cyclical responses in both income and
3In modeling debt, I follow the mainstream approach of Iacoviello (2005). Debt is amortized within a
quarter which according to Gelain et al. (2018b, 2018a), renders debt sensitive to (aggregate) shocks. The
estimation may partially resolve the tension between the adopted modeling and the low-frequency observed
debt dynamics in the likelihood construction by boosting the influence of distributional shocks on debt.
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wealth inequality. Since they drastically alter the distribution of assets and, thereby, the
ability of middle class to post collaterals, the collateral channel worsens their impact. Put
di↵erently, access to credit is harder when inequality rises. Both wealth and credit supply
shocks yield positive elasticities for output and the top income decile (since they increase
the debt burden of the middle class). Although credit shocks lead to a positive correlation
between wealth inequality and debt, wealth shocks lead to a negative correlation. The reason
is that after credit shocks asset prices, and thereby the top’s-bonds-to-economy-wide-wealth
ratio, do not respond as much as they do after wealth shocks.
The present paper quantifies the e↵ect of erratic and unpredictable fluctuations in the policy
instrument on the path of income and wealth inequality, and shows that it has been negligible
throughout the sample. Expansionary fluctuations, in fact, raise income inequality because
profits are unequally distributed, and decrease wealth inequality because low lending costs
help the middle class acquire assets. As for the systematic part of monetary policy, the find-
ings suggest that the policy transmission channel is not broken in the presence of inequality.
An aggressive stance towards inflation stabilizes the economy even when the economy wide
fluctuations emanate from distributional shocks because inflation and aggregate demand are
pro-cyclical in response to these shocks. Nonetheless, reacting to either income, or wealth,
or consumption inequality directly and not only through general equilibrium e↵ects, entails
small gains in the variability of the output gap that is linked to the variability of aggregate
demand, in exchange of inflation volatility.
Comparing the results from the RA model to those of this paper reveals that, in the former,
the persistence in aggregate consumption is captured by endogenous sources of persistence
and, in particular, habit formation whereas, in the latter, the importance of habit is attenu-
ated (from 0.77 to 0.51) and replaced by persistent changes in income and wealth inequality.
Heterogeneous preferences and imperfect insurance, in contrast, amplify the volatility of ag-
gregate demand. In general, the findings suggest a dichotomy in identification: parameters
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associated with the model’s aggregate dimension are identified mainly by aggregate data,
whereas inequality data are informative for the parameters associated with distributional
imbalances. Moreover, in the present model, risk premium and investment shocks obtain
a tad more elevated (ephemeral) role in output (consumption) cycles compared to the RA
model, suggesting that with distributional shocks incorporated demand shocks contribute
less to the output–consumption correlation. Furthermore, the analysis pins down the di-
rection and size of the impact of aggregate shocks on inequality; for example, these shocks
explain 39/10% of the swings in short/medium-run wealth inequality.
The literature review follows below. Section 2 outlines the structural model. Section 3
elaborates on the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
1.0.2 Related Literature.
In tackling inequality and debt, the present paper relates to Iacoviello (2008) and Kumhof
et al. (2015). Both of these papers feature exogenous production and, thereby, preclude a
recurrent impact of changes in inequality on output. In contrast, in the present work, en-
dogenous production enables the emergence of an aggregate demand channel. As in Kumhof
et al. (2015), I consider two agent groups. These authors consider the top and the rest of
the distribution, where the latter involves borrowers with no assets holdings. In this pa-
per, however, I consider middle-class households who hold both liabilities and assets in their
portfolio allowing for a broad view on the balance sheet of households outside of the top.
This perspective on the portfolio of agents also distinguishes this work from Cairo´ and Sim
(2018) who endogenize production in the framework of Kumhof et al. (2015). These authors
assume that workers only receive wages whereas shareholders own capital and firms but do
not supply labor. The present paper’s framework, though, allows to match income and wealth
inequality simultaneously for both agent groups. In addition, the present approach to the
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middle-class portfolio along with the extraction of distributional shocks from the data within
a structural setup contributes in the strand of two-agent NK models featuring a fraction of
agents excluded from financial markets, and abstracting from including information found
in inequality series [Debortoli and Gal´ı, 2018; Walsh, 2016; Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012;
Lee, 2012; Curdia and Woodford, 2010; Iacoviello, 2005].
As argued by Christiano et al. (2018), a developing research strand involves Heterogeneous
Agent New Keynesian (HANK) models along the lines of Kaplan et al. (2016). Studies
in that strand feature idiosyncratic risk and investigate how inequality influences demand
[Werning, 2015], as well as the various channels of monetary or fiscal policy transmission to
inequality [Gornemann et al., 2014; Doepke et al., 2015; Sterk and Tenreyro, 2015; Kaplan
and Violante, 2014; Auclert, 2015]. Similarly to those papers, I consider a small set of assets
and a fraction of financially constrained agents. Contrary to them, I consider fixed rather
than endogenously formed agent groups. Although this choice does not allow the study of
precautionary savings, it helps with model tractability and is consistent with the observed
changes in inequality suggesting a disconnect between the top and the rest of the distribution
as well as with the equilibrium formation of two groups derived in HANK models.
Another distinguishing feature of the present work is that I include seven aggregate and
three distributional shocks in total that exceed the number of shocks often considered in
HANK models (two aggregate and one idiosyncratic)4. Moreover, contrary to HANK models
involving either perfect competition or search frictions in labor markets, I consider staggered
wage setting which is used in the workhorse monetary policy models. Furthermore, HANK
models involve partial information approaches, namely moment matching and data treatment
outside of the model. The present paper, though, adopts a full-information approach that
allows to examine the joint historical evolution of U.S. inequality and macroeconomic series.
Delving into the interaction of monetary policy and inequality from a structural perspec-
4This is true for Iacoviello (2008), Kumhof et al. (2015), and Cairo´ and Sim (2018) as well.
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tive complements a branch of the literature involving reduced-form models and examining
whether various inequality series (i) are a↵ected by policy and inflation [Lenza and Slacalek,
2018; Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou, 2017; Guerello, 2017; Coibion et al., 2016; Adam and
Zhu, 2015; Casiraghi et al., 2016; Furceri et al., 2016; McKinsey Global Institute, 2013;
Doepke and Schneider, 2006; Romer and Romer, 1998]; (ii) are associated with credit con-
ditions [Coibion et al., 2014; Paul, 2017]; (iii) exhibit cyclicality [De Giorgi and Gambetti,
2017]. Worth pointing out is that extracting a latent factor from multiple debt measures
strengthens identification and builds on the use of multiple observables in Boivin and Gian-
noni (2006) and wages in Gal´ı et al. (2012a, 2012b) and Justiniano et al. (2013).
The heterogeneity in preferences for wealth is aligned with that considered in Kumhof et al.
(2015), Carroll et al. (2015), Tokuoka (2012), and Francis (2009). More generally, this
formulation shares similarities with Sidrauski (1967) who introduces utility from money
balances – an approach followed by Michaillat and Saez (2015) in order to study economic
slack and by Zou (1998) who argues that it reflects Weber’s spirit of capitalism5; with
Kurz (1968) who examines non-linearities stemming from utility yielding capital in a growth
model; and with Iacoviello (2005) who introduces utility from housing services.
1.1 Full-Fledged Model
The model builds on the medium-scale DSGE environment of Christiano et al. (2005) and
Smets and Wouters (2007), and shares similarities with Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Jus-
tiniano et al. (2015). Two families populate the economy. ⌧ indexes the top family and µ
indexes the middle-class family, populated by measures of n⌧ and nµ = 1 n⌧ identical house-
holds, respectively. The families di↵er in terms of their wealth preferences and discounting.
Perfect consumption insurance holds within families. Households participate in intra-family
5Luo and Zou (2009), Zou (2015), and Bakshi and Chen. (1996) tread along that line.
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borrowing, and trade firms’ ownership shares. Each household consists of a continuum of
agents with di↵erent labor types. The di↵erentiated labor is uniformly distributed, supplied
along the intensive margin, priced in a staggered fashion by monopolistically competitive
unions, aggregated and sold to monopolistically competitive intermediate good producers
who rent capital from capital producers and choose prices in a staggered fashion.
Households.
Household i, with i 2 {µ, ⌧}, chooses a sequence of consumption, loans, and shares, {C it , Bit,⌦it},
to maximize the present discounted value of future utility:
Et
+1X
s=0
( i)
s

ln
 
C it+s   ⌘C it+s 1
   ✓ Z 1
0
[Lit+s(j)]
1+ 
1 +  
dj +  i !t+sln
 
⌦it+s
  
(1.1)
Preferences are log-separable, and depend on consumption, on labor disutility across j labor
types, and on the ownership of firms’ shares that confers social status. ⌘ mirrors external
habit formation,   is the inverse Frisch elasticity, and  i captures the strength of preferences
over wealth (shares) which di↵ers across families:  µ 6=  ⌧ 6.  µ <  ⌧ renders middle-class
families more impatient than the top in a way analogous to that in Iacoviello (2005).  !t
stands for the wealth shock a↵ecting wealth preferences. The combination of that shock
and heterogeneous  i creates wealth dispersion, and potentially captures unequal access to
investment opportunities. ln( !t ) follows an AR(1) process with parameters {⇢!,  !}. The
budget constraint for a middle-class household is given by
6 ⌘, ✓,  are common across agents. This assumption, albeit stylized, ensures that the steady state of
economy wide aggregates is the same as that in the representative agent model; that region is a natural
starting point. Identifying heterogeneous ⌘, ✓,  would require heterogenous consumption and labor data.
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C it +Qt
⇥
⌦it  
 
1  S!(⌦it/⌦it 1)
 
⌦it 1
⇤
+ T it /Pt = Y
i
t (1.2)
Y it ⌘ s W i,h,rt (j)Lit(j)dj + F µt + [Bit/(e btRtPt)  Bit 1/(Pt 1⇧t)] + ⌦itVt (1.3)
The budget constraint of a top household is symmetric to the above, bonds enter with the
opposite sign though. Y it is the pre-tax income.  
b
t is a risk premium shock following an
AR(1) process with parameters {⇢b,  b}. S!(·), with S!(1) = S!(1)0 = 0 and S 00!(1) ⌘ S! > 0,
stands for portfolio adjustment costs. Qt is the shares’ price in terms of the final good. ⇧t
stands for price inflation. Vt denotes economy wide profits. T it stands for nominal taxes.
W i,h,rt (j) is the real wage of labor type j in household i that would prevail in the absence of
rigidities, and is equal to the marginal labor disutility expressed in consumption terms:
W i,h,rt (j) = ✓[L
i
t(j)]
 /⌅it (1.4)
= ✓Lt(j)
 /⌅it (1.5)
where ⌅it is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The second equality in
(1.5) holds in equilibrium, and uses the fact that type-j labor is determined by the labor
union’s problem independently of the household identity.
Contrary to Smets and Wouters (2007) who consider an equal distribution of labor income
(W rt Lt), but along the lines of Walsh (2016) and Lee (2012) who consider partial, albeit
deterministic, income insurance, aggregate income is distributed to households via an im-
perfect wage insurance scheme. Household members supply labor, pool together wages across
unions, but when the wage bill is allocated, they only receive a fraction of what would be
allocated under perfect insurance. Thus, transfers F it from the unions read as
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F µt = stW
r
t Lt/n
µ   s W i,h,rt (j)Lit(j)dj (1.6)
for the middle class and, symmetrically, as F ⌧t = (1 st)W rt Lt/n⌧ s W i,h,rt (j)Lit(j)dj for the
top. st stands for the time-varying wage share of the middle class; it is a wage polarization
shock generating wage dispersion between the top and the middle class. For st = nµ, the
scheme boils down to an equitable wage distribution. bst ⌘ ln(st/s¯) follows an AR(1) process
with associated parameters {⇢s,  s} and steady state s¯.
Along the lines of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), middle-class borrowers
can default, in which case lenders receive a fraction mt, with steady state m, of the posted
collateral. ln(mt) follows an AR(1) process with parameters {⇢m,  m}. The shares serve as
collateral and have no impact on the production function as in Gelain et al. (2018b, 2018a).
Thus, borrowing Bit/(e
 btRtPt) is up to a period-t limit determined by:
Bit/[e
 btRtPt]  mtEt
⇣
Qt+1⌦
i
t⇧t+1/[e
 btRt]
⌘
(1.7)
Two remarks are in order. First, modeling the polarization shock through (1.6) allows that
shock to enter in the budget constraint that becomes relevant for equilibrium dynamics be-
cause of the financial market imperfection. In contrast, under perfect insurance, shocks in
polarization and the debt limit would play no role, while wealth shocks would lose interpre-
tation. Thus, hurdles in perfect insurance play a catalytic role for distributional shocks to
have an impact. Second, the wage shock does not a↵ect the marginal labor disutility. If it
did, it would appear in the wage Philips curve and be convoluted with wage markup shocks.
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Capital.
As in Chen et al. (2012), a representative capital producer invests It in raw capital, K¯t,
subject to adjustment costs S(It/It 1). It chooses the utilization rate ut that determines
the e↵ective capital, Kt = utK¯t 1, subject to utilization costs that are proportional to the
last period’s raw capital (a(ut)K¯t 1). The rental rate of capital is denoted by Rkt . The firm
maximizes the present discounted value of future dividends,
Et
1X
s=0
[(⌅avgt+sPt)/(⌅
avg
t Pt+s)]
⇥
Rkt+sKt+s   Pt+sa(ut+s)K¯t+s 1   Pt+sIt+s   Zt+sPt+s k
⇤
(1.8)
subject to the law of capital accumulation: K¯t = (1    )K¯t 1 +  it (1  S(It/It 1)) It. The
steady state full utilization is associated with zero cost: a(1) = 0. As in Smets and Wouters
(2007), the properties of the cost functions are defined so that a(1)00/a(1)0 =  /(1    ),
S(e ) = S(e )0 = 0, and S(e )00 ⌘ S > 0.   is the growth rate of aggregates along the
balanced growth path, and Zt = e Zt 1 reflects trend growth.   is the depreciation rate.
Fixed costs ( k) ensure zero steady state dividends.  it is an investment disturbance; ln( 
i
t)
follows an AR(1) process with associated parameters {⇢i,  i}. ⌅avgt+1/⌅avgt stands for the
average discounting between t+ s and t, defined as: ( ⌧ )s[n⌧⌅⌧t+s + n
µ⌅µt+s]/[n
⌧⌅⌧t + n
µ⌅µt ]
7.
Final Good.
A perfectly competitive final good producer purchases and aggregates intermediate goods
Yt(i), 8i 2 [0, 1], to output Yt according to technology Yt = [
R 1
0 Yt(i)
( p,t 1)/ p,tdi] p,t/( p,t 1).
7 This definition simplifies a discount factor that would take into account the time-varying ownership of
firms and severely complicate the equations governing capital and investment and their associated steady
state expressions – the chosen definition keeps them isomorphic to their representative agent analogues.
12
 p,t is the time varying elasticity of substitution across product varieties, with the gross
markup,  p,t/( p,t 1), following an AR(1) process with parameters {⇢p,  p}. The associated
demand for good i and the aggregate price index are
Yt(i) = [Pt(i)/Pt]
  p,tYt and Pt = [s Pt(i)1  p,tdi]1/(1  p,t) (1.9)
Intermediate Good.
Monopolistically competitive intermediate good producers, indexed by “i” and situated in
the unit interval, hire labor Lt(i) from a labor aggregator defined below, and capital Kt(i)
from the capital producing sector while taking as given factor prices (Wt, Rkt ), in order to
produce output Yt(i) according to the production function:
Yt(i) = e
bztKt(i)↵ (ZtLt(i))1 ↵   Zt y (1.10)
bzt is the technology shock following an AR(1) process with associated parameters {⇢z,  z}.
Fixed production costs,  y, guarantee zero steady state profits. Cost minimization yields
the optimal capital-labor ratio, Kt(i)/Lt(i) = [↵/(1  ↵)](Wt/Rkt ), and marginal cost,
MCt = (↵)
 ↵(1  ↵) (1 ↵)(Wt)(1 ↵)(Rkt )↵Z (1 ↵)t e bzt (1.11)
Each firm chooses price P  t (i) with probability ⇣p. In periods in which the price cannot be
optimally chosen, it is updated according to a convex combination of lagged and steady-
state (gross) inflation based on the indexation parameter ◆p. Thus, the period-(t + s) price
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of a firm that last chose its price in period t is given by Pt+s|t(i) = P  t (i)X
p
t,s, where X
p
t,s ⌘Qs
l=1⇧
◆p
t+l 1⇧
1 ◆p for s > 0 and = 1 for s = 0. The firm maximizes the present discounted
value of current and expected future profits subject to output demand (2.2),
Et
+1X
s=0
(⇣p)
s [(⌅avgt+sPt)/(⌅
avg
t Pt+s)]
⇥
Pt+s|t(i) MCt+s
⇤
Yt+s|t(i) (1.12)
Labor Demand.
Individuals of the same labor type j form a union that operates in a monopolistically competi-
tive environment and sets wages in a staggered fashion. The unions sell di↵erentiated labor to
a labor agency that aggregates it according to technology Lt = [
R
Lt(j)( w,t 1)/ w,tdj] w,t/( w,t 1).
 w,t is the time varying elasticity of substitution across labor varieties, with the gross markup,
 w,t/( w,t 1), following an AR(1) process with parameters {⇢w,  w}. The associated demand
for type j and the aggregate wage are
Lt(j) = [Wt(j)/Wt]
  w,tLt and Wt = [s Wt(j)1  w,tdj]1/(1  w,t) (1.13)
The type-j labor union, in turn, takes into account labor demand (2.11) and chooses wage
W  t (j) in a staggered way a` la Calvo-Yun and Erceg et al. (2000), in order to maximize the
present discounted value of expected future wages net of the economy wide average type-j
labor disutility expressed in terms of the final good. Given equation (1.5) and the uniform
distribution of labor types within each household, the latter is given by:
W ht (j) = n
µW µ,h,rt (j) + n
⌧W ⌧,h,rt (j) = ✓Lt(j)
 [nµ/⌅µt + n
⌧/⌅⌧t ] (1.14)
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When wages are not reset, they are updated according to lagged and steady-state price
inflation based on the indexation parameter ◆w: Wt+s|t(j) = W  t (j)X
w
t,s, where X
w
t,s =Qs
l=1(e
 ⇧t+l 1)◆w(e ⇧)1 ◆w for s > 0 and = 1 for s = 0. The objective function of a union is:
Et
+1X
s=0
(⇣w)
s [(⌅avgt+sPt)/(⌅
avg
t Pt+s)]
⇥
Wt+s|t(j) W ht+s(j)Pt+s
⇤
Lt+s(j) (1.15)
Policy.
Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing:
Rt/R = (Rt 1/R)
⇢r [(⇧t/⇧)
 ⇡(Yt/Y
f
t )
 y [(Yt/Yt 1)/(Y
f
t /Y
f
t 1)]
  y ]1 ⇢re 
mp
t (1.16)
 mpt ⇠ N(0,  2mp) is a white noise disturbance. Y ft denotes output under flexible prices and
wages and perfect insurance. Fiscal policy follows a balanced budget: PtGt = Tt, where
ln(Gt/ZtG) = ⇢gln(Gt 1/Zt 1G) + ⇢gz✏zt + ✏
g
t , with ✏
g
t ⇠ N(0,  2g). To avoid additional
complications, the tax burden is equally distributed across households: T it = T
µ
t = T
⌧
t = Tt
8.
Aggregation.
Consumption is the weighted sum of family-specific consumption profiles: Ct = n⌧C⌧t +n
µCµt .
After using (2.3) and the capital-labor ratio, the aggregate production function reads as:
Yt = ebztK↵t (ZtLt)1 ↵   Zt y. Market clearing dictates n⌧B⌧t = nµBµt in the debt market,
and n⌧⌦⌧t + n
µ⌦µt = ⌦t ⌘ 1 in the market for shares – the sum of shares is normalized
to unity. Profits in the intermediate good sector are: ⇧intt ⌘ Yt   W rt Lt   Rk,rt Kt. The
8 In the canonical model, the way in which government spending is financed, be it taxation or one-period
bonds, is irrelevant in the log-linearized equilibrium. With heterogeneous households and financial frictions,
this no longer is the case. Justiniano et al. (2015) consider some degree of heterogeneous taxation.
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dividends from capital production are given by Divt ⌘ Rk,rt Kt   a(ut)K¯t 1   It   Zt k.
Thus, the economy wide profits distributed to households according to their shares are:
Vt = ⇧intt + Divt. Combining the household (2.14) and government budget constraints,
financial market clearing, and profits, yields the resource constraint
Ct + It +Gt + ACt +  kZt = Yt (1.17)
featuring adjustment costs: ACt = a(ut)K¯t 1+Qt[nµ⌦
µ
t 1S!(⌦
µ
t /⌦
µ
t 1)+n
⌧⌦⌧t 1S!(⌦
⌧
t /⌦
⌧
t 1)].
Equilibrium.
The stationary model, the steady state, and the log-linearized equilibrium are reported in
Appendix. The steady state of aggregate variables is the same as that of the representative
agent economy. The interest rate is given by R = ⇧e / ⌧ . Moreover, the steady state
features heterogeneous consumption, debt, and shares, as well as a binding constraint (1.7)
since  ⌧ >  µ. I examine equilibria in which the constraint binds.
The model features 10 structural shocks. The 7 aggregate shocks are those considered in
the representative agent model [Smets and Wouters, 2007]: risk premium, technology, wage
and price markups, government spending, investment, and monetary policy shocks. To the
above set of shocks, wage polarization, wealth, and credit supply shocks are added.
1.2 Estimation
I conduct mixed-frequency estimation over quarterly and annual data series starting in
1954Q3 and stoping in 2009Q4 to avoid getting further into the zero lower bound period.
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I discuss below the data, the measurement equations, and how I apply the state space ap-
proach of Chan and Jeliazkov (2009), along the lines of Charalampidis (2018), that leads to
computational gains by exploiting the sparse and block-banded nature of precision matrices.
1.2.1 Data And Observation Equations.
t = {1, 2, . . . , nq} 7! {1964Q1, . . . , 2007Q4} and T = {1, 2, . . . , nT} 7! {1964, . . . , 2007}
denote the quarterly and annual time spans of the sample, respectively. Ten (oq) quarterly
series are used. Per capita real growth of output, consumption, and investment, along
with labor hours, the Federal Funds Rate, the GDP deflator, and the growth rate of the
compensation index are obtained from the sources described in Smets and Wouters (2007)9.
Two quarterly measures of real per capita household debt, loaded with measurement error,
aim to discipline the evolution of debt. Home mortgages (HMt) and consumer credit debt
(CCt) are obtained from Fred. The second series is loaded with a factor  b. The observation
equations are reported below, where dlnXt ⌘ 100(lnXt   lnXt 1).
264dlnHMt
dlnCCt
375 =
264100 hm
100 cc
375+
264 1
 b
375bbµt  bbµt 1 +
264✏hmt
✏cct
375 ,
264✏hmt
✏cct
375 ⇠ N
0B@
2640
0
375 ,
264µ2hm
µ2cc
375
1CA
(1.18)
Debt detrending is data driven and captures the fact that the sample average growth rates
of home mortgage and consumer credit debt (1% and 0.7%, respectively) are well above the
growth rate of output (measured at 0.4% within the sample)10.
9The observation equations for that block of observables are similar to those in Smets and Wouters (2007),
with the inclusion of measurement error, ✏jt ⇠ N(0, µ2j ), for each generic j series being the di↵erence.
10Imposing the balanced growth path trend on debt series would yield persistent and volatile measurement
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Moreover, I introduce observables for the annual top 10% income and wealth shares obtained
from the World Inequality Database and the work of Piketty and Saez (2003) and Saez and
Zucman (2016). Table (1.1) gives inklings of the correlation of income and wealth inequality
with macroeconomic and debt series. Income inequality is strongly pro-cyclical, whereas
wealth inequality exhibits a small degree of counter-cyclicality. Moreover, the correlation of
both income and wealth inequality with output are stronger in the post-84 period than in
the pre-84 period. Furthermore, income inequality is positively correlated with the multiple
measures of household debt. Although wealth inequality does not commove with debt across
the entire sample, it is actually positively correlated with debt in the years before 1984 but
becomes negatively correlated after 1984.
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics, Correlations
TIS TWS Y ⇡ HM CC
1954-2009 TIS 1.64 0.30 0.49 -0.16 0.34 0.32
TWS 0.30 1.63 -0.07 -0.33 0.02 -0.07
1954-1983 TIS 1.50 0.32 0.43 -0.19 0.37 0.43
TWS 0.32 1.90 -0.01 -0.27 0.21 0.08
1984-2009 TIS 1.69 0.15 0.68 0.37 0.23 0.19
TWS 0.15 1.14 -0.22 -0.21 -0.56 -0.47
Notes: Growth rates, annual frequency. Mnemonics: TIS: Top 10% Income Share, TWS: Top 10%
Wealth Share, Y : Real GDP per capita, ⇡: inflation, HM : Real Home Mortgage Debt per capita, CC:
Real Consumer Credit Debt per capita. Data sources: FRED Economic Data, World Inequality Database.
The model-implied pre-tax top income share that is consistent with the observed series
(TIST ) encompasses wages, profits (entrepreneurial income), and interest (capital income)
over aggregate pre-tax income, and is pinned down by:
TIST =
3X
j=0
 
n⌧Y ⌧t j
 
/
3X
j=0
 
n⌧Y ⌧t j + n
µY µt j
 
⇡ tis+
3X
j=0
(⌫j ·ctist j) + (1 · tis · t) + ✏tisT (1.19)
errors in (1.18); see earlier versions of this paper.
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where ctist = ctiseat + ctisbt + ctisprt . The approximation (1.19) is obtained in equilibrium, after
converting the ratio in terms of stationary variables, and taking a Taylor expansion (Appx.
A.4). The steady state top income share is given by tis = (1   s) + tisb: 1   s is the top
10% wage share, and tisb ⌘ n⌧b⌧ (R   e ⇧)/(e ⇧wrLR) stands for bond income flowing to
the top. Steady state profits are zero. ctist stands for the cyclical component of the top
income share; its weight is given by ⌫j ⌘ e(3 j) /[e3  + e2  + e1  + 1]. Measurement error,
✏tisT ⇠ N(0, µ2tis), is included. tis · t approximates higher-order terms in the expansion, and
aims at capturing the non-stationary evolution of TIST after the mid-80s; consequently, the
indicator function, 1, is non-zero only during that period. {ctiseat ,ctisbt ,ctisprt } drive the swings
of the top income share; they stand for earnings, bond income, and profits, respectively.
They are given by:
Table 1.2: Cyclical Swings, Top Income Share
earnings channel ctiseat =  s¯ · bst   ( bwrt + bLt) tisb
(1.20)
bond income channel ctisbt = (bb⌧t 1   b⇡t) [n⌧b⌧/(e ⇧wrL)]
  (bb⌧t   brt   b bt ) [n⌧b⌧/(wrLR)]
(1.21)
profits channel ctisprt = bvt[(y/wrL) (n⌧!⌧   tis)] (1.22)
According to (1.20–1.22), the top income share falls below its steady state if there is an
increase in the wage share of the bottom (bst), the average wage, employment, or inflation.
In contrast, increases in the bottom borrowing and in profits (bvt) boost capital income flowing
to the top and, in turn, the top income share.
The model-implied top wealth share that is consistent with the observed series (TWST ) is
given by the sum of shares and assets over the value of all shares (n⌧⌦⌧tQt + n
µ⌦µtQt = Qt)
since family debt positions net out to zero:
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TWST =
3X
j=0
n⌧
"
Qt j⌦⌧t j +
B⌧t j/Pt j
e 
b
t jRt j
#
/
3X
j=0
Qt j
⇡ tws+
3X
j=0
(⌫j ·dtwstwst j) + (tws · t) + ✏twsT (1.23)
where dtwstwst = dtws!t +dtwsbt +dtwsqt . The approximation (1.23) is obtained after converting
the ratio in terms of stationary variables, and taking a Taylor expansion. (Appx. A.4). The
steady state top wealth share is given by tws = n⌧!⌧+twsb: n⌧!⌧ is the top profit share, and
twsb ⌘ n⌧b⌧/(Rq) is the top’s outstanding assets to the value of shares in terms of the final
good. dtwstwst j stands for the cyclical component of the top wealth share. Measurement error,
✏twsT ⇠ N(0, µ2tws), is included. tws · t approximates higher-order terms in the expansion,
and aims at capturing the fact that TWST exhibits a small positive sample growth rate.
The terms {dtws!t ,dtwsbt ,dtwsqt} drive the fluctuations of the top wealth share; they stand for
shares, bonds, and asset price gains/losses, respectively. They are given by:
Table 1.3: Cyclical Swings, Top Wealth Share
real assets (shares) channel dtws!t = b!⌧t (n⌧!⌧ )
(1.24)
bonds channel dtwsbt = (bb⌧t   brt   b bt ) twsb (1.25)
asset price gains/losses channel dtwsqt =  bqt twsb (1.26)
According to (1.24–1.26), the top wealth share overshoots its steady state when the profit
shares or the intra-household assets of the top increase. It undershoots it, however, when
the interest rate, or the risk premium shock, or the asset price (bqt) increase since all those
changes decrease the contribution of outstanding bonds to the top wealth share.
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Few assumptions underlie equations (1.18, 1.19, 1.23). (1.18) implies that the observed debt
pertains to the bottom 90% of the income distribution11. This mapping is supported by
data from the Survey of Consumer Finance [Ravenna and Vincent, 2014], while including
multiple debt indicators with measurement error helps extract their part that is relevant
for the model. In addition, measurement error in both top shares (1.19 and 1.23) mitigates
potential inconsistencies from assuming that the top of the income and wealth distributions
coincide. Consistently with the model’s foundations, there is no feedback from inequality to
the growth rate along the balanced growth path that is determined by technology.
1.2.2 State Space And Likelihood.
I stack the measurement equations for aggregates series and (1.18) vertically to obtain:
⌥t =  q +H0⇣t +H1⇣t 1 +Mt , Mt ⇠ N(0,⌃q) (1.27)
where ⌥t and  q are (oq ⇥ 1) vectors of quarterly observed series and intercepts, respec-
tively. Mt collects the associated measurement errors. ⌃q is the diagonal covariance matrix.
{H0, H1} denote the (oq ⇥ n⇣) selection matrices and include the slope coe cients. ⇣t is the
period-t (n⇣ ⇥ 1) state vector. Stacking (1.19) and (1.23) vertically yields:
⌥T =  a +H30⇣t +H31⇣t 1 +H32⇣t 2 +H33⇣t 3 +H34⇣t 4 +MT , MT ⇠ N(0,⌃a)
(1.28)
where ⌥T ⌘ [TIST , TWST ]0 and  a are (oa ⇥ 1) vectors (oa = 2) of annually observed
11 Kumhof et al. (2015) and Cairo´ and Sim (2018) map debt to the bottom 95%.
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series and intercepts, respectively. MT ⌘ [✏tisT , ✏twsT ]0 collects the measurement errors; ⌃a is
the associated diagonal covariance matrix. {H30, H31, H32, H33, H34} denote the (oa ⇥ n⇣)
selection matrices that include the slope coe cients of (1.19) and (1.23).
Eq.(2.18) appears for four consecutive quarters until the end of a year when the inequality
series are observed and linked to the model via (1.28). Stacking over time yields:
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The matrix representation of (2.19) is given by
⌥ =  +H⇣ +M , M ⇠ N (0o,⌃M ⌘ InT ⌦ diag (diag[I4 ⌦ ⌃q]; diag[⌃a])) (1.30)
where o = [(4oq+oa)nT ]⇥1. ⌥ ⌘ [⌥0t=1,⌥0t=2,⌥0t=3,⌥0t=4,⌥0T=1, . . .]0 is the observation vector.
  ⌘ [ 0q, 0q, 0q, 0q, 0a, . . .]0 is a vector of intercepts. ⇣ ⌘ [⇣ 01, ⇣ 02, ⇣ 03, ⇣ 04, . . .]0 is the (n⇣nq) ⇥ 1
state vector. M ⌘ [M 0t=1,M 0t=2,M 0t=3,M 0t=4,M 0T=1, . . .]0 collects the measurement errors. H
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is a sparse and block-banded matrix. According to (3.31), the likelihood of the data given
the parameter vector ⇥ and the states ⇣ is P (⌥  |⇥, ⇣), where (⌥  )|⇥, ⇣ ⇠ N(H⇣,⌃M).
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are casted in the form:  0(⇥)⇣t =  1(⇥)⇣t 1 +
 (⇥)✏t + ⇧⌘t, where the system matrices { 0, 1, } are functions of the parameter vector
⇥, and ⌘t collects the expectational errors. The structural shocks are grouped in the (n✏⇥1)
vector ✏t, and are fewer than the number of observables (n✏ < oq + oa). (3.26) gives the
VAR(1) representation of the rational expectations solution of Sims (2002).
⇣t =  1(⇥)⇣t 1 +  2(⇥)✏t , ✏t ⇠ N(0n✏ , In✏), 8t   2 (1.31)
{ 1, 2} are non-linear functions of ⇥. ⇣1 is initialized with covariance D being the steady
state covariance of the state vector evaluated at the prior mean of ⇥. Defining the reduced-
form errors, ✏˜t =  2✏t for t > 1 and ✏˜1 = ✏1, and stacking (3.26) across time yields:
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where ⌦ ⌘  2 02. In matrix notation, the above equation reads as
Z⇣ = ✏˜ , ✏˜ ⇠ N(0n⇣nq , K 1✏˜ ) (1.33)
✏˜ ⌘ [✏˜01, ✏˜02 . . . , ✏˜0T ]0 is the (n⇣nq) ⇥ 1 vector of errors, and K✏˜ is its sparse and block-banded
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precision. A change of variable transformation yields the prior state distribution, P (⇣|⇥),
with ⇣|⇥ ⇠ N(⇣˜, K 1) and ⇣˜ = 0n⇣nq . The precision K = Z 0K✏˜Z is sparse and block-banded
[Chan and Jeliazkov, 2009]. Bayes rule, P (⇣|⌥,⇥) / P (⌥|⇥, ⇣)P (⇣|⇥), yields the block-
banded posterior precision: P = K + H 0⌃ 1M H. The posterior mean state (b⇣) is computed
from (3.32) below based on the e cient simulation of Chan and Jeliazkov (2009).
P b⇣ = K ⇣˜ +H 0⌃ 1M (⌥   ) (1.34)
The integrated log-likelihood (given the parameters but marginally of the states) is evaluated
at a high density point along the lines of Chib (1995) and, in particular, at the posterior
mean of the hidden states: logP (⌥|⇥) = +logP (⌥|⇥, b⇣) + logP (b⇣|⇥)  logP (b⇣|⌥,⇥).
1.2.3 Priors.
The Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to simulate draws from the non-
tractable posterior. The RA version is obtained for n⌧ = 1 and  ⌧ = 0. The priors for
the parameters appearing in both the present and the RA models are conventional12 and
reported in Table (D.1). Additionally, the fraction of top agents (n⌧ ) is 10% in accordance
with the observed series.  ⌧ is set to 0.99, and  µ is fixed at 0.985 as in Gelain et al.
(2018b). The loan-to-value ratio (m) is fixed at 0.55 as in Iacoviello (2005). The top wage
share, 1  s¯, is calibrated at 0.32 – a value a tad below the sample average top income share
(0.35) before the mid-80s since wages are less unequally distributed than overall income that
includes capital income. The strength of preferences over wealth for the top ( ⌧ ) is sampled
from Beta centered at 0.1 (0.03 standard deviation, “std”) often considered in the literature.
12 The std of all measurement errors is drawn from the Inverse Gamma centered at 0.15 (1 std) for the
debt series and at 0.01 (0.001 std) for series matched to a single observable – these estimates are shown in
the Appendix.   and g are set to the values chosen in Smets and Wouters (2007).
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 µ is drawn from Beta too with a tad higher mean (0.15) that attenuates inequality in the
distribution of shares which, when combined with the bonds-to-income ratio (influenced by
m), yields a prior top wealth share of about 0.67 that is aligned with the data. The prior
std for wage, wealth, and credit shocks is aligned with that of all other shocks; their prior
persistence is a tad higher (0.7) though. Portfolio adjustment costs (S!) are small (0.1).
1.3 Findings
The parameter estimates are presented first. The economy wide e↵ects of cyclical changes
in inequality and the interplay between inequality and monetary policy are then assessed.
The subsequent section delves into the distributional implications of aggregate shocks. A
battery of robustness checks closes the analysis.
1.3.1 Posterior Estimates.
The parameter estimates across the RA and the present model are displayed in Table (D.1).
Zooming in on the parameters associated with the economy’s aggregate dimension, habit (⌘)
falls considerably from 0.77 in the RA model to 0.51. The inverse Frisch elasticity ( ) is a tad
higher in the present model than in the RA model. Both price (◆p) and wage (◆w) indexation
are a tad elevated compared to their RA estimates, whereas price (⇣p) and wage (⇣w) stickiness
are a tad dampened down. Wage markup shocks become more volatile and persistent, and
price markup shocks gain volatility but lose persistence. Risk premium shocks obtain a
stronger low-frequency impact compared to the RA model (their persistence rises from 0.80
to 0.91, and their volatility falls from 0.12 to 0.1). In the investment side, investment shocks
obtain a more profound impact (⇢i rises from 0.85 to 0.99, and  i increases from 0.30 to 0.53).
The latter along with the increased elasticity of utilization costs ( ) compared to the RA
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model compensate for lower investment adjustment costs (S) in the former (2.48) compared
to the latter (6.74). The policy reaction coe cient to inflation ( ⇡) rises from 1.88 in the RA
model to 2.17 in the present model. Overall, the small di↵erences in the parameter estimates
across the two configurations imply a dichotomy in identification: parameters associated with
the economy’s aggregate dimension are mainly identified by aggregate data included in the
estimation of both models rather than by the inclusion of inequality and debt series.
As for the parameters associated with the distributional dimension of the model, the strength
of preferences over wealth ( µ, ⌧ ) is heterogeneous across households, 0.37 for the middle
class and 0.15 for the top, and implies that the homogeneity often postulated in models
might be restrictive13. Polarization, wealth, and credit shocks are all persistent. Credit and
wage shocks are more volatile than wealth shocks. The debt series are loaded with volatile
measurement errors suggesting that the model picks a slow-evolving component from them.
Home mortgage debt is favored over consumer credit debt ( d = 0.77). The trends in debt
and the top shares are situated around their data averages. This set of parameters jointly
with a subset of aggregate parameters yield tight posteriors for the top income (37%) and
wealth (68%) shares around their sample averages (38% and 67%). Inequality and debt data
are, hence, informative for this set of parameters.
1.3.2 Economy Wide Implications of Inequality.
Economy Wide E↵ect.
I quantify the autonomous e↵ect of distributional shocks on the U.S. business cycle in Table
(1.5) which displays the forecast error variance decomposition of several variables two/ten
years ahead. The combined e↵ect of wage, wealth, and credit shocks explains less than
10% of output fluctuations at any horizon. More precisely, wage polarization shocks have
13Justiniano et al. (2015) consider such heterogeneous parameters in their robustness checks.
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Table 1.4: Posterior Distribution
Prior Posterior Mean [5-95%] Prior Posterior
Rep. Agent D. Imbalances D. Imbalances
↵ N(0.30, 0.05) 0.21 [0.19, 0.24] 0.25 [0.23, 0.27]  µ B(0.15, 0.03) 0.37 [0.32, 0.42]
⌘ B(0.70, 0.10) 0.77 [0.71, 0.82] 0.51 [0.46, 0.55]  ⌧ B(0.10, 0.03) 0.15 [0.13, 0.17]
  N(2.00, 1.00) 4.14 [2.94, 5.39] 5.14 [4.01, 6.35] ⇢s B(0.70, 0.20) 0.99 [0.99, 0.99]
 B(0.50, 0.10) 0.37 [0.24, 0.56] 0.59 [0.47, 0.72]  s IG(0.15, 1.00) 2.77 [2.16, 3.49]
S N(4.00, 1.00) 6.74 [5.45, 8.01] 2.48 [1.92, 3.13] ⇢! B(0.70, 0.20) 1.00 [0.99, 1.00]
⇣w B(0.60, 0.10) 0.90 [0.84, 0.95] 0.77 [0.73, 0.80]  ! IG(0.15, 1.00) 0.27 [0.21, 0.38]
⇣p B(0.60, 0.10) 0.91 [0.87, 0.94] 0.90 [0.87, 0.92] ⇢m B(0.70, 0.20) 0.99 [0.99, 1.00]
◆p B(0.50, 0.15) 0.07 [0.03, 0.12] 0.09 [0.04, 0.16]  m IG(0.15, 1.00) 1.55 [1.38, 1.72]
◆w B(0.50, 0.15) 0.75 [0.61, 0.87] 0.80 [0.67, 0.91]  d N(1.00, 0.50) 0.77 [0.63, 0.90]
⇢r B(0.75, 0.10) 0.90 [0.88, 0.92] 0.85 [0.83, 0.87] µhm IG(0.15, 1.00) 0.70 [0.49, 0.88]
 ⇡ N(1.70, 0.25) 1.88 [1.55, 2.22] 2.17 [1.89, 2.46] µcc IG(0.15, 1.00) 1.12 [0.99, 1.24]
 y N(0.12, 0.05) 0.20 [0.13, 0.26] 0.17 [0.12, 0.23]  hm N(1.00, 0.04) 1.01 [0.95, 1.07]
  y N(0.12, 0.05) 0.23 [0.14, 0.31] 0.33 [0.25, 0.41]  cc N(0.70, 0.04) 0.70 [0.64, 0.76]
⇢b B(0.60, 0.20) 0.80 [0.71, 0.88] 0.91 [0.88, 0.93] tis N(0.32, 0.03) 0.30 [0.24, 0.35]
 b IG(0.15, 1.00) 0.12 [0.09, 0.15] 0.10 [0.08, 0.12] tws N(0.00, 0.03) 0.03 [-0.02, 0.07]
⇢z B(0.60, 0.20) 0.99 [0.98, 0.99] 0.96 [0.94, 0.97] (, ) [, ]
 z IG(0.15, 1.00) 0.55 [0.51, 0.60] 0.57 [0.52, 0.61] (, ) [, ]
⇢i B(0.60, 0.20) 0.85 [0.75, 0.98] 0.99 [0.99, 1.00] (, ) [, ]
 i IG(0.15, 1.00) 0.30 [0.25, 0.36] 0.53 [0.44, 0.64] (, ) [, ]
⇢p B(0.60, 0.20) 0.81 [0.74, 0.87] 0.71 [0.65, 0.78] (, ) [, ]
 p IG(0.15, 1.00) 0.07 [0.05, 0.08] 0.10 [0.08, 0.11] (, ) [, ]
⇢w B(0.60, 0.20) 0.13 [0.05, 0.22] 0.25 [0.14, 0.38] (, ) [, ]
 w IG(0.15, 1.00) 0.60 [0.54, 0.67] 0.63 [0.54, 0.72] (, ) [, ]
 mp IG(0.15, 1.00) 0.24 [0.22, 0.26] 0.26 [0.23, 0.28] (, ) [, ]
⇢g B(0.60, 0.20) 0.97 [0.95, 0.99] 0.94 [0.91, 0.96] (, ) [, ]
 g IG(0.15, 1.00) 0.46 [0.42, 0.50] 0.45 [0.41, 0.49] (, ) [, ]
⇢gz B(0.50, 0.20) 0.32 [0.26, 0.38] 0.34 [0.29, 0.40] (, ) [, ]
  N(0.40, 0.03) 0.39 [0.35, 0.43] 0.41 [0.38, 0.44] (, ) [, ]
⇡ N(0.80, 0.03) 0.83 [0.78, 0.87] 0.88 [0.83, 0.93] (, ) [, ]
 w N(0.50, 0.03) 0.50 [0.45, 0.54] 0.50 [0.45, 0.55] (, ) [, ]
 p N(0.30, 0.03) 0.34 [0.29, 0.38] 0.27 [0.22, 0.31] (, ) [, ]
l¯ N(0.00, 0.10) 0.03 [-0.12, 0.20] 0.17 [0.03, 0.31] (, ) [, ]
logL -1433 -2764
Notes: Author’s computations. “Rep. Agent ” refers to the Smets and Wouters (2007) model estimated
over the 1954Q3-2009Q4 period.
a small impact (3/2%) on output cycles. Wealth shocks explain 4/2% of output cycles.
That influence is aligned with the findings of Iacoviello and Neri (2010), according to which
a similar shock a↵ecting the preferences over housing exerts about the same influence on
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output. Credit supply shocks, too, explain a small fraction (3/2%) of output cycles. The
limited macroeconomic impact of credit shocks, is consistent with the findings of Justiniano
et al. (2015). The small influence of the above triplet of shocks is confirmed in the cases of
inflation and of the interest rate.
Despite its aforementioned limited influence, the above triplet of shocks has a profound
impact on household indebtedness. It explains 75% and 52% of household debt swings at
short and long horizons, respectively. Polarization shocks account for 8% of long-run debt
swings. The influence of wealth shocks on debt (44/27%) is about 1.5 times higher than the
influence of credit supply shocks on debt (30/17%) at any horizon. The sizable influence
of the above shocks on household debt empirically corroborates the dynamics described in
Kumhof et al. (2015) and Stiglitz (2014), according to which households outside of the top
leverage their portfolios in response to swings in inequality.
Table 1.5: Business Cycles and Distributional Shocks
variable
shock byt b⇡t brt bb⌧t ctist dtwst bc⌧t bcµt
wage polariz. 3/2 0/1 2/5 1/8 99/100 13/61 91/95 69/85
wealth pref. 4/2 1/1 5/5 44/27 0/0 40/9 2/1 3/1
credit supply 3/2 0/1 3/3 30/17 0/0 8/20 1/0 2/0
distributional 10/6 1/3 11/13 75/52 100/100 61/90 93/96 74/86
technology 32/28 1/2 0/0 15/7 0/0 16/3 0/1 6/3
price markup 10/5 68/60 16/8 2/1 0/0 6/1 0/0 1/0
wage markup 2/2 8/8 1/1 5/1 0/0 6/1 0/0 1/0
supply side 44/35 77/70 18/9 22/9 0/0 28/5 1/1 9/4
risk premium 28/14 12/13 49/46 1/2 0/0 5/2 0/0 9/3
investment 5/39 7/12 6/24 1/35 0/0 2/1 6/3 1/6
gov. spending 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/1 0/0 2/1
mon. policy 13/6 2/2 16/8 1/1 0/0 4/2 0/0 5/1
demand side 46/59 22/27 72/78 3/39 0/0 11/5 6/3 17/11
Notes: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 8/40 quarters ahead, computed at the posterior mean.
Mnemonics: {byt, b⇡t, brt,bb⌧t ,ctist,dtwst,bc⌧t ,bcµt } stand for output, inflation, the interest rate, lending/borrowing,
top income share, top wealth share, top and middle-class consumption (% deviation from steady state).
It is worthwhile to elaborate on the labeling of polarization, wealth, and credit shocks as
28
“distributional” shocks. Polarization shocks account for the entire cyclical fluctuations of
income inequality and have a sizable impact on wealth (13/61%) and consumption inequality
as well (91/95% and 69/85% of the cycles in the consumption of the top and the middle
class, respectively). Wealth shocks, too, have a sizable influence on the fluctuations of wealth
inequality (40/9%). Credit supply shocks have a sizable impact on middle-class’ indebtedness
and the top wealth share (8%/20%) – they are, thus, viewed as a distributional disturbance
in this paper. Altogether, the findings suggest that a moderate fraction of wealth inequality
(39%/10%) is accounted for by aggregate shocks, and that the fluctuations in polarization,
wealth, and credit shocks capture cyclical swings in income and wealth inequality as well as
in debt. Their economy wide e↵ect, therefore, reflects the e↵ect of changes in inequality.
Di↵usion.
Figures (1.1) and (1.2) display the e↵ect of shocks in wages, wealth, and credit on economic
aggregates and on the top income and wealth deciles, respectively. They suggest that dis-
tributional shocks operate through an aggregate demand channel. The latter hinges on the
heterogeneous consumption responses across the population, reflecting the heterogeneity in
marginal propensities to consume. Moreover, the e↵ect on the evolution of inequality and
debt is highly persistent compared to the e↵ect on aggregate variables, and mirrors the
low-frequency shifts in the observed debt and inequality series.
In response to wage polarization, top consumption rises whereas middle-class consumption
falls. The two changes do net out to zero, and result in a gradual economy wide consumption
increase – an aggregate demand stimulus – that eventually raises production, employment,
and wages, and generates pro-cyclical, albeit small in magnitude, inflation and interest rate
responses. Therefore, the adjustment is stronger in quantities than in prices. The positive
output elasticity mirrors the observed pro-cyclicality of the top income share (0.49 in Table
1.1). The workings of a demand channel are corroborated by the fact that the output and
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consumption increases are about coequal on impact.
In addition, wage polarization leads to pro-cyclical responses in both income and wealth
inequality. More specifically, it results in a higher share of earnings flowing to the top
(tisea). The top families leverage their income to increase consumption (c⌧ ) and raise their
shares (tws!). Interest payments from bond holdings (tisb) boost income inequality (tis)
further. Due to the increased demand for ownership shares, their price goes up and negatively
feedbacks to the top wealth share (twsq) since part of the assets of the top is in terms of
bonds. It is worth pointing out that the collateral channel amplifies the e↵ect of these
shocks: although middle-class households are borrow after the shock, the combination of a
fixed supply of shares and of an increasing fraction of them going to the top (tws! rises) leaves
middle-class households with less collaterals to post. As a result, the middle class borrows
(twsb falls) and consumes less. Thus, access to credit is harder when income inequality rises.
The e↵ects of changes in the desire for wealth accumulation and in the borrowing capacity
of the middle class are similar [Fig.1.2]. Both shocks trigger positive output and aggregate
demand elasticities because they lead to an expansion fueled by the consumption expansion
of the middle class. The consumption of top households exhibits a small drop. Inflation, the
interest rate, and the real wage all follow a small pro-cyclical response.
Both credit and wealth shocks quickly elevate income inequality; tisb falls on impact and
immediately rises (the reduction stems from the fact that, on impact, lending rises but
payments start in the second period). Over time, the economic expansion leads to profits for
the top (tispr) that shape the increase in income inequality (tis) since the response of the
earnings channel (tisea) is negligible. Both shocks lead to an expansion in the bonds held
by the top (twsb): middle-class families borrow in order to increase their ownership shares
(tws! decreases). The high demand for shares raises their price which, in turn, negatively
a↵ects the top wealth share (twsq). It is worth pointing out that despite the fact that both
wealth and credit shocks lead to changes of the same sign, the former shocks drive down
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Figure 1.1: Economy Wide Implications of Wage Polarization Shocks
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Notes: impulse response functions, % deviation from steady state. 3rd row:: top income share (tis): earnings
(tisea), bond income (tisb), and profits (tispr) channels, with tis = tisea+ tisb+ tispr. 4th row:: top wealth
share (tws): shares (tws!), bonds (twsb), and asset price (twsq) channels, with tws = tws! + twsb + twsq.
wealth inequality whereas the latter raise it. This di↵erence happens because credit shocks
do not generate an increase in the asset price (reflected in twsq) as large as that observed
after wealth shocks. Thus, wealth shocks lead to a negative correlation between debt and
wealth inequality, whereas credit shocks to a positive correlation.
Debt Pileup and Output Cycles.
Although the findings of Table (1.5) suggest that distributional shocks explain about 50-70%
of household debt fluctuations, they remain silent about the influence of those shocks during
the debt buildup of the decades prior to the Great Recession. In other words, is the historical
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Figure 1.2: Economy Wide Implications of Wealth and Credit Shocks
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Notes: impulse response functions, % deviation from steady state. 3rd row:: top income share (tis): earnings
(tisea), bond income (tisb), and profits (tispr) channels, with tis = tisea+ tisb+ tispr. 4th row:: top wealth
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e↵ect of distributional shocks on debt and output growth time-varying over the 1954-2009
period? Fig.(1.3) tackles this question.
The top panel displays the structural forces behind the average debt growth during 1954-
1982 and 1983-2009. It demonstrates that there is a debt buildup over the business cycle:
debt growth is larger during the 1983-2009 period (0.3) than during the 1954-1982 period
(-0.2). Both credit and supply shocks contribute to the debt buildup. The contribution of
credit shocks, in particular, is sizable. Their e↵ect accounts for about half of the average
debt growth. This evidence, hence, casts support on Mian and Sufi (2018), and citations
therein, who argue that the U.S. credit expansion was one of the main factors behind the
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phenomenon of debt buildup, but goes goes against Justiniano et al. (2015) who find that a
taste shock for housing (the analogous of the present wealth shock but di↵erently identified)
accounts for the observed leveraging, despite the fact that the present limited influence of
credit shocks on output cycles is compatible with Justiniano et al. (2015) according to whom
credit shocks do not su ce to account for the severity of the Great Recession and have limited
economic influence. What is, though, behind that di↵erence?
Two factors explain that di↵erence: (i) the weakening of the collateral channel due to rising
income inequality, and (ii) the negative correlation of wealth inequality and debt in response
to wealth shocks. The cyclical rise of income inequality after the 1980s (see Appx.) is
reflected in wage polarization shocks. The latter trigger an increase in the ownership of
shares of top households as shown in Fig.(1.1). As a result, middle-class families have fewer
shares available to use as collateral and, thus, borrow less. Rising income inequality, hence,
cannot trigger an increase in borrowing. A downward influence on debt accumulation is also
triggered by wealth shocks after the 1980s. Negative wealth shocks explain a large part of
the cyclical rise in wealth inequality during that period (see Appx.), and trigger a decrease in
household debt according to the negative correlation shown in Fig.(1.2). Therefore, against
both polarization and wealth shocks pushing towards a reduction in borrowing, credit supply
shocks obtain an influential role in explaining the observed increase in debt.
The bottom panel of Fig.(1.3) corroborates that distributional shocks have limited impact
on output cycles. Wealth shocks are more influential during the cycles before the 1980s
than after that period. Polarization shocks exert a small influence throughout time. Credit
relaxation consistently boosts output growth during the cycles from 1982 to 2009.
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Figure 1.3: Debt Pileup and Output Cycles
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Notes: Historical decomposition. Real per capita growth rates. Top Panel: Quarterly average debt.
Bottom Panel: cumulative output. Figures shown on top of each column. Demand shocks: risk premium,
investment, monetary, and government spending. Supply shocks: technology, price and wage markup.
Endogenous and Exogenous Imbalances.
This section disentangles the influence of exogenous distributional imbalances (distributional
shocks) from the influence of mechanisms (heterogeneous  ’s and imperfect insurance) that
endogenously generate distributional imbalances. Table (1.6) reports the properties of ag-
gregate demand across various alternative scenarios pertaining to imbalances. Removing the
impact of distributional shocks while keeping in the model the mechanisms of endogenous
imbalances, results in an aggregate demand that is more volatile than (0.85 vs 0.74), less
persistent than (-0.07 vs 0.26), and considerably di↵erent from (0.19) the observed series of
aggregate demand. Therefore, a sizable part of the persistent evolution of aggregate demand
and, thereby, of the economy hinges on distributional shocks which, in turn, account for a
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large part of inequality and debt. Put di↵erently, a large part of the economy’s persistence
is attributed to the low-frequency dynamics of inequality and debt. This result is mirrored
in the lower habit (⌘) that is obtained in the present model compared to the RA model (0.51
vs 0.77).
Removing distributional shocks and assuming homogeneous preferences over wealth across
households results in an aggregate demand that remains more volatile than (0.81 vs 0.74) and
largely deviates from (0.31) the observed series. Nevertheless, this series is less volatile than
the series with heterogeneous  ’s (0.81 vs 0.85). The heterogeneity in wealth preferences,
therefore, amplifies the heterogeneity in the consumption responses and, thereby, the e↵ect
of aggregate shocks compared to an environment with homogeneous preferences.
As a final step, I impose perfect insurance. The model collapses to the RA specification and,
therein (i.e. with the RA parameter estimates), I consider the propagation of aggregate shocks
extracted from the present model. The fact that the volatility of the resulting aggregate
demand is not dampened down implies that the estimated standard deviation of disturbances
in the RA model is about the same with that in the present model. Nevertheless, the resulting
series is far more persistent (0.59) than the observed and counterfactual series above. The RA
estimation, therefore, yields higher endogenous persistence than the present model reflected
in the deep parameter of habit (see Appx. for a graphical depiction).
The bottom part of Table (1.6) entails another important result. Both exogenous distri-
butional shocks and heterogeneous  ’s have limited direct e↵ects on the volatility and per-
sistence of inflation: after gradually removing them, following the steps described above,
inflation remains close to the data. The reason behind this result is that the inclusion of
inequality and debt entails an indirect implication for inflation, namely the attenuation of
general equilibrium e↵ects on it. This attenuation is reflected on the resulting inflation series
deviating from the observed ones (0.05) when the aggregate shocks from the present model
are fed to the RA model, since the RA parameters of Table (D.1) [low price indexation (0.07
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Table 1.6: Measuring Endogenous and Exogenous Distributional Imbalances
Mean Volatility Persistence Deviation
Aggregate Demand
Observed (minus measur. error) 0.48 0.74 0.26 0.00
No Exogenous Imbalances 0.49 0.85 -0.07 0.19
No Exog. Imbalances &  µ =  ⌧ 0.49 0.81 -0.09 0.31
No Exog. & Endog. Imbalances 0.47 0.85 0.59 0.31
Inflation
Observed (minus measur. error) 0.85 0.58 0.86 0.00
No Exogenous Imbalances 0.84 0.58 0.86 0.00
No Exog. Imbalances &  µ =  ⌧ 0.83 0.58 0.86 0.00
No Exog. & Endog. Imbalances 0.80 0.71 0.91 0.05
Notes: Observed and simulated series. Quarterly % changes in aggregate demand (consumption) and
inflation. “Deviation” refers to the quarterly average squared deviation from the observed series.
vs 0.09) and volatility of price markup shocks (0.07 vs 0.10), as well as high price stickiness
(0.91 vs 0.90) and persistence of price markup shocks (0.81 vs 0.71) – all compared to the
present model] do not dampen the volatile aggregate shocks of the present model.
The Nature of Aggregate Shocks.
Is the transmission of aggregate shocks to economy wide variables in the model with distri-
butional imbalances (DI) di↵erent from that implied by the RA model due to keeping track
of additional facets of the U.S. economy? Table (1.7) reports the five-year cumulative e↵ect
of aggregate shocks in the DI and RA models. Matching inequality and debt alters aspects
of these shocks. Compared to the RA model, technology and price markup shocks in the DI
model obtain a tad less influential role in the fluctuations of all variables. In contrast, wage
markup shocks are more prominent in explaining output and consumption in the DI model
than in the RA model. Risk premium and investment shocks exert a pronounced e↵ect on
the economy when inequality is considered. Interestingly, along with the habit reduction,
the influence of risk premium shocks on consumption declines in the DI model compared to
the RA model. The influence of government spending shocks is more temporary in the DI
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than in the RA economy14.
Table 1.7: Total E↵ect of Aggregate Shocks across Model Specifications
yt ⇡t rt ct
RA DI RA DI RA DI RA DI
technology 16.9 15.7 -0.7 -0.2 -0.7 0.1 12.9 9.6
price markup -6.5 -6.0 1.2 0.7 1.0 0.7 -4.3 -3.4
wage markup -3.0 -4.3 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.3 -3.9 -4.0
premium 8.1 10.5 0.0 0.7 1.4 2.9 8.8 6.1
investment 8.6 10.7 -0.2 0.7 0.4 1.6 0.8 -5.3
spending 2.7 0.5 0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.0 -5.9 -4.1
policy 6.1 6.4 0.1 0.2 -1.1 -0.2 5.8 3.8
Notes: Cumulative % deviation from steady state after twenty quarters. RA:
Representative Agent model. DI: Distributional Imbalances model.
1.3.3 Monetary Policy and Inequality.
I examine three aspects of the monetary policy and inequality nexus: (i) the propagation
of unpredictable changes in the policy instrument to inequality; (ii) the role of the policy
stance against inflation in the transmission of distributional shocks; (iii) the inflation–output
gap variability trade-o↵ from a direct interest rate response to distributional imbalances.
Unpredictable Policy over Half a Century.
Fig.(1.4) pins down the e↵ect of an unexpected expansionary change in the interest rate.
The latter stimulates the consumption of both top and middle-class households. Aggregate
demand shifts outwards and production adjusts to it. Low lending costs favor middle-class
borrowing (twsb) which leads to interest payments to the top (tisb). The latter along with
the unequally disturbed profits (tispr) stemming from the economic expansion lead to a
positive (pro-cyclical) elasticity of income inequality. In contrast, the elasticity of wealth
14In the Appx., I compare the FEVD and IRFs across the DI and RA specifications, and show that
including the top deciles and debt in the estimation has minor implications for the path of the output gap.
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Figure 1.4: Monetary Policy Disturbances
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Notes: impulse response functions (posterior mean). All variables in % deviation from steady state. 1st and
2nd row: aggregate variables. 3rd row:: top income share (tis): earnings (tisea), bond income (tisb), and
profits (tispr) channels, with tis = tisea + tisb + tispr. 4th row:: top wealth share (tws): shares (tws!),
bonds (twsb), and asset price gains/losses (twsq) channels, with tws = tws! + twsb + twsq.
inequality is negative (counter-cyclical) because the middle class uses the borrowed funds to
raise its asset holdings (tws! falls). The latter along with the asset price rise (twsq falls) that
accompanies low interest rates, spur downward pressures to wealth inequality that dominate
top’s increased bond assets.
The present paper allows to quantify the e↵ect of interest rate changes not explained by
fundamentals (i.e. the policy “surprises”) on inequality during the entire 1954-2009 period.
To that end, Fig.(1.5) displays how the U.S. income and wealth inequality would have looked
like, had monetary policy been characterized by zero surprises during the above period.
According to the findings, there are some di↵erences of small magnitude (about 1-3% points)
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Figure 1.5: Monetary Policy Surprises and Inequality Swings
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Notes: Counterfactual top 10% income and wealth shares for zero monetary policy surprises.
between the observed and the counterfactual series. In terms of wealth inequality, between
1955 and 1981 as well as between 2000 and 2009 the initially formed di↵erences between the
actual and the counterfactual series persist and remain rather constant. From the mid-80s
and up to about 2000, the counterfactual series converges to the actual one from above
implying that zero policy surprises are more expansionary than the actual surprises of that
period. In terms of income inequality, the picture is a tad di↵erent: in the absence of policy
surprises the counterfactual income inequality becomes more noisy and volatile than the
actual series is. The counterfactual series fluctuates around the actual series, demonstrating
a sensitivity of the top income share to the policy interest rate.
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Monetary Policy Stance.
I shed light on how the propagation of swings in inequality depends on the monetary pol-
icy stance. According to Fig.(1.6), the policy regime towards inflation ( ⇡) influences the
amplitude of the output elasticity to wage polarization and wealth shocks: the more non-
accommodative the policy, the smaller the output elasticity. The reason behind this result
is that those shocks generate pro-cyclical changes in aggregate demand and, thereby, in
inflation. As a result, monetary policy faces no trade o↵ in stabilizing the economy.
Figure 1.6: Monetary Policy Stance and the Transmission of Distributional Imbalances
5 10 15 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
w
a
ge
 p
ol
ar
iz.
 s
ho
ck
output
ψ
π
=1 ψ
π
=2 ψ
π
=3
5 10 15 20
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
top lending
5 10 15 20
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
top income share
5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
top wealth share
5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
w
e
a
lth
 s
ho
ck
output
5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
top lending
5 10 15 20
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
top income share
5 10 15 20
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
top wealth share
Notes: Transmission of polarization and wealth shocks across di↵erent policy regimes towards inflation.
As described in Fig.(1.1), polarization shocks weaken the collateral channel and force the
middle class to bring down its debt obligations, while inflation and output, driven by the
consumption of the top, increase and result in an interest rate rise. Therefore, the stronger
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the policy reaction to inflation, the higher the interest rate rise and, thereby, the heavier
the debt burden on the middle class and, in turn, the reduction in its debt obligations.
Furthermore, in response to wealth shocks, output, inflation, the interest rate, and debt
rise. A non-accommodative policy curtails the debt expansion through a sharp raise of the
policy rate. Interestingly, the various degrees of the systematic policy reaction to inflation
have limited impact on the trajectory of income and wealth inequality in response to wealth
and polarization shocks. The above evidence entail an additional message. Thanks to the
pro-cyclical inflation response to these two shocks, monetary policy stabilizes the economy
by monitoring aggregates rather than household-specific variables even in the presence of
heterogeneous agents and economic fluctuations that emanate from changes in inequality.
Should Monetary Policy React To Inequality?
Assuming that the volatilities of inflation and of the output gap are the only objectives
of monetary policy, it is important to quantify how their trade-o↵ depends on an interest
rate policy that responds to distributional imbalances not only indirectly, through general
equilibrium e↵ects, but also directly. This section addresses this issue by considering policy
rules in the form of (in log-linear terms):
brt = ⇢rbrt 1 + (1  ⇢r) h ⇡b⇡t +  y(byt   byft ) +   y (byt   byft ) +  jbxjti+ ✏mpt (1.35)
where bxjt is replaced, in turn, with the top income decile (ctist), the top wealth decile (ctist),
and the middle-class–top consumption di↵erential (nµbcµt   n⌧bc⌧t ). The associated reaction
coe cients are given by  j 2 { tis, tws, (cµ c⌧ )}. I set all parameters at their posterior
mean and, in the spirit of Levin et al. (1999) and Iacoviello (2005), search for the { ⇡, j}
values that minimize a welfare loss function of inflation and output gap variabilities across
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di↵erent parameterizations of the relative weight between the two.
Figure 1.7: Policy Frontier
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As displayed in Fig.(1.7), altogether, the alternative rules achieve negligible to no gains in
terms of the inflation–output gap variability trade-o↵, with the gains emanating from an in-
creased sensitivity of the interest rate to fluctuations in aggregate demand capturing changes
in inequality. More specifically, in the case of a policy response to income inequality, the
interest rate responds to the wage polarization shock capturing changes in income inequal-
ity, and the economy shifts in a region of slightly higher inflation and output gap volatilities
compared to the trade-o↵ emanating from the “optimal rule” featuring an optimal inflation
response and no response to inequality15. In the case of a policy response to either the
consumption di↵erential or the top wealth share, the inflation–output gap variability trade-
15The curve involves an optimal  ⇡ conditionally on the posterior distribution of all model parameters,
and is situated below the point indicated by the estimated policy rule over the historical data.
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o↵ stemming from rules augmented with inequality shifts south-east, and monetary policy
achieves moderate gains in terms of the output gap variability that are unattainable by the
optimal rule but faces a much higher inflation volatility than that of the optimal rule. For a
loss function placing weight almost exclusively on output gap variability, a policy response to
wealth inequality yields negligible gains of about 2-3% in terms of the output gap volatility
compared to the optimal policy for a level of inflation volatility around 0.5%.
As for the coe cients { tis, tws, (cµ c⌧ )}, as the welfare weight on inflation volatility goes
from zero to one,  tis rises from -0.12 to -0.03,  tws rises from -0.45 to -0.03, and  (cµ c⌧ )
rises from -0.36 to -0.03. Hence, all the coe cients are considerably di↵erent from zero when
the welfare criterion places more weight on output gap than on inflation volatility since
the variables attached to those coe cients heavily depend on distributional shocks inducing
persistent shifts in aggregate demand and, thereby, in the output gap (the connection of
demand and the output gap fluctuations is reinforced by the fact that the flexible equilibrium
does not feature distributional shocks). Conversely, a welfare function favoring inflation over
output gap stabilization places negligible weight on changes in inequality.
1.3.4 Distributional Implications of Aggregate Shocks.
Although demand and supply side shocks are labeled as “aggregate” shocks following conven-
tion, they may in fact have distributional consequences because their transmission is filtered
through MPC heterogeneity and imperfect insurance. This section, therefore, investigates
the e↵ect of aggregate shocks on inequality. According to Table (1.5), income inequality
is mainly explained by polarization shocks. In contrast, supply and demand side shocks
entail profound implications for wealth inequality by galvanizing 28/5% and 11/5% of its
short/medium-run fluctuations, respectively. The short-run e↵ect of supply shocks is mainly
attributed to technology shocks through their impact on the debt overhang, whereas the
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long-run e↵ect is distributed across all supply shocks. All demand side shocks but govern-
ment spending shocks have about a co-equal influence on the swings of wealth inequality.
Fig.(1.8) displays the di↵usion of demand side disturbances. More specifically, a reduction
in the risk premium raises the consumption of both types of households; in fact, middle-class
consumption rises more than top consumption does. Due to the workings of the aggregate
demand channel, output expands and inflation exhibits a pro-cyclical response. Income
inequality (tis) rises because the increasing profit margins (tispr) are unequally distributed
across the population while the earnings (tisea) and capital income (tisb) channels have
a small e↵ect. In contrast, wealth inequality decreases (tws). Low lending costs result
in middle-class households borrowing from the top (twsb) to raise their consumption and
ownership of firms (tws! falls). The latter and the negligible asset price e↵ect to the top
(twsq) edge out the increase in borrowing, and result in a plummeting top wealth share.
Investment and government spending shocks generate expansions that raise profits and the
top income share. Nevertheless, both shocks depress aggregate consumption: (i) investment
shocks lead to a sizable decrease in top consumption but to an increase in the assets of the
top; (ii) government spending shocks raise the tax burden for middle-class families dispro-
portionally since the model was built on the premise of an equal tax across households, and
result in a consumption contraction. In response to both shocks, thus, the top ownership of
shares rises (tws!) and along with the borrowing of the middle class (twsb) and the small
asset price e↵ects generate an increase in wealth inequality (tws).
Fig.(1.9) reports the transmission of supply side innovations. Stochastic increases in price
markups generate pro-cyclical responses in both income and wealth inequality. In response
to exogenous increases in prices, the consumption of all agents falls by about the same
amount, and drives down production, labor, and the real wage. Given the low borrowing
costs due to high inflation, the middle class partially smoothes its consumption by borrowing
from the top (twsb) and expands its ownership of shares (tws! falls). As a result, the top
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Figure 1.8: Distributional Implications of Demand Side Shocks
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Figure 1.9: Distributional Implications of Supply Side Shocks
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
y
Technology (+) Price Markup (+) Wage Markup (+)
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5 π
5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
r
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
c
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5 c
τ
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1 c
µ
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
L
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1 w
r
5 10 15 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
tis
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1 ×10
-3 tisea
5 10 15 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
tisb
5 10 15 20
-0.05
0
0.05 tis
pr
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
tws
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1 tws
ω
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1 tws
b
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1 tws
q
Notes: impulse response functions (posterior mean). All variables in % deviation from steady state.
1st and 2nd row: aggregate variables. 3rd row:: top income share (tis): earnings (tisea), bond income (tisb),
and profits (tispr) channels, with tis = tisea+ tisb+ tispr. 4th row:: top wealth share (tws): shares (tws!),
bonds (twsb), and asset price gains/losses (twsq) channels, with tws = tws! + twsb + twsq.
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wealth share (tws) falls. Despite the price increases favoring the firms’ profits, the demand
contraction is sizable and results in low profits flowing to the top (tispr) and, thereby, in
a falling top income share (tis). Wage markup shocks lead to economy wide conditions
that are similar to those generated by price markup shocks, and to a similar, albeit smaller,
decrease of income inequality due to weakened profits flowing to the top. Nonetheless,
wage markup shocks raise wealth inequality because middle-class households deplete their
real assets triggering an asset price decline (twsq rises) that benefits the top who holds a
larger fraction of shares. Technological advances raise the consumption of both families,
trigger an economic expansion, and boost profits which, in turn, spur an increase in income
inequality. Interestingly, those advances generate a reduction in wealth inequality since the
low borrowing costs help middle-class families debt-finance an increase in their ownership
shares while boosting asset prices that negatively feed back to the top wealth share.
1.3.5 Robustness Checks.
Collaterals and the Elasticity of Output to Wealth Shocks.
The analysis so far has not made clear how the transmission of distributional shocks de-
pends on the degree of financial market imperfections and, in particular, on the importance
of collaterals captured by the loan-to-value ratio (m); the higher the m, the lower the imper-
fections16. Fig.(1.10) displays the transmission of wage and wealth shocks under alternative
values for m. It unveils that the elasticities of output to wage and wealth shocks are of the
same sign but of di↵erent magnitude depending on m. The fact that even low values of m
generate positive elasticities to the wealth shock illustrates that those shocks di↵er from the
ones considered in Iacoviello (2005) where the output elasticity changes sign for low m.
More precisely, a high degree of financial market imperfections (low m) leads to a small
16In terms of steady state e↵ects, a higher m raises debt, as well as the top income and wealth shares.
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output spike on impact and a highly persistent response of a small volatility subsequently.
In contrast, a high m renders the collateral channel important and, thereby, (i) dampens
down the debt reduction in the case of polarization shocks, and (ii) amplifies the debt buildup
in the case of wealth shocks. In case (i), the easier access to credit does not require the middle
class to massively deplete its assets; as a result, wealth inequality does not rise as much as it
would for a low m. In case (ii), the massive increase of middle-class borrowing is channeled
to increase the assets of the middle class; consequently, wealth inequality falls much more
than that it would for a low m. The e↵ect of the above shocks on the top income share does
not depend on m as much as their e↵ect on the top wealth share does.
Figure 1.10: Collaterals and the Transmission of Distributional Imbalances
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Identification.
To further understand the influence of inequality data compared to that of aggregate data on
the estimates for the parameters associated with the distributional dimension of the model,
I repeat the estimation without including the top deciles in the observation vector as well as
wage and wealth shocks in the stochastic structure. The results below suggest that income
and wealth inequality series are in fact informative. The estimation yields top income and
wealth deciles (651% and 73%, respectively, at the steady state) that are at odds with U.S.
data. Compared to the benchmark run,  ⌧ rises from 0.15 to 0.35 and  µ rises from 0.37 to
0.52. Credit supply shocks become less volatile and their influence on debt rises from 30/17%
in the benchmark model to 40/35% in the estimation without inequality data, whereas their
influence on output remains unchanged. The loading factor for consumer credit debt ( d)
rises from (0.77) to (0.87).
Credit and Wealth Shocks, and a Comment on Taxes.
Table (1.5) shows that wealth and credit shocks each account for a sizable part of the debt
fluctuations. Are these two shocks, however, somehow connected? Several results suggest
some degree of connection. First, the two innovations have a negative correlation of -0.29
despite their modeling as iid processes17. Second, a negative connection between the two
shocks is observed in the historical decompositions of Fig.(1.3). Third, as discussed in the
above section, re-estimating the model by excluding top shares from the observation set as
well as polarization and wealth shocks from the stochastic structure raises the influence of
credit shocks on debt.
Altogether, these results suggest that disentangling wealth from credit shocks is important in
17 In contrast, the correlation between wealth and risk premium shocks is negligible (0.01), which does
not validate the connection between risk premium and taste shocks for assets shown in Fisher (2015).
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understanding changes in the economy. Including shifts in wealth inequality in the estimation
helps in that direction by disciplining the path of variables appearing in the observation
equation for wealth (1.23). As a result, wealth and credit shocks spur some qualitatively
and quantitatively similar dynamics in Fig.(1.2), but the former entail more volatile asset
price changes than the latter do, trigger a counter-cyclical instead of a pro-cyclical wealth
inequality, and do not contribute to the debt pileup prior to the Great Recession. Finally,
worth mentioning is that consistently with the literature showing that the top income share
is connected to the top tax rate [Piketty et al., 2014; Piketty and Saez, 2013], I find a 0.28
correlation between polarization and government spending shocks.
Prior.
The postulated prior specification is not dogmatic. At the prior, distributional shocks ac-
count for 0%, 2%, 67%, and 1% of the short-term cycles in output, debt, income inequality,
and wealth inequality, respectively (see Appx.). That e↵ect is considerably smaller than the
estimated one (10%, 75%, 100%, and 61%, respectively; Table 1.5).
Marginal Propensity To Consume.
This section quantifies the model-implied MPC heterogeneity across top and middle-class
households. Fig.(1.11) displays the posterior distribution of MPC out of several variables and
all sources of stochastic variation. Several insights emerge. First, middle-class households are
more prone to consume out of an increase in output than top households are. Additionally,
middle-class households reduce their consumption in response to debt more strongly than
top households increase theirs (panel 1,1). Furthermore, the evidence suggests negligible
reaction of a group’s consumption to the other group’s consumption (panel 2,2). In addition,
the consumption responses to a wage shock are of the opposite sign across the population and
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orders of magnitude larger than the MPC observed for other shocks and variables (panel 2,3).
Moreover, according to panels (2,4) and (3,1), in response to wealth and credit shocks, the
MPC has the opposite sign across the population and is more than ten times higher for the
middle class than for the top. Interestingly, panels (1,3) and (1,4) suggest a weak feedback
from employment and asset prices to consumption choices for both groups. Lastly, it is worth
mentioning that for homogeneous wealth preferences ( ⌧ =  µ), the MPC heterogeneity is
attenuated (Appx.).
Figure 1.11: Marginal Propensity To Consume Di↵erentials
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Portfolio Costs.
The elasticity of portfolio costs (Sw) is kept to a low value (0.1) – small costs is the conven-
tional view in the literature; see Iacoviello (2005) for example. Considering high values for
Sw while conditioning on the posterior parameter distribution leads to a monotonic increase
in the influence of wealth shocks: rising Sw from 0.1 to 1 increases the influence of wealth
shocks on output from 2% to 89%. Such an unrealistic increase suggests that the posterior
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distribution of Sw depends on that of the other parameters. Unreported results suggest that
when Sw is estimated, it obtains moderate values around 2, dampens down the influence of
wealths shocks to some extent because part of the debt persistence is now captured by the
sluggishness induced by high portfolio costs, and boosts the general equilibrium e↵ects of
aggregate shocks on debt. Nevertheless, no sizable changes are observed in the parameters
and the overall influence of distributional shocks.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
The present paper adds to the literature on the macroeconomic ramifications of inequality
by examining the historical fluctuations of inequality, debt, and aggregate series jointly over
five decades through the lens of a proposed and estimated structural model. The take-
away message suggests that swings in inequality have limited e↵ect on business cycles, but
influence household debt gyrations to a large extent. The monetary policy transmission is
not impaired in this framework because changes in inequality operate through aggregate
demand. This paper sets the stage for further explorations across several dimensions. For
example, delving into the swings of inequality in environments where debt plays a more
crucial role for economic stability than that considered in this paper may reveal a larger
macroeconomic influence of those swings.
51
Chapter 2
The U.S. Labor Income Share and
Automation Shocks
It is well known by now that the U.S. labor income share exhibits a downward trend over
the past decades. Empirical studies have identified several determinants of the labor share,
namely production automation or, interchangeably, routine-biased technical change [Goos
et al., 2014; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Dao et al., 2017; Abdih and Danninger, 2017; Graetz and
Michaels, 2018], the relative price of investment [Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014], labor
market institutions and trade globalization [Abdih and Danninger, 2017], statistical errors
and o↵shoring of labor activities [Elsby et al., 2014], as well as firms’ market power [Autor
et al., 2017b, 2017a; Dixon and Lim, 2018]1. Automation, in particular, holds a position so
prominent that it has led authors using simulated growth models to make predictions about
the future role of machines that paint a bleak picture for labor [Acemoglou and Restrepo,
2017b; Kotliko↵ and Sachs, 2012; Nordhaus, 2015; Berg et al., 2018].
Although the aforementioned studies focus on the relatively recent downward trajectory of
1 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argue for shifts in regulation of the European product and labor markets.
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the labor share, the present paper contributes on this topic by considering the broad historical
swings of that share since 1964 to 2016. Fig.(2.1), in fact, gives inklings on beyond garden-
variety swings during the entire period under consideration. This paper places those swings
in a macroeconomic context and examines them in conjunction with U.S. aggregate series
through the lens of a stylized structural model. In doing so, it sheds light on the origins
and the implications of the fluctuations in the labor share. In addition, it quantifies the
influence of production automation shocks in a setup that includes the competing influence
of the relative price of investment, of labor market institutions via the wage markup shocks,
of the firms’ market power via the price markup shocks, and of measurement errors.
This paper addresses the above through the lens of the medium-scaled New Keynesian dy-
namic general equilibrium model of Justiniano et al. (2011) who build the relative price of
investment2 in the framework of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). I
consider two novel features. The first pertains to the inclusion of observables for the labor
income share and their joint consideration with U.S. aggregates in a state-of-the-art Bayesian
approach, and the second pertains to the introduction of automation shocks.
DSGE models featuring a single observable for wages, output, and labor do not allow match-
ing series for the labor share because the model-implied analogue of the latter is uniquely
pinned down. I include observables for the labor share by treating the wage as a latent
state that is identified through multiple wage measures and a factor approach – this treat-
ment of wages is examined in several cases [Gal´ı et al., 2012a; Justiniano et al., 2013; Linde´
et al., 2016; Charalampidis, 2018]. To strengthen identification, I consider multiple series,
displayed in Fig.(2.1), and a factor approach for the labor share as well. A factor approach
to both wages and the labor share allows to jointly sample the wage and the labor share, and
2 Following the identification strategy of Justiniano et al. (2011), shocks to the marginal e ciency of
investment (MEI) are disentangled from investment-specific shocks (IST) suggested by Greenwood et al.
(1988), examined in Greenwood et al.(1997, 2000) and Fisher (2006), and introduced in an international real
business cycle model in Mandelman et al. (2011). Moura (2018) confirms the sizable role of MEI shocks in
a two-sector DSGE model but finds a weak link between the relative investment price and IST shocks.
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Figure 2.1: Swings in the Labor Income Share
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accounts for the possibility of measurement errors. Jointly sampling wages and the labor
share disciplines the extracted wage from the data in a way that resembles, in a conceptual
sense, to the Justiniano et al. (2011)’s use of the relative price of investment to disentangle
investment-specific shocks from innovations in the marginal e ciency of investment.
In addition, the present approach helps identify production automation disturbances encap-
sulating routine-biased technological shifts. These disturbances are modeled as stochastic
variations in the output elasticities with respect to the production factors, that is, in the
exponents of the individual firm’s production function along the lines of Lansing (2015)
and Lansing and Markiewicz (2016) who study the asset-pricing and welfare implications of
exogenous capital share shifts in a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, respectively; of Rios-
Rull and Santaeula`lia-Llopis (2010) who consider redistribution shocks; and of Young who
incorporates capital share shifts in a RBC model without neutral technology. In a similar
spirit, Goldin and Katz (2007) model shifts in the shares of a CES production function to
study the premium between skilled and unskilled workers.
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According to this paper’s findings, two thirds and one third of fluctuations in the U.S. labor
share are explained by persistent automation shocks in the short and long run, respectively.
Wage markup shocks, reflecting changes in workers’ market power, maintain a prominent
role in the swings of the labor share: they account for 19% and 62% of the short- and long-
run swings, respectively. This result is consistent with Abdih and Danninger (2017) who
find an influence of changes in unionization on the decline of the labor share. Demand side
shocks and, in particular, disturbances associated with investment and the relative price
of investment exert limited influence on the labor share throughout the sample period –
this finding di↵ers from Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) who find that the decline in the
corporate labor share is attributed to the relative investment price.3
Furthermore, automation shocks account for the lion’s share of the post-2000 tumble in the
labor share. Thus, gauging the e↵ect of automation shocks based on a structural macroeco-
nomic perspective complements empirical studies [Goos et al., 2014; Autor and Dorn, 2013;
Dao et al., 2017; Abdih and Danninger, 2017; Graetz and Michaels, 2018] that attribute a
crucial role to routine-biased technical change. Moving the analysis beyond the recent de-
cline of the labor share that has been the topic of most of the aforementioned studies, during
1970-1985, supply side shocks balance out the influence of automation shocks and result in
a relative stable labor share. During 1985-2000, supply side shocks edge out automation
shocks leading to a gradually declining labor share.
Turning to the macroeconomic implications of automation shocks, I find that these shocks
entail a distinctive characteristic that is not matched by any other aggregate innovation:
they spur a counter-cyclical response in labor hours. The latter is intuitive since automation
shifts, at their core, entail a substitution of labor with capital, as well as a temporary output
expansion. This characteristic implies that the present modeling of those disturbances is not
susceptible to the critique of Acemoglou and Restrepo (2018) about various modeling ways of
3In addition, I find moderate measurement errors in the labor share which can be thought to reflect the
evidence of Elsby et al. (2014).
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automation shocks not being able to generate a fall in labor demand. Moreover, automation
disturbances account for 29/9% of output cycles in the short/long run, and are correlated
with the part of capital intensity indices in the private, non-farm, and manufacturing sectors
that is not explained by the state of the economy.
Introducing observables for the labor share in a rigorous Bayesian estimation contributes in
three additional branches of the literature. First, this work’s data-driven approach di↵ers
from papers studying the implications of structural models, featuring labor search [Shao
and Silos, 2014] or other deviations from Walrasian markets [Boldrin and Horvath, 1995;
Gomme and Greenwood, 1995], in terms of the labor share through summary statistics from
model simulations. Second, the present work’s extraction of exogenous shifts in the output
elasticities with respect to the factor shares from the data expands on papers examining
the implications of labor or capital share shifts and employing either simulation [Lansing,
2015; Lansing and Markiewicz, 2016; Rios-Rull and Santaeula`lia-Llopis, 2010; Young, 2004;
Castane˜da et al. (1998)] or regression analysis [Blanchard, 1997; Bentolila and Saint-Paul,
2003]. Third, this paper’s identification of automation shocks works through the introduction
of multiple wage and labor share observables. In contrast, capital-augmenting shocks studied
in Cantore et al. (2015) and Di Pace and Villa (2016) who introduce CES production in a
DSGE framework are not identified from information embedded in the factor shares because
Cantore et al. (2015) match the observables in Smets and Wouters (2007), while Di Pace and
Villa (2016) add unemployment and vacancies to that set. In addition, capital-augmenting
shocks are susceptible to the critique of Acemoglou and Restrepo (2018).
Including observables for the labor share, in fact, entails profound implications for the model
behavior. More specifically, the NK–DSGE model estimated on multiple wage measures
without labor share observables yields a pro-cyclical model-implied labor share that is at odds
with the counter-cyclicality of that share in the data. The model-implied pro-cyclicality is
triggered by an overstated comovement between the labor share and the real wage compared
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to that in the data. In contrast, including series for the labor share in the observation set
disciplines the evolution of its model-implied analogue to match the salient features of the
data. This improvement is accomplished via the following channels.
First, the prominent role of price markup shocks in the model without the labor share
observables is attenuated in the model with those series, because those shocks entail a pro-
cyclical labor share that is at odds with the data. Second, and along the lines of Justiniano
et al. (2011), shocks in the marginal e ciency of investment (MEI) are the main determinant
of the business cycle in the model without the labor share series. Nevertheless, with the
labor share in the observation set, MEI shocks become less persistent, obtain a moderate
explanatory power on output, and retain a large influence only on investment fluctuations.
Although MEI shocks, along with all demand-side shocks, trigger a counter-cyclical response
in the labor share, the response is small in magnitude and rests on a high degree of wage
indexation that renders the real wage less responsive to general equilibrium forces stemming
from disturbances outside of the labor market. A high degree of wage indexation that
attenuates the real wage response is needed for those shocks to yield a counter-cyclical labor
share because they trigger a pro-cyclical response in both labor and the real wage. It is
worth mentioning that the reduced influence of MEI shocks is analogous to that obtained
in Kaihatsu and Kurozumi (2014) who introduce a financial accelerator and shocks to net
worth and the external finance premium in Justiniano et al. (2011).
Third, wage markup and automation shocks yield a sizable counter-cyclical response in the
labor share and, thus, are favored by the data. Wage markup shocks, therefore, obtain a
more prominent role in economic fluctuations than that they have in Justiniano et al. (2011);
they account for 8% and 38% of output fluctuations two years ahead in the model without
and with the labor share series, respectively. Their pronounced influence is in line with the
evidence of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Gal´ı et al. (2012a).
Section 2 outlines the structural model. Section 3 develops the estimation and identification
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strategy. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2.1 Full-fledged Model
This section outlines the model. I build automation shifts in the medium-scale DSGE model
of Justiniano et al. (2011) who include the relative price of investment and non-stationary
technology in the environment of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
The model features a zero lower bound on the policy rate as well.
A representative firm converts units of the final good to investment purchased by a capital
producer. The latter produces capital that is channeled to a continuum of monopolistically
competitive firms. Those firms combine capital and labor to produce intermediate goods,
and choose prices in a staggered fashion. Households invest in one-period nominal bonds
priced at a rate determined by monetary policy, consume the final good, and supply labor.
Perfect risk sharing holds. Each household consists of a continuum of agents with di↵erent
labor types. The di↵erentiated labor is uniformly distributed, supplied along the intensive
margin, and priced in a staggered fashion by monopolistically competitive unions.
2.1.1 Final Good.
A perfectly competitive final good producer purchases and aggregates intermediate goods
Yt(i), 8i 2 [0, 1], to output Yt that is sold to consumers at price Pt. The producer maximizes
period-t profits: {PtYt  
R 1
0 Pt(i)Yt(i)di}, subject to technology
Yt =
✓Z 1
0
Yt(i)
( p,t 1)/ p,tdi
◆ p,t/( p,t 1)
(2.1)
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where  p,t is the time varying elasticity of substitution across product varieties, with the
gross price markup  p,t/( p,t  1) following an AR(1) process with parameters {⇢p,  p}. The
resulting demand for good “i” and the aggregate price index are given by
Yt(i) =
✓
Pt(i)
Pt
◆  p,t
Yt and Pt =
✓Z 1
0
Pt(i)
1  p,tdi
◆1/(1  p,t)
(2.2)
2.1.2 Intermediate Good.
Monopolistically competitive intermediate good producers, indexed by “i” and situated in
the unit interval, hire labor Lt(i) from a labor aggregator defined below, and capital Kt(i)
from the capital producing sector while taking as given factor prices (Wt, Rkt ), in order to
produce output Yt(i) according to the production function:
Yt(i) = Kt(i)
↵t (ZtLt(i))
1 ↵t   At y (2.3)
The neutral technology exhibits a unit root, ln(Zt/Zt 1) =  z + bzt, and multiplicatively
augments labor. bzt follows an AR(1) process with associated parameters {⇢z,  z}. At is the
composite technology pinned down by Zt⌦
↵t
1 ↵t
t . ⌦t is the investment-specific technological
factor – to be explained below. Fixed costs,  y, guarantee zero steady state profits.
↵t and 1 ↵t stand for the time-varying output elasticities with respect to capital and labor,
respectively. Stochastic variations in ↵t aim to reflect shifts in automation – such as those
related to routine-biased technological change – because they alter the responsiveness of
output to the capital-labor mix in the production line. ln(↵t/↵) follows an AR(1) process
with associated parameters {⇢↵,  ↵}. Such variations are recently considered in Lansing
(2015), Lansing and Markiewicz (2016), and Rios-Rull and Santaeula`lia-Llopis (2010).
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The above definition of automation shocks di↵ers from papers modeling automation as a
capital-augmenting process [Kotliko↵ and Sachs, 2012; Nordhaus, 2015; Graetz and Michaels,
2018]. Such a modeling would be sensitive to the critique of Acemoglou and Restrepo (2018)
about capital-augmenting automation not being able to generate a decrease in labor demand.
In this paper, automation shocks do generate a decline in labor hours.
Cost minimization yields the following capital-to-labor ratio and marginal cost – both are
influenced by the automation shock,
Kt(i)/Lt(i) = [↵t/(1  ↵t)](Wt/Rkt ) (2.4)
MCt = (↵t)
 ↵t(1  ↵t) (1 ↵t)(Wt)(1 ↵t)(Rkt )↵tZ (1 ↵t)t (2.5)
It is worth pointing out that the fact that the capital-to-labor ratio is a↵ected by the automa-
tion shock imposes a cross-equation restriction on the evolution of that shock that di↵ers
from the cross-equation restrictions that would be imposed on a stationary neutral technol-
ogy shock, if such a shock were included, because the latter would not a↵ect the above ratio
– see, for example, the equilibrium conditions in Smets and Wouters (2007).
Each firm chooses price P  t (i) with probability ⇣p in order to maximize the present discounted
value of expected future profits subject to output demand (2.2). In periods in which the
price cannot be optimally chosen, it is updated according to a convex combination of the
one-period-lagged (gross) inflation and the steady-state (gross) inflation according to the
indexation parameter ◆p; thus, the period-(t + s) price of a firm that last chose its price in
period t is given by Pt+s|t(i) = P  t (i)X
p
t,s, where X
p
t,s ⌘
Qs
l=1⇧
◆p
t+l 1⇧
1 ◆p for s > 0 and = 1
for s = 0. The present discounted value of current and future profits is given by
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Et
+1X
s=0
(⇣p)
s [(⌅t+sPt)/(⌅tPt+s)]
⇥
Pt+s|t(i) MCt+s
⇤
Yt+s|t(i) (2.6)
2.1.3 Investment.
A representative firm purchases Y It units of the final good, and converts them to It units
of the investment good according to: It = ⌦tY It . ⌦t is the investment-specific technological
factor (IST) and aims at capturing shifts in the price of investment goods over the price of
consumption goods. Its non-stationary evolution is described by: ln(⌦t/⌦t 1) =  ! + b !t ,
where b !t follows an AR(1) process with associated parameters {⇢!,  !}. The growth rate
of the economy along the balanced growth path, therefore, is given by   =  z +
↵
1 ↵ !. The
investment good is sold to a capital producing firm at price P It . Profit maximization leads
to an equalization of marginal benefit to marginal cost:
P It /Pt = 1/⌦t (2.7)
2.1.4 Capital Production.
Capital production is delinked from the household problem4. A representative capital pro-
ducing firm invests (It) in raw capital (K¯t) subject to adjustment costs S(It/It 1). It chooses
the utilization rate ut that determines the e↵ective capital, Kt ⌘ utK¯t 1, subject to utiliza-
tion costs that are proportional to the last period’s raw capital (a(ut)K¯t 1/⌦t5). Capital is
sold to intermediate good producers at the nominal rental rate Rkt . The firm maximizes the
present discounted value of future dividends,
4 With identical agents, centralized and decentralized capital production yield the same dynamics.
5Scaling these costs with ⌦t ensures the existence of a balanced growth path.
61
Et
1X
s=0
[(⌅t+sPt)/(⌅tPt+s)]

Rkt+sKt+s  
Pt+sa(ut+s)K¯t+s 1
⌦t+s
  P It+sIt+s   At+sPt+s k
 
(2.8)
subject to the law of capital accumulation,
K¯t = (1   )K¯t 1 +  it (1  S(It/It 1)) It (2.9)
 it is the marginal e ciency of investment (MEI) shock a↵ecting the transformation of invest-
ment goods to capital. ln( it) follows an AR(1) process with associated parameters {⇢i,  i}.
Investment in units of the consumption good is pinned down by eIt = (P It /Pt)It. The steady
state full utilization is associated with zero cost: a(1) = 0. As in Smets and Wouters
(2007), the properties of the cost functions for utilization and investment are defined so that
a(1)00/a(1)0 =  /(1    ), S(·) = S(·)0 = 0, and S(·)00 ⌘ S > 0.   is the depreciation rate.
Fixed costs ( k) ensure zero steady state dividends. ⌅t+s/⌅t is the discount factor.
2.1.5 Labor Demand.
Individuals of the same labor type “j” form a union that operates in a monopolistically
competitive environment and sets wages in a staggered fashion. The unions sell di↵erentiated
labor to a labor agency that aggregates it according to technology
Lt =
✓Z
Lt(j)
( w,t 1)/ w,tdj
◆ w,t/( w,t 1)
, 8j 2 [0, 1] (2.10)
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where  w,t is the time varying elasticity of substitution across labor varieties, with the gross
wage markup,  w,t/( w,t   1), following an AR(1) process with parameters {⇢w,  w}. Profit
maximization yields the following labor demand for each j type and the aggregate wage
Lt(j) =
✓
Wt(j)
Wt
◆  w,t
Lt , 8j 2 [0, 1] and Wt =
✓Z
Wt(j)
1  w,tdj
◆1/(1  w,t)
(2.11)
Each labor union takes into account labor demand (2.11), and chooses wage W  t (j), in a
staggered way a` la Calvo-Yun and Erceg et al. (2000), in order to maximize the expected
present discounted value of future wages net of the economy wide type-j labor disutility
expressed in terms of the final good, W ht (j). In periods in which the wage is not reset, it
is updated according to the weighted product of one-period-lagged and steady-state price
inflation rates, with the weight being given by the indexation parameter ◆w: Wt+s|t(j) =
W  t (j)X
w
t,s, where X
w
t,s =
Qs
l=1(e
 +bzt+l 1+(↵t+l 1/[1 ↵t+l 1])b !t+l 1⇧t+l 1)◆w(e ⇧)1 ◆w for s > 0
and = 1 for s = 0. The union’s objective function is:
Et
+1X
s=0
(⇣w)
s [(⌅t+sPt)/(⌅tPt+s)]
⇥
Wt+s|t(j) W ht+s(j)Pt+s
⇤
Lt+s(j) (2.12)
2.1.6 Demand Side.
The household chooses an infinite sequence of consumption and bonds {Ct, Bt}, to maximize
the present discounted value of future expected utility:
Et
+1X
s=0
 s

ln (Ct+s   ⌘Ct+s 1)  ✓
Z 1
0
Lt+s(j)1+ 
1 +  
dj
 
(2.13)
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Preferences are log-separable, and depend on the deviation of consumption from last period’s
average consumption and on labor disutility across all j types. ⌘ mirrors external habit
formation, and   is the inverse Frisch elasticity. The budget constraint is given by
Ct   Bt/( btRtPt) + Tt/Pt =
Z 1
0
W ht (j)Lt(j)dj + Ft   Bt 1/(Pt 1⇧t) + Vt (2.14)
ln( bt ) is a risk premium shock following an AR(1) process with parameters {⇢b,  b}. ⇧t and
Tt stand for (gross) price inflation and taxes, respectively. Vt denotes economy wide profits.
W ht (j) is the type-j real wage that would prevail in the absence of rigidities, and which would
be equal to the marginal labor disutility in consumption terms: ✓Lt(j)
 /⌅t. Ft stands for
transfers made by the unions ensuring an equitable wage distribution.
2.1.7 Policy.
Monetary policy may be restricted by the zero lower bound in turbulent times. The observed
interest rate (rot ) is set according to
rot = max{0, r + ln(Rt/R)} (2.15)
where the interest rate during normal times is determined by a conventional policy rule,
Rt/R = (Rt 1/R)
⇢r

(⇧t/⇧)
 ⇡
⇣
Yt/Y
f
t
⌘ y ⇣
(Yt/Yt 1)/(Y
f
t /Y
f
t 1)
⌘  y 1 ⇢r
e✏
mp
t (2.16)
where R = 1 + r; ⇢r 2 (0, 1) captures interest rate smoothing;  ⇡ > 1,  y,  y   0; and
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✏mpt ⇠ N(0,  2mp) is a white noise disturbance. Fiscal policy follows a balanced budget, with
spending given by ln(Gt/At/G) = ⇢gln(Gt 1/At 1/G) + ⇢gz✏zt + ✏
g
t , with ✏
g
t ⇠ N(0,  2g). Y ft
denotes output under flexible prices and wages. Automation shocks shift that equilibrium.
2.1.8 Aggregation.
Aggregating (2.3) and (2.4) across firms yields the aggregate production function: Yt =
K↵tt (ZtLt)
1 ↵t   At y. Intermediate good profits and dividends read as: ⇧intt ⌘ PtYt  
WtLt   RktKt, Divt ⌘ RktKt   Pta(ut)K¯t 1/⌦t   PteIt   PtAt k. Thus, the economy wide
profits distributed to households are: Vt = ⇧intt +Divt. Combining the constraint (2.14), the
government’s balanced budget, and profits, yields the resource constraint:
Ct + eIt +Gt + a(ut)K¯t 1/⌦t +  kAt = Yt (2.17)
2.1.9 Equilibrium.
The variables are rendered stationary after normalizing them by the composite technology.
The log-linearized equilibrium is reported in Appendix.
The model features 9 structural shocks. Eight of them appear in Justiniano et al. (2011):
risk premium, technology, wage and price markup, spending, IST, MEI, and monetary policy
shocks. An automation shock is the additional disturbance.
observables to their model analogue (blst) Matching data for the labor income share is viable
because the wage is a latent state – had we used a single measure for wages the right-hand-
side of (??) and, in turn, the labor income share would uniquely be pinned down rendering
impossible to match data series for the latter. In this approach, the evolution of the observed
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labor income share influences the wage component that is extracted from the two wage series.
In other words, the observed labor share series provide discipline to the whole model – a
discipline that incarnates the idea of jointly examining the U.S. aggregate and labor income
share series. It is in a similar spirit to the motivation of Justiniano et al. (2011) about using
the relative price of investment goods to provide discipline in the estimation.
2.1.10 State Space and Likelihood.
I stack all the measurement equations vertically, and obtain the following matrix equation:
⌥t =  q +H0⇣t +H1⇣t 1 +Mt , Mt ⇠ N(0,⌃q) (2.18)
where ⌥t and  q are (oq ⇥ 1) vectors of observables and intercepts, respectively. {H0, H1}
denote the (oq⇥n⇣) selection matrices and include the slope coe cients of the measurement
equations. ⇣t is the period-t (n⇣ ⇥ 1) state vector. Mt collects the measurement errors. ⌃q
is the diagonal covariance matrix of measurement errors. Stacking (2.18) over time yields:
266666664
⌥t=1
⌥t=2
⌥t=3
...
377777775 =
266666664
 q
 q
 q
...
377777775+
266666664
H0 . . . . . . . . .
H1 H0 . . . . . .
. . . H1 H0 . . .
. . .
. . . . . . . . .
377777775
266666664
⇣t=1
⇣t=2
⇣t=3
...
377777775+
266666664
Mt=1
Mt=2
Mt=3
...
377777775 (2.19)
The matrix representation of (2.19) is given by
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⌥ =  +H⇣ +M , M ⇠ N  0o,⌃M ⌘ Inq ⌦ ⌃q  (2.20)
where 0o is (oqnq)⇥ 1. ⌥ ⌘ [⌥0t=1,⌥0t=2, . . .]0 is the observation vector.   ⌘ [ 0q, 0q, . . .]0 is a
vector of intercepts. ⇣ ⌘ [⇣ 01, ⇣ 02, . . .]0 is the (n⇣nq) ⇥ 1 state vector. M ⌘ [M 0t=1,M 0t=2, . . .]0
collects the measurement errors. H is a sparse and block-banded matrix. According to (3.31),
the likelihood of the data given the parameter vector ⇥ and the states ⇣ is P (⌥    |⇥, ⇣),
where (⌥   )|⇥, ⇣ ⇠ N(H⇣,⌃M).
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions of the model are casted in the form
 2,⌧ (⇥)Et⇣t+1 +  0,⌧ (⇥)⇣t =  1,⌧ (⇥)⇣t 1 + ⌧ (⇥)✏t (2.21)
The system matrices { 0,⌧ , 1,⌧ , 2,⌧ , ⌧} are functions of the parameter vector⇥, and depend
on the underlying economic regime ⌧ 2 {n, zlb}. The two regimes di↵er in the specification
of the policy rule: ⌧ = n denotes normal times where monetary policy is not constrained,
and ⌧ = zlb denotes times with a binding zero lower bound on the policy rate. The structural
shocks are grouped in the (n✏⇥ 1) vector ✏t ⇠ N(0n✏ , In✏), and are fewer than the number of
observables (n✏ < oq). The solution of the system can be represented as
⇣t =  1,t(⇥)⇣t 1 +  2,t(⇥)✏t (2.22)
where the system matrices { 1,t, 2,t} are potentially time-varying and their dependence on
⇥ is suppressed in terms of the notation in the following sections.
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Estimation in Normal Times.
During normal times, { 1,t, 2,t} are time-invariant and obtained from the rational expecta-
tions solution of Sims (2002). The estimation proceeds in the following way. ⇣1 is initialized
at the observed data for observed variables and at zero otherwise, with a covariance D being
the steady state covariance of the state vector evaluated at the prior mean of ⇥. Defining
the reduced-form errors, ✏˜t =  2✏t for t > 1 and ✏˜1 = ✏1, and stacking (3.26) across time
yields:
266666664
In⇣ . . . . . . . . .
  1 In⇣ . . . . . .
. . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .   1 In⇣
377777775
266666664
⇣1
⇣2
...
⇣T
377777775 =
266666664
✏˜1
✏˜2
...
✏˜T
377777775 ,
266666664
✏˜1
✏˜2
...
✏˜T
377777775 ⇠ N
0B@0n⇣nq ,
264D . . ....  ⌦ IT 1
375
1CA (2.23)
where   ⌘  2 02. In matrix notation, the above equation reads as
Z⇣ = ✏˜ , ✏˜ ⇠ N(0n⇣nq , K 1✏˜ ) (2.24)
where ✏˜ ⌘ [✏˜01, ✏˜02 . . .]0 is the (n⇣nq) ⇥ 1 vector of errors, and K✏˜ is the sparse and block-
banded precision of the latter. A change of variable transformation yields the prior state
distribution, P (⇣|⇥), with ⇣|⇥ ⇠ N(⇣0, K 1) and ⇣0 = 0n⇣nq . The precision K = Z 0K✏˜Z is
also sparse and block-banded [Chan and Jeliazkov, 2009].
Bayes rule, P (⇣|⌥,⇥) / P (⌥|⇥, ⇣)P (⇣|⇥), yields the block-banded posterior precision: P =
K + H 0⌃ 1M H. The posterior mean state (b⇣) is computed based on the e cient simulation
of Chan and Jeliazkov who use forward and backward substitution in (3.32) exploiting the
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nature of P :
P b⇣ = K⇣0 +H 0⌃ 1M (⌥   ) (2.25)
The integrated log-likelihood (the likelihood of the data given the parameters but marginally
of the states) is evaluated at a high density point along the lines of Chib (1995) and, in
particular, at the posterior mean of the states: lnP (⌥|⇥) = lnP (⌥|⇥, b⇣) + lnP (b⇣|⇥)  
lnP (b⇣|⌥,⇥), where all terms are computed fast using the banded nature of the precisions.
Zero Lower Bound.
To study the post-2008 determinants of the labor share, I extract the shocks by simulating
the model, evaluated at the posterior parameter mean and with the ZLB binding, on the
2009-2016 data. As shown in Hirose and Inoue (2016), although the shocks are sensitive to
the incorporation of the ZLB, the parameter estimates become biased only with a lengthy
zero interest rate duration. Given the large model dimension, I do not adopt a fully non-linear
solution. Instead, I adopt the perfect foresight approach of Chen et al. (2012), examined
in Del Negro et al. (2015) and Linde´ et al. (2016). In a similar vein, Cagliarini and Kulish
(2013) examine solutions with anticipated structural changes.
The rational expectations solutions is viewed as the absorbing state in 2016Q1 – the first
interest rate hike took place in December 2015 – and onwards up to end of the sample in
2016Q4. The agents incorporate in their expectations the duration of the ZLB6. During the
ZLB period, ⌧ = zlb, and { 1,t, 2,t} in (3.26) are time-varying and pinned down by
6 I take a shortcut. As in Del Negro et al. (2015), the agents are myopic and do not forecast changes
in the duration of the ZLB. Contrary, though, to those authors who exogenously pin down the expected
duration of the ZLB through overnight index swap rates, the duration is entirely exogenous in the present
paper in order to speed up computations and given that the ZLB is not the main focus of the paper. Kulish
et al. (2017) find variation in the expected duration of the ZLB.
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 1,t = [ 0,zlb +  2,zlb 1,t+1]
 1 1,zlb (2.26)
 2,t = [ 0,zlb +  2,zlb 1,t+1]
 1 zlb (2.27)
with  t+1 being the rational expectations solution in 2016Q1.
2.1.11 Sampler And Estimated Models.
The Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to simulate draws from the non-
tractable posterior7. To deepen the understanding, I estimate the model with and without
labor share series and automation shocks.
2.1.12 Priors.
The priors are conventional and reported in Table (D.1)8. The persistence of automation
shocks is drawn from a Beta distribution centered at 0.5 with a 0.2 standard deviation (std).
The std of the associated innovations and measurement errors is drawn from the Inverse
Gamma distribution centered at 0.15 (1 std). The loading factors ( w, c) are sampled from
a disperse Normal distribution around 1 (0.5 std).
7The covariance of the jumping distribution is initialized at the prior and updated every 100k draws.
8   and g are set at the values chosen in Smets and Wouters (2007).   is fixed at 0.998. The std of
measurement errors associated with series other than wages and the labor share are drawn from a tight
Inverse Gamma centered at 0.01 (0.001 std).
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2.2 Findings
The presentation of the findings starts with the parameter estimates. It then delves into the
determinants of the labor share swings and their implications. The latter features the impact
of automation shocks, and sheds light on the model behavior that is heavily influenced by
the properties of the labor income share. Robustness checks are discussed at the end.
2.2.1 Posterior.
Table (D.1) collects the posterior parameter distribution9 – the four blocks display, in order,
the parameters associated with the micro foundations of the model, the stochastic structure,
the labor market, and the automation shocks. Most parameters obtain about the same value
in both model configurations, and are aligned with what is commonly found in the literature.
Nonetheless, some shift away from their values in the model without the LS to capture the
properties of the labor share swings.
Disturbances in production automation are persistent (0.9) and volatile (1.78). The loading
factor  ↵ di↵ers from one and implies that the two LS series exhibit distinct features that
the model disentangles. In fact, it is below one (0.55), suggesting that the model weighs the
fluctuations in the non-farm business sector more than the fluctuations in the non-financial
corporations. This finding is corroborated by the fact that the latter series is loaded with a
higher measurement error (0.62) than the former series is (0.46).
Some parameters associated with the labor market change fundamentally across the two
model configurations. Shifting from the model without the LS to that including the LS
amplifies the endogenous mechanisms of persistence and, in particular, wage indexation
from 0.07 to 0.76. As it is seen in later sections, this change play a pivotal role in the model
9The std of measurement errors for variables with a single observable series is relegated to the Appendix.
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behavior. Contrary to the model without the LS, in the model with the observed LS, the
loading factor for the compensation index exceeds 1 and implies that more weight is put on
that index than on the survey-based earnings which are loaded with sizable measurement
error. It is important to point out that although  w exceeds 1, it does so by a small margin
(0.19). The latter suggests that although the model weighs the compensation index more
than the earnings series, the earnings series still remains influential to the wage component
that is extracted from the data (in the opposite case, the loading factor would obtain higher
values). Furthermore, the persistence of wage markup shocks rises a tad from 0.98 to 0.99,
and the volatility of those shocks almost doubles. Wage stickiness decreases a tad.
Two shifts in the stochastic structure are noteworthy. First, the persistence of MEI shocks
decreases by about a half, from 0.91 to 0.48, despite a small increase in the volatility of
those shocks from 7.35 to 8.21. These changes have implications for the explanatory power
of MEI shocks that become apparent in the analysis that follows. Second, the parameters
associated with pricing change a tad. The highly persistent price markup shock of the model
without the LS, obtains a highly disperse distribution in the model with the LS. This result
is in line with the literature: price markup shocks are highly persistent and not volatile
when the relative price of investment in included in the model as in Justiniano et al. (2011),
but become less persistent and more volatile in models featuring a factor approach to labor
market observables as in Justiniano et al. (2013). The attenuated exogenous persistence of
price dynamics in the model with the LS is compensated with increases in price indexation,
as well as in the steady state inflation and price markup.
2.2.2 The Determinants of the Labor Share Swings.
In this section, I study the origins of the fluctuations in the U.S. labor income share.
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Table 2.1: Posterior Distribution
Prior Posterior Mean [5-95%]
Without LS With LS
capital share ↵ N (0.30, 0.05) 0.17 [0.16, 0.18] 0.18 [0.17, 0.19]
habit ⌘ B (0.70, 0.10) 0.88 [0.83, 0.93] 0.83 [0.73, 0.90]
inv. Frisch elast.   N (2.00, 1.00) 3.87 [2.77, 5.11] 3.91 [2.68, 5.16]
util. cost elast.  B (0.50, 0.10) 0.40 [0.27, 0.55] 0.47 [0.34, 0.61]
adj. cost elast. S N (4.00, 1.00) 5.18 [3.23, 6.96] 3.51 [1.78, 4.94]
price stickiness ⇣p B (0.60, 0.10) 0.73 [0.69, 0.78] 0.55 [0.48, 0.62]
price indexation ◆p B (0.50, 0.15) 0.13 [0.06, 0.22] 0.19 [0.08, 0.34]
MP resp. to int.rate ⇢r B (0.75, 0.10) 0.81 [0.77, 0.84] 0.82 [0.78, 0.85]
MP resp. to inflation  ⇡ N (1.70, 0.25) 1.67 [1.39, 1.95] 1.91 [1.64, 2.18]
MP resp. to gap  y N (0.12, 0.05) 0.04 [0.01, 0.07] 0.08 [0.04, 0.12]
MP resp. to growth   y N (0.12, 0.05) 0.23 [0.15, 0.31] 0.23 [0.15, 0.31]
composite growth   N (0.40, 0.03) 0.41 [0.37, 0.45] 0.41 [0.36, 0.45]
inv. price growth  ! N (0.30, 0.03) 0.30 [0.26, 0.35] 0.30 [0.26, 0.35]
inflation ⇡ N (0.62, 0.10) 0.65 [0.52, 0.81] 0.96 [0.82, 1.09]
st.st. wage markup  w N (0.50, 0.05) 0.50 [0.41, 0.58] 0.50 [0.42, 0.58]
st.st. price markup  p N (0.30, 0.05) 0.29 [0.22, 0.36] 0.41 [0.34, 0.48]
AR risk premium ⇢b B (0.50, 0.20) 0.62 [0.34, 0.84] 0.63 [0.36, 0.87]
std risk premium  b IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.09 [0.05, 0.15] 0.10 [0.05, 0.14]
AR MEI ⇢i B (0.50, 0.20) 0.91 [0.82, 0.99] 0.48 [0.22, 0.66]
std MEI  i IG (0.50, 1.00) 7.35 [5.62, 9.29] 8.21 [5.00, 11.11]
AR IST ⇢! B (0.20, 0.10) 0.14 [0.06, 0.24] 0.14 [0.06, 0.22]
std IST  ! IG (0.50, 1.00) 0.74 [0.68, 0.81] 0.74 [0.68, 0.80]
AR technology ⇢z B (0.40, 0.20) 0.11 [0.03, 0.20] 0.23 [0.08, 0.37]
std technology  z IG (0.50, 1.00) 0.97 [0.88, 1.07] 0.72 [0.62, 0.82]
AR price markup ⇢p B (0.50, 0.20) 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 0.52 [0.09, 0.98]
std price markup  p IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.13 [0.10, 0.17] 0.24 [0.18, 0.30]
std MP  mp IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.24 [0.22, 0.26] 0.25 [0.22, 0.27]
AR govt spending ⇢g B (0.50, 0.20) 0.98 [0.96, 0.99] 1.00 [0.99, 1.00]
std govt spending  g IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.28 [0.25, 0.30] 0.28 [0.26, 0.31]
tech. resp. to govt ⇢gz B (0.50, 0.20) 0.08 [0.04, 0.11] 0.09 [0.05, 0.13]
wage stickiness ⇣w B (0.60, 0.10) 0.72 [0.68, 0.76] 0.63 [0.52, 0.71]
wage indexation ◆w B (0.50, 0.15) 0.07 [0.04, 0.11] 0.76 [0.64, 0.87]
AR wage markup ⇢w B (0.50, 0.20) 0.98 [0.97, 0.99] 0.99 [0.97, 1.00]
std wage markup  w IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.04 [0.02, 0.05] 0.07 [0.03, 0.16]
factor for wages  w N (1.00, 0.50) 0.56 [0.43, 0.70] 1.19 [1.09, 1.29]
std m.e. earnings µew IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.32 [0.28, 0.37] 0.71 [0.65, 0.79]
std m.e. compensation µcw IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.66 [0.60, 0.72] 0.25 [0.17, 0.33]
AR labor share ⇢↵ B (0.50, 0.20) [, ] 0.90 [0.81, 0.98]
std labor share  ↵ IG (0.15, 1.00) [, ] 1.78 [1.50, 2.11]
factor for labor share  ↵ N (1.00, 0.50) [, ] 0.55 [0.43, 0.66]
std m.e. non farm ls µnfls IG (0.15, 1.00) [, ] 0.46 [0.41, 0.51]
std m.e. corporate ls µcls IG (0.15, 1.00) [, ] 0.62 [0.57, 0.67]
Marginal Likelihood -1484 -1863
Notes: “Without/With LS”: without/with multiple labor income share observables.
73
Business Cycles.
The last column of Table (2.2) quantifies the autonomous e↵ect of the model’s disturbances
on the fluctuations of the labor share by displaying its forecast error variance decomposi-
tion (FEVD) at di↵erent horizons (2 and 20 years ahead). Table (2.3) reports the same
decomposition in the model without the LS.
The lion’s share of the fluctuations in the labor share (lst) is attributed to automaton shocks
(66%) in the short run. Their influence, however, decreases to 31% in the long run. The
decrease stems from a weakening in the influence of automation shocks on output (from 29%
to 9%), because their influence on the real wage (about a third) and labor remains largely
unchanged across di↵erent horizons. In contrast, wage markup shocks, mirroring stochastic
variations in workers’ market power and, in turn, in labor market competitiveness, are the
main determinant of long-run fluctuations in the LS (62%) despite their moderate short-run
influence (19%). The long-run influence of wage markup shocks reflects their prominent
role in economy wide fluctuations. Their prominence contradicts the findings in the model
without the LS (Table 2.3) where MEI shocks are the most prominent force behind output
fluctuations. The introduction of the LS observables, hence, attenuates the impact of MEI
shocks and amplifies the impact of wage markup shocks. Put di↵erently, the influence of
MEI shocks on output is sensitive to observables associated with the labor market.
Demand side disturbances have a limited influence on the labor share at all horizons. A
result that stands out in the model without the LS is that the LS fluctuations are entirely
explained by supply side disturbances and, in particular, by the persistent price markup
shocks. With the introduction of observables for the labor share, the explanatory power
of price markup shocks falls drastically at all horizons, and that of wage markup shocks
rises. Furthermore, the fact that MEI and IST disturbances, that are tightly linked to the
evolution of the relative investment price, account for a negligible part of the labor income
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share (3/1%) suggests a limited interaction between the evolution of the relative investment
price and the labor share that di↵ers from the evidence of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).
Table 2.2: Business Cycles – with LS
variable
shock yt it ⇡t rt Lt wrt lst
technology 2/0 1/1 9/5 4/3 1/1 32/21 5/2
price markup 1/0 1/0 20/12 7/4 1/0 17/10 5/2
wage markup 38/83 15/47 33/60 23/58 57/89 3/8 19/62
IST 1/0 1/1 0/0 0/1 0/0 8/9 0/0
supply side 43/84 17/50 62/77 35/65 60/90 60/48 29/66
risk premium 9/2 2/1 14/8 27/14 12/2 1/1 1/0
MEI 15/3 61/33 5/3 10/6 17/3 6/13 3/1
govt spending 2/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 3/2 0/0 1/1
policy 2/0 1/0 7/4 18/9 3/1 0/0 0/0
demand side 28/7 64/35 27/16 55/29 35/8 8/14 5/3
automation 29/9 19/15 11/6 11/6 5/1 32/38 66/31
Table 2.3: Business Cycles – without LS
variable
shock yt it ⇡t rt Lt wrt lst
technology 2/1 0/0 8/6 6/3 2/1 8/1 6/0
price markup 21/42 6/15 33/33 16/14 17/26 87/96 90/98
wage markup 8/26 1/4 8/16 4/12 11/39 0/0 3/1
IST 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0
supply side 32/69 8/19 50/55 27/29 30/66 96/96 98/100
risk premium 9/2 1/0 4/3 7/5 11/4 0/0 0/0
MEI 56/28 91/80 44/41 55/60 56/29 3/4 1/0
govt spending 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0
policy 2/0 0/0 2/1 11/6 2/1 0/0 0/0
demand side 68/31 92/81 50/45 73/71 70/34 4/4 2/0
Notes: FEVD at the posterior mean 8/80 quarters ahead.
Historical Fluctuations and the Downward Trend.
Have the forces behind the evolution of the labor share varied over time? The structural per-
spective of the present paper allows to answer that question. Fig.(2.2) reveals an a rmative
answer by displaying the historical decomposition of the fluctuations in the labor share across
the model’s innovations grouped in demand and supply side shocks – automation shocks are
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not included in any of those groups. The influence of automation shocks evolves in waves.
During 1970-1985, automation shocks push the LS downwards. Their influence changes dur-
ing 1985-2000, when they exert an upward e↵ect on the LS. The post-2000 tumble of the
LS, before and during the zero lower bound period, is largely shaped by the influence of
automation shocks. This finding suggests that technical advances during that period largely
favored capital over labor in the production process. The post-2000 profound influence of
automation shocks on the LS decline is consistent with the evidence of Dao et al. (2017) and
Abdih and Danninger (2017) on the influence of automation on the downward trend of the
labor share.
Demand side shocks exert a small influence throughout the sample period, suggesting that
the forces driving the labor share rest outside the demand side of the economy. Furthermore,
during the 1970-1985 wave, supply side shocks balance out the influence of automation shocks
and sustain the labor share relative stable. During 1985-2000, supply side shocks edge out
automation shocks resulting in a gradually declining labor share. The decline is temporarily
reversed around 2000 before the subsequent tumble of the LS. During the latter, supply side
shocks are aligned with automation shocks.
2.2.3 Implications.
I investigate the implications of incorporating the labor share swings in the observation set
across several dimensions.
Economic Cycles.
As briefly mentioned in the above section, automation shocks influence business cycles. They
explain 29% and 9% of output cycles in the short and long run, respectively, about a third
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Figure 2.2: U.S. Labor Income Share
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Notes: Historical Decomposition of the deviation of the smooth Labor Income Share from its steady state.
1964Q2–2008Q4: Posterior mean influence of structural shocks. 2009Q1-2016Q4 simulated influence of
structural shocks at the posterior parameter mean. The categorization of shocks follows Table (2.2).
of real wage fluctuations, and about 20% of short-run investment. They exhibit a moderate
influence (about 10%) on inflation and the interest rate. Although their influence on labor is
small (5%), matching LS observables and allowing for automation shocks, decreases massively
the influence of MEI shocks on labor – from 56/29 to 17/3 – in favor of wage markup shocks.
Thus, labor is freed from being determined by investment demand innovations in favor of
innovations associated with the labor market.
According to Table (2.2), there are three major shifts in the determinants of aggregate
variables when matching the LS series. First, demand side shocks no longer are the main
determinant of the business cycle; they explain 68/31 and 28/7 of output cycles in the model
without and with LS series, respectively. Their attenuated role stems from a reduction in the
influence of MEI shocks which, for example, falls from 56/28 to 15/3 in terms of ouput, and
is mirrored in a moderate persistence parameter in Table (D.1). MEI shocks, however, retain
a large influence on investment (61/33), which is intuitive since those shocks are investment
demand shocks as argued in Moura (2018) as well. The fact that the MEI shock is the
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main driver of the business cycle in the model without the LS suggests that the findings
of Justiniano et al. (2011) are robust to the inclusion of multiple wage indicators in the
estimation. Nevertheless, the findings of the present paper demonstrate that when the wage
extracted from multiple wage series is disciplined by the labor share data, the determinants
of the business cycle change. With wages and the labor share sampled jointly, the influence
of MEI shocks declines in an analogous way to that found in Kaihatsu and Kurozumi (2014)
who study financial shocks in conjunction with MEI shocks and match financial data.
Second, the explanatory power of price markup shocks is attenuated for all variables, and
reflected in their moderate persistence. Third, wage markup shocks obtain an elevated role
associated with an increase in their persistence and volatility. Jointly sampling wages and
the LS, therefore, attributes a pronounced role to wage markup disturbances – this role is
in line with the evidence of Gal´ı et al. (2012b, 2012a).
Automation Shocks.
How are, though, automation disturbances di↵used in the economy? What are their economy
wide e↵ects? For example, automation shocks may lead to a production increase for a given
capital-to-labor ratio or to a substitution of labor with capital for no change in production.
I tackle those questions in Fig.(2.3). In response to automation shocks, output and capital
increase, whereas marginal cost, labor, and the labor share decrease10. Therefore, automation
shocks trigger both an output rise and a substitution of labor with capital. The labor share
decreases since the wage increase associated with the economic stimulus is small and cannot
compensate the combined e↵ect of the employment decline and output expansion. The
lowered marginal cost generates downward pressure to inflation and, in turn, to the interest
rate through the monetary policy rule. The influence of automation disturbances persists
10These responses can be understood from eq. (2.3 –2.5) in the paper, the associated equations in the
Appendix, and the fact that the steady state implies k/L > 1, where k = K/(A⌦).
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for several quarters, and only gradually raises capital.
Figure 2.3: Automation Shocks
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How are the automation disturbances disentangled from the other disturbances? Worth
emphasizing is the fact that labor and inflation exhibit counter-cyclical responses. As a
result of the labor counter-cyclicality, labor and capital move in opposite directions due
to the substitution of the former with the latter. Over time, labor overshoots its steady
state and demonstrates a pro-cyclicality – albeit a quantitatively small one compared to
its drop on impact. A counter-cyclical response of labor hours cannot be generated by any
other shock as it is seen in Fig.(2.6,2.7). This distinctive response, therefore, disentangles
automation shocks from all other shocks. On top of that response, automation innovations
are disentangled from demand side innovations on an additional ground, namely the inflation
response. They trigger counter-cyclical inflation through their e↵ect on production cost,
which is at odds with the pro-cyclical inflation response after all demand side disturbances
– see Fig.(2.6). Moreover, they di↵er from all supply disturbances but wage markup shocks
in terms of their pro-cyclical wage response and their counter-cyclical LS response.
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Furthermore, the equilibrium drop of labor shows that the model is not susceptible to the
critique of Acemoglou and Restrepo (2018) according to which production automation gen-
erates a drop in labor demand that cannot be matched by models featuring various forms
of capital-augmenting processes. It is important to add to the above that the fall in labor
cannot be obtained by other exotic shocks a↵ecting capital, namely utilization and deprecia-
tion shocks – Furlanetto and Seneca (2014) show that those shocks spur a pro-cyclical labor
response in a New Keynesian DSGE model.
Fig.(2.4) gauges the autonomous e↵ect of exogenous shifts in automation on the evolution of
U.S. output, inflation, and the real wage. The figure suggests persistent waves of influence
on output and the real wage, and a small impact on inflation. During 1970-1985, while they
have a negative influence on the labor share, automation shocks boost output and the real
wage. In contrast, during 1985-2000, while they favor labor and the labor income share,
automation shifts have a negative e↵ect on output and the real wage on average. During the
post-2000 tumble of the labor income share, those disturbances trigger a rather steep upward
e↵ect on output and the real wage. The fact that those shocks do not strongly commove
with either demand side or supply side shocks corroborates earlier evidence on the unique
features of those shocks that disentangle them from other aggregate innovations.
The Cyclicality of the Labor Income Share.
Is the labor share pro-cyclical, counter-cyclical, or a-cyclical? RBC models using U.S. data
over the 1970s-1990s found a counter-cyclical labor income share [Young, 2004; Boldrin
and Horvath, 1995; Gomme and Greenwood, 1995]. In accordance with those papers, the
findings of Table (2.4) suggest a counter-cyclical share in the 1964-2008 U.S. data;  0.5 and
 0.3 are the correlations in the non-farm business sector and the non-financial corporations,
respectively.
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Figure 2.4: U.S. Output, Inflation, and the Real Wage
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Notes: Historical decomposition of cyclical fluctuations in output, inflation, and
the real wage. The posterior e↵ect of innovations is displayed.
Table (2.4), in fact, reveals a weakness of the DSGE model estimated on multiple wage
indicators but not multiple LS series: the model implies a pro-cyclical labor share (0.6) that
is at odds with the data. The model-implied pro-cyclicality is associated with overstated
comovements between the labor share and the real wage (1.0), as well as between the labor
share and employment (0.4), compared to the moderate comevement between wages and the
LS in the data (0/0.5 and -0.1/0.3 for the non-farm business sector and the non-financial
corporations, respectively) and the weak comevement between labor and the LS in the data
(-0.1). The present paper, therefore, demonstrates that including multiple wage indicators
in the canonical NK DSGE model – an approach undertaken in several papers [Gal´ı et al.,
2012a; Justiniano et al., 2013; Linde´ et al., 2016; Charalampidis, 2018] aiming to strengthen
the identification of wage markup shocks – spurs model-implied comovements that are at
odds with the data. It is important to clarify, though, that the pro-cyclical LS emerges only
when the model is matched to multiple wages. It does not emerge in Smets and Wouters
(2007) where the counter-cyclicality of the model-implied LS is -0.5 and replicates that in
the data shown in Table (2.4) since only the compensation index is included therein.
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In contrast, when the estimation features observables for the labor share, on top of multiple
wage indicators, the model-implied cyclicality of the labor share is disciplined to follow that
in the data. The evidence of Table (2.4) corroborates this argument by revealing a counter-
cyclical LS ( 0.6), a moderate comevement between the LS and the real wage (0.3), and a
low comovement between the LS and employment. The comovement of the LS with either the
nominal interest rate or inflation is aligned with that in the data in both models. Therefore,
including information reflecting salient features of the labor share entails an improvement
in the model performance in a similar spirit to Rios-Rull and Santaeula`lia-Llopis (2010).
Fig.(2.5) displays the smooth swings of the extracted labor share in the model with and
without observables for it. The figure confirms the existence of di↵erences in their evolution.
In the Appendix, I provide similar evidence pertaining to the extracted wage.
Table 2.4: Cyclical Properties of the Labor Income Share
correlation  lst, yt  lst, wrt  lst, Lt  lst,⇡t  lst, rt
model
without LS 0.6 1.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.1
with LS -0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
data
non farm LS -0.5 -0.0/0.5* -0.1 -0.0 0.1
non fin. corp. LS -0.3 -0.1/0.3* -0.1 -0.0 0.1
Notes. Model correlations are computed at the posterior mean of smooth states. *with
earnings/compensation series.
Explaining the Changes in Aggregate Shocks.
Why do demand side and price markup shocks lose influence while wage markup shocks
gain influence when LS series are matched? Although demand side and, in particular, MEI
shocks trigger a counter-cyclical LS response (fig.2.6), the response is of a moderate mag-
nitude compared to that triggered by wage markup and automation shocks. Furthermore,
that response rests on the elevated wage indexation (0.76, Table D.1) in the model with the
LS compared to the model without the LS observables (0.07, Table D.1). Due to index-
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Figure 2.5: Labor Income Share Swings
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Notes: The figure displays the (posterior mean of the smooth) swings in the
labor share in the model with and without labor income share observables.
ation, wage inflation remains tightly linked to inflation and less responsive to the general
equilibrium e↵ects of disturbances taking place outside of the labor market. As a result of
the tightly linked wages to inflation, the response of the real wage is attenuated (fig.2.6,2.7)
and the labor share is counter-cyclical despite the pro-cyclical response of labor and the real
wage to demand side shocks. This attenuated wage response explains the low comovement
between the labor share and real wages (0.3) in Table (2.2) which di↵ers from their high
comevement (1.0) in the model without the LS series. This evidence suggests that the wage
response plays a catalytic role in shaping the response of the labor share.
Price markup shocks lose influence because they spur a pro-cyclical response in the labor
share, displayed in Fig.2.7, which is at odds with the counter-cyclical LS in the data. In
contrast, wage markup shocks generate a counter-cyclical LS response (fig.2.7) that is aligned
with the data and, hence, favored by the model. Therefore, exogenous shifts in the demand
side are attenuated in favor of shifts in labor market in the model with the LS.
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Figure 2.6: Demand Side Disturbances
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Figure 2.7: Supply Side Disturbances
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Notes: IRFs evaluated at the posterior mean. Black/Grey: model with/without labor share observables.
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2.2.4 Robustness Checks.
Despite that the prior specification is in line with what is commonly considered in the liter-
ature, I investigate the robustness of the results to it. The forecast error variance decompo-
sition at the prior mean shows a substantially smaller influence of automation shocks than
that obtained at the paper; these shocks account for about 1% of economy wide fluctuations
and 10% of the LS swings; see Appendix. These results suggest that the prior is not dog-
matic. Although the long-run influence of automation shocks on the LS at the prior is close
to that obtained at the posterior mean, there are considerable di↵erences in the influence
of the other shocks. In particular, computations at the prior mean weigh price markup and
technology shocks considerably more than wage markup shocks compared to the weighting
associated with the computations at the posterior mean. In addition, computations at the
prior mean suggest zero influence of demand side shocks on the LS which di↵ers from the
5/3% influence at the posterior mean shown in Table (2.2).
Moreover, I undertake some steps towards an external validation of the model-implied au-
tomation shocks. In particular, I examine whether these shocks exhibit an association with
measures of capital intensity which can be viewed as proxies of the degree of routinization
of production. Although using proxies is not fully satisfactory due to the fact that they may
be influenced by several factors and due to their availability in an annual frequency since
1988, they provide a viable way to examine the properties of automation shocks because the
empirical papers studying automation that were mentioned in the introduction use survey
data at various years which, however, are not consecutive and not enough to run time series
regressions. I use the (growth rate of) the capital intensity index in the private and non-farm
business sectors, as well as in manufacturing, compiled by the BLS. Following Milani (2017)
who uses the same identification approach on expectational shocks, I obtain the unexplained
part of the capital intensity indices from their regression on output, inflation, and the interest
rate, and examine its association with the model-implied automation shocks (↵t). I conduct
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the analysis during 1989-2016 to exploit the largest possible time span – the results for the
1989-2008 window are relegated to the Appendix. Fig.(2.8) shows that the model-implied
automation shocks commove with the unexplained part of the capital intensity indices (about
0.5 correlation)11. This result implies that the automation shocks are connected to capital
intensity and, in turn, to the degree of automation in the private sector.
Figure 2.8: Capital Intensity and Automation Shocks, 1988-2016
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In addition, I consider the case in which shifts in the relative price of investment spur shifts
in production automation. To this end, I re-estimate the model by including correlated
disturbances and, more specifically, the following specification for automation shocks
b↵t = ⇢↵b↵t 1 + ⌫!b !t 1 +  ↵✏↵t (2.28)
where a Beta prior centered around 0.5 (0.2 std) is assigned to ⌫!. The data do not favor
the above specification – the posterior mean of ⌫! is 0.12.
11During the 1989-2008 window the comovement is weaker (about 0.2); see the Appendix.
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2.3 Concluding Remarks
The present paper is the first that brings series for the labor income share into the workhorse
medium-scale NK DSGE model through a latent factor approach, and examines their drivers
and their implications, while extracting automation shocks that capture exogenous shifts in
routine-biased technology from a macroeconomic perspective. The paper shows that wage
markup shocks and automation shocks account for the lion’s share of fluctuations in the labor
income share, whereas disturbances associated with the investment side of the economy, such
as shocks to the marginal e ciency of investment and investment-specific technology shocks,
have limited influence. Automation shocks, in particular, play a large role during the post-
2000 tumble of the labor share, generate a distinctive counter-cyclical response in labor that
cannot be matched by any other disturbance, and explain 29/9% of output fluctuations in
the short/long run. In order to match the counter-cyclical evolution of the labor share,
the model attenuates the influence of MEI shocks in favor of wage markup and automation
shocks, and yields a high degree of wage indexation that renders the real wage less a↵ected
by general equilibrium e↵ects generated by disturbances outside of the labor market.
This paper sets the stage for future explorations across di↵erent dimensions. First, the labor
income share can be used to inform the underlying mechanisms in papers featuring heteroge-
neous agents, such as workers and capitalists, as well as high- and low-skill workers. Second,
shifting away from the Cobb-Douglas production function to alternative specifications such
a CES [Cantore et al., 2015; Di Pace and Villa, 2016] or task-based approaches [Acemoglou
and Restrepo, 2018, 2017a, 2017b], albeit challenging, can potentially illustrate further the
role of automation. Third, enriching the observation set with additional indicators capturing
automation may deepen the understanding of its macroeconomic e↵ects.
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Chapter 3
On Unemployment And Wage Cycles:
Euro Area, 1999–2016
3.1 Introduction
The financial collapse that plunged the Euro Area into the Great Recession led to a turmoil
that unveiled fundamental problems in labor, goods, and financial markets. It resulted in
an output trough and an unemployment spike in the whole Euro Area and, especially, in
the southern periphery from about 6-9% in 2008 to about 12% in Italy, 17% in Portugal,
and more than 25% in Spain and Greece in 2013. Despite these sizable swings, still little is
known about the cyclical drivers of unemployment in those economies.
This lack of evidence on the sources of unemployment fluctuations in those economies is at
odds with the accumulating evidence pertaining to unemployment in U.S. [Gal´ı et al., 2012a,
2012b; Canova et al., 2013; Casares et al., 2014; Furlanetto and Groshenny, 2016]. Even
analyses investigating various dimensions of the Great Recession in the southern periphery
[Eggertsson et al., 2014; in ’t Veld et al., 2014; Gourinchas et al., 2016; Kollmann et al., 2016;
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Albonico et al., 2016] abstract from unemployment, and ultimately preclude understanding
the factors that shaped its spike during that tumultuous period. This abstraction relates to
the fact that models tailored to explain business cycles in small open economies [Justiniano
and Preston, 2010; Adolfson et al., 2005, 2007] do not feature unemployment. Christiano
et al. (2011) is an exception that incorporates labor search in a model for Sweden. Shedding
light on the drivers of unemployment, though, can inform policy making since growing un-
employment raises the pressure for a policy reaction [Draghi, 2014], labor market conditions
influence policy decisions [Gerlach and Stuart, 2016] and price dynamics [Rudebusch and
Williams, 2016], and monetary policy can have desirable stabilization properties depending
on the origins of unemployment cycles [Gal´ı, 2011].
The present paper fills the above void by shedding light on the recurrent sources of unemploy-
ment cycles in the Euro Area and the southern economies (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain)
during 1999Q1–2016Q4. It does so through the lens of an estimated structural model and
by extracting information from a plethora of wage indicators. I elaborate on those features
below.
Unemployment in the model stems from a wage markup above the competitive market-
clearing wage. This perspective on unemployment is relevant for the southern economies
where labor markets are notoriously rigid and involve staggered wage setting. The ap-
proach is along the lines of Gali (2011) who introduces the extensive margin of labor supply
and heterogeneous labor disutility across workers in Erceg et al. (2000). In a similar vein,
Casares (2010) studies labor supply and demand mismatches due to wage stickiness. A
closed-economy model similar to that of Gal´ı et al. (2012b) is considered for the Euro Area.
To model business cycle in the southern economies, unemployment is introduced in the small
open economy model of Justiniano and Preston (2010), which is the limit of Gal´ı and Mona-
celli (2005) as shown in De Paoli (2009), featuring fixed exchange rates, union wide monetary
policy, imperfect insurance across economies, and nominal rigidities.
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The time-varying wage markup triggering unemployment entails an endogenous component
that responds to economy wide conditions, as well as an exogenous component defined as the
wage markup disturbance. The disturbance, modeled as exogenous shifts in the elasticity
of substitution across labor types, generates movements in workers’ market power which, in
turn, mirror changes in labor market competitiveness. Following the approach of Gal´ı et al.
(2012b, 2012a) in addressing the critique of Chari et al. (2009), I identify those disturbances
and disentangle them from labor disutility shocks capturing developments in labor supply,
by postulating an autoregressive structure for both, and by using the unemployment rate
and multiple wage indicators as observables. Three wage measures based on administrative
data and a survey-based measure are used in the estimation. Justiniano et al. (2013) use
two wage indicators, but postulate white noise wage markup shocks.
The first set of results involves four observations. First, consistently with the U.S. evidence
of Gal´ı et al. (2012b), persistent shifts in labor market competitiveness, with a volatility that
is smaller than that of the other disturbances, constitute the main source of long-run unem-
ployment cycles: they explain 80–97% and 65% of those cycles in the periphery and the Euro
Area, respectively. Second, the short-run impact of those shifts depends on the comovement
– captured by the correlation – between the latent wage series and unemployment: the higher
that comovement is, the lower the impact and volatility of wage markup shocks are. Thus, in
Greece and Italy, that are characterized by low comovement, shifts of moderate volatility in
labor market competitiveness play the dominant role in the short-run unemployment cycles
by explaining 72% and 88% of them, respectively. Conversely, in the Euro Area, Spain, and
Portugal, that are characterized by high comovement, the influence of low-volatility shifts
in labor market competitiveness is attenuated and accounts for a moderate share of unem-
ployment cycles. In particular, the combination of demand and supply side shocks is about
equal to the contribution of wage markup shocks in Portugal (25%+20% vs 42%) and Spain
(18% + 17% vs 49%), and even exceeds it in the Euro Area (50% + 26% vs 24%). Third,
the importance of labor market innovations (wage markup and labor disutility shocks) is
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larger in the periphery than in the Euro Area for short-run unemployment (54-90% vs 25%),
as well as for nominal wage inflation (53-85% vs 13%) and price inflation (22-53% vs 7%).
In fact, in the Euro Area, demand side shocks exert a sizable influence on those variables.
Fourth, unemployment cycles in the periphery are entirely ignited by domestic rather than
euro-area disturbances.
After having examined the determinants of unemployment over the whole sample, the present
paper zooms in the episode of the Great Recession, and pins down the factors – the mix of
demand, supply, and labor market disturbances – that shaped the unemployment spike, in a
similar spirit to Ireland (2011) and Gal´ı et al. (2012a). It shows that, in the Euro Area, the
two unemployment humps, as well as the output troughs, during the two phases of the reces-
sion – the onset (2008-11) and the sovereign debt crisis (2011-14) – are largely attributed to
two factors: an exogenous contraction in demand, and an adversarial shift in wage markups.
The sizable influence of wage markup shocks emerges only during the recession. In con-
trast, in the pre-2008 period, demand side disturbances account for unemployment cycles.
Although wage markup shocks negatively a↵ect unemployment and output, they slow down
the fall in wages and prices stemming from the demand contraction.
In the southern economies, adversarial shifts in labor market competitiveness contribute to
the unemployment spike to a larger extent than they do in the Euro Area. In fact, they are
the main determinant of unemployment during the Great Recession. The large influence of
wage markup shocks during that tumultuous period is associated with a drastic weakening
of the unemployment–wage comovement. As for the contribution of the other disturbances,
during the first phase of the recession, unemployment rises due to di↵erent causes across
countries, likely reflecting asynchronous business cycles: due to negative demand side shocks
in Spain and Italy, and due to supply side shocks in Greece and Portugal. During the
second phase, a demand-side contraction that encapsulates the sovereign debt crisis, as well
as an abrupt decrease in labor disutility that raises the labor force, increase unemployment.
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Euro-area shocks have a persistently adversarial, albeit small in magnitude, contribution
throughout the two phases.
Turning to wage cycles, the present paper documents the phenomenon of subdued wage
growth, observed in advanced economies [Hee Hong et al., 2018; Bell and Blanchflower,
2018; European Commission, 2017; Ciccarelli and Osbat, 2017], for the Euro Area and the
southern economies. During 2014Q3–16Q4 – a period of positive detrended output growth
in the Euro Area – the cumulative growth rate of real wages is smaller than that of output,
negative, and on average smaller in the periphery than in the Euro Area. The driving factors
of the output–wage di↵erential paint a picture of a certain degree of country heterogeneity
that is aligned with the findings of the aforementioned papers. Despite that heterogeneity,
the results suggest that in all the economies, except for Italy, a sizable weakening of workers’
market power is a catalytic factor in the subdued wage growth.
To asses the robustness of the model’s empirical performance, I compare the model-implied
unemployment gap, defined as the deviation of unemployment from its natural counterpart,
to its reduced-form estimates. The two measures are remarkably well aligned in the Euro
Area and Portugal. In Spain and Italy, the alignment is qualitatively good despite some
quantitative di↵erences. In Greece, the model-implied gap is aligned to the empirical es-
timates up to 2008, but becomes at odds with them thereafter. Thus, the alignment is
better in economies with high unemployment–wage comovement. Overall, the gaps suggest
a lengthy economic slack during the Great Recession, as well as an economic “over-heating”
in the pre-2008 period.
Additional sensitivity checks suggest that altering some dimensions may boost a tad the
short-run impact of shifts in worker’s market power: matching the euro-area medium-term
private sector unemployment forecasts, or allowing for time variation in the deep parameters
associated with wage setting, strengthens the influence of those shifts over that of demand
side shocks. Including a shadow rate to capture the e↵ect of unconventional policies has a
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negligible e↵ect.
Finally, the paper contributes in the literature of Bayesian estimation of Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium models [An and Schorfheide, 2006] by being the first that operationalizes
the e cient simulation of states of Chan and Jeliazkov (2009) in the Bayesian estimation of
a structural model. These authors consider reduced-form models, and provide an alternative
state space approach to the filtering recursions that exploits the sparse and block-banded
nature of precision matrices, leads to computational gains of 20-40% in running time, and
does not require the prediction error decomposition of the likelihood. Applying that approach
in the present paper is a fruitful enterprise to cope with the structural model’s large state
space dimensionality that stems from including both a peripheral economy and the core of
the Euro Area, and renders the exploration of the posterior surface time-demanding.
In closing, it is worth mentioning that the above results are based on a linear solution of
the structural model. Thus, the case of downward nominal wage rigidities (DNWR), that
hinges on a non-linear solution of the model, cannot be examined and remains outside the
scope of the paper. A connection of the paper’s results on the comovement of wages and
unemployment to the DNWR without further examination is not warranted because recent
studies using high-quality administrative data find no DNWR before and during the Great
Recession in several Eurozone economies [Verdugo, 2016] and Ireland [Doris et al., 2015]1,
and challenge previous survey-based studies [Fabiani et al., 2010; Babecky´ et al., 2010].
Section 2 discusses the structural model. Section 3 develops the estimation approach. Section
4 presents the results. Section 5 conducts the sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
1Kurmann and McEntarfer (2017) and Elsby et al. (2016) find similar evidence for the U.S.A.
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3.2 Structural Model
The model for the Euro Area is a closed-economy DSGE model with unemployment as
in Gal´ı et al. (2012b) but without capital. The model for a peripheral economy is a small
open economy model [Justiniano and Preston, 2010], featuring nominal rigidities, indexation,
monopolistic competition, staggered price setting, linear production, imperfect exchange rate
pass-through [Monacelli, 2005] and cross-country insurance [Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003].
In that structure, I integrate unemployment stemming from staggered wage setting and the
market power of labor unions a` la Gali (2011), and a regime of fixed nominal exchange rates.
Each economy is populated by a large number of identical families consisted of individuals
who di↵er in terms of their labor type and disutility, supply labor along the extensive margin,
and are perfectly insured. There is no immigration.
I describe the log-linearized equilibrium conditions below, and relegate their derivation to the
Appendix. Lower-case letters denote log-deviations from a non-stochastic zero growth steady
state. Starred (non-starred) variables and parameters pertain to the Euro Area (periphery).
I focus on the periphery when describing equations and parameters that are isomorphic in
all the economies.
According to the Euler equation (3.1/3.2), consumption (ct) depends on a weighted average
of its past and future values, on an interest rate, on expected inflation (Et⇡t+1), and on an
AR(1) demand (preference) shock ( d,t) with associated parameters {⇢d,  d}. The composite
parameters are given by c1 = 1/(1 + ⌘) and c2 = (1   ⌘)/(1 + ⌘), where ⌘ is the external
habit. The coe cient of relative risk aversion is unitary as in Gal´ı et al. (2012b). Rational
expectational operators are defined over all states of nature. The interest rate in the Euro
Area (i⇤t ) is set by monetary policy (3.3) in response to its last period’s value, inflation (⇡
⇤
p,t),
and the output gap (y⇤t  y⇤,ft ), with the associated reaction coe cients being ⇢⇤,  ⇤⇡, and  ⇤,
respectively. y⇤,ft stands for output in the flexible price and wage allocation that does not
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feature wage and price markup shocks. "⇤mp,t denotes a white noise policy innovation with
standard deviation (std)  ⇤mp. The interest rate in the periphery (it) is determined in the
uncovered interest rate parity (3.4) as a function of the union wide rate and a debt elastic
premium with elasticity  , capturing the cross-country financial market incompleteness. The
asset position (dt) of the periphery is traced out by the budget constraint (3.5) that involves
the real exchange rate (qt), the terms of trade (st), and output (yt).
Turning to the labor market, workers endogenize the market clearing wage and participate
in the market as long as that wage exceeds their disutility of work. In the equilibrium, the
labor force (lt) is defined as the mass of workers whose labor disutility lies below that of
the worker who is indi↵erent between participating in and staying out of the market. It
is pinned down by condition (3.13/3.18) that implies an equalization of the real wage, wt,
to the labor disutility (expressed in consumption units) of the workers who participate in
the market.   stands for the inverse Frisch elasticity along the extensive margin. zt is a
smooth consumption trend determined in (3.14/3.19) as a weighted average of its past value
and the inverse marginal consumption utility. ! regulates the consumption wealth e↵ects
on labor supply and is added by Gal´ı et al. (2012b) to address the pro-cyclicality of labor
supply in response to monetary policy innovations. It reconciles a balanced growth path
with an arbitrarily small wealth e↵ect in separable preferences.   ,t captures changes in
labor disutility and is modeled as an AR(1) process with associated parameters {⇢x,  x}.
Once in the market, workers of di↵erent types form monopolistically competitive unions that
sell labor to a perfectly competitive labor aggregator and set wages in a staggered fashion,
leading to the wage Phillips curve (3.16/3.21). The latter determines wage inflation as a
function of its future value, of past and current price inflation rates stemming from wage
indexation to past price inflation according to parameter  w, and of the wage markup given
by the deviation of unemployment from its natural level (unt ). The latter is obtained from the
same model solved under flexible prices and wages, and is given by unt =  w,t/ .  w,t stands
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for the AR(1) wage markup shock with parameters {⇢w,  w}. It stems from the exogenous
time-varying elasticity of substitution across labor types, and leads to changes in the market
power of workers and, thus, in the competitiveness of the labor market [Justiniano et al.,
2013; Gal´ı et al., 2012b]. The slope coe cient reads as w = (1  ✓w)(1 ✓w)/[✓w(1+ ✏w)],
where ✏w is the steady state elasticity of substitution across labor types, and ✓w governs the
frequency of wage adjustments. Each union provides the labor that is associated with the
equilibrium wage. The latter, however, exceeds the competitive wage due to the staggered
wage setting. The resulting wage markup leads to unemployment since employment is lower
than what would otherwise prevail in an economy of perfectly flexible wages. Unemployment
is defined as the di↵erence between the labor force and employment (nt) in (3.15/3.20).
(3.12/3.17) is an identity defining the real wage as the inflation di↵erential between nominal
wages and prices.
In the supply side, production (3.7/3.11) is linear and includes an AR(1) technology shock
( a,t) with associated parameters {⇢a,  a}. In the Euro Area, prices are set in a staggered way
and partially indexed to past inflation according to  ⇤p . Inflation is determined by the Phillips
curve (3.6) as function of its past and future value, the wage, the AR(1) price markup shock
 ⇤p,t with associated parameters {⇢⇤p,  ⇤p}, and technology. The composite parameters are:
⇡⇤1 =  /(1 +   
⇤
p), ⇡
⇤
2 =  
⇤
p/(1 +   
⇤
p), and 
⇤
p = (1  ✓⇤p)(1  ✓⇤p )/[✓⇤p(1 +   ⇤p)]. ✓⇤p captures
the degree of price stickiness.   is the common discount factor across economies. (3.8) yields
price inflation (⇡p,t) in a peripheral economy as the weighted average of domestic-good (⇡h,t)
and imported-good (⇡m,t) inflation rates. 1  ⌧ 2 [0, 1] is the share of domestic goods in the
consumption basket (home bias).
Intermediate good producers hire workers from the labor aggregator that packages hetero-
geneous labor supplied by unions, set prices in a staggered way, and sell goods in domestic
and euro-area markets. The inflation of the domestically produced goods is determined by
the forward-looking Phillips curve (3.9), where ⇡h1 ⌘  /(1 +   h), ⇡h2 ⌘  h/(1 +   h), and
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h ⌘ (1  ✓h)(1  ✓h )/[✓h(1+  h)]. It is, thus, sensitive to real marginal costs given by the
real wage and the terms of trade after accounting for technology and AR(1) price markup
( h,t) shocks with associated parameters {⇢h,  h}. The price markup shocks stem from a
time-varying elasticity of substitution across domestic varieties. ✓h governs the frequency of
price adjustments, and  h reflects indexation to past inflation. Monopolistically competitive
importers buy goods at the euro-area price, and sell them in a peripheral market by setting
prices in a staggered way. The imported-good inflation rate (3.10) depends on its past and
future values, as well as on deviations from the law of one price, captured in the di↵erence
between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade (weighted by the home bias), where
⇡m1 ⌘  /(1 +   m), ⇡m2 ⌘  m/(1 +   m), and m ⌘ (1  ✓m)(1  ✓m )/[✓m(1 +   m)].  m,t
is an AR(1) import price shock with parameters {⇢m,  m}, and stems from a time-varying
elasticity of substitution across imported varieties. ✓m governs the frequency of price adjust-
ments, and  m reflects indexation to past inflation.
(3.22) and (3.23) yield the market clearing conditions in the Euro Area and the periphery,
respectively. Both conditions include a government spending shock ( g,t) with associated
parameters (⇢g,  g). ⌫ > 0 is the trade elasticity between domestic and imported goods. The
real exchange rate and the terms of trade are pinned down by the cross-country inflation
di↵erential in (3.24) and the di↵erential between imported- and domestic-good inflation rates
in (3.25), respectively.
Two remarks are in oder. First, the policy rule is stylized and does not account for the possi-
bility of a binding zero lower bound (ZLB). The ZLB applies since 2014Q4 and, thus, a↵ects
only a small part of the sample. I return to this issue in the robustness analysis. Second,
neither block features capital accumulation, precluding the identification of an investment
shock. Abstracting from that shock, though, is innocuous since the response of labor market
variables to it is similar to that generated after other demand-side shocks like those already
included; see Gal´ı et al. (2012b).
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The ten equations in the first column of Table (3.1) describe the equilibrium dynamics of the
euro-area model for the variables {c⇤t , y⇤t , z⇤t , l⇤t , w⇤t , n⇤t , u⇤t , ⇡⇤w,t, ⇡⇤p,t, i⇤t}. The fifteen equations
in the second column describe the equilibrium dynamics in a peripheral economy for the
variables {ct, yt, zt, lt, wt, nt, ut, ⇡w,t, ⇡p,t, ⇡h,t, ⇡m,t, it, dt, qt, st}.
Both blocks feature seven structural innovations. Six of them are common to both blocks:
price and wage markup, demand, technology, spending, and labor disutility shocks. The
euro-area block also features a policy innovation, and the peripheral block an import price
markup innovation.
3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 E cient simulation.
The present paper operationalizes the e cient simulation of states of Chan and Jeliazkov
(2009) in a full-fledged structural framework. Those authors provide an alternative approach
to the Kalman filtering [Durbin and Koopman, 2001] that exploits the insights of Fahrmeir
and Kaufmann (1991) on the nature of sparse and block-banded precision matrices.
The equilibrium conditions are casted in the form:  0(⇥)⇠t =  1(⇥)⇠t 1 +  (⇥)✏t + ⇧⌘t,
where the matrices { 0, 1, } are functions of the parameter vector ⇥, ⇠t is the (nq ⇥ 1)
state vector, and ⌘t collects the expectational errors. The structural shocks are grouped in
the (n✏ ⇥ 1) vector ✏t. (3.26) gives the VAR(1) representation of the rational expectations
solution of Sims (2002).
⇠t =  1(⇥)⇠t 1 +  2(⇥)✏t , ✏t ⇠ N(0n✏ , In✏), 8t   2 (3.26)
98
Table 3.1: Log-Linearized Equilibrium
Euro Area Block Small Open Economy Block
Demand Demand
c⇤t = c
⇤
1Etc
⇤
t+1 + (1  c⇤1)c⇤t 1   c⇤2[i⇤t
  Et⇡⇤t+1   (1  ⇢⇤d) ⇤d,t] (3.1)
ct = c1Etct+1 + (1  c1)ct 1   c2[it
  Et⇡t+1   (1  ⇢d) d,t] (3.2)
Policy Financial Structure
i⇤t = ⇢
⇤i⇤t 1 + (1  ⇢⇤)[ ⇤⇡⇡⇤p,t
+  ⇤(y⇤t   y⇤,ft )] + "⇤mp,t (3.3)
it = i
⇤
t    dt (3.4)
ct + ⌧(⌧st + qt) + dt =  
 1dt 1 + yt    g,t
(3.5)
Supply Supply
⇡⇤p,t = ⇡
⇤
1Et⇡
⇤
p,t+1 + ⇡
⇤
2⇡
⇤
p,t 1
+ ⇤p[w
⇤
t    ⇤a,t +  ⇤p,t] (3.6)
y⇤t = n
⇤
t +  
⇤
a,t (3.7)
⇡p,t = (1  ⌧)⇡h,t + ⌧⇡m,t (3.8)
⇡h,t = ⇡h1Et⇡h,t+1 + ⇡h2⇡h,t 1
+ h [wt    a,t +  h,t + ⌧st] (3.9)
⇡m,t = ⇡m1Et⇡m,t+1 + ⇡m2⇡m,t 1
+ m [qt   (1  ⌧)st +  m,t]
(3.10)
yt = nt +  a,t (3.11)
Labor Market Labor Market
w⇤t = w
⇤
t 1 + ⇡
⇤
w,t   ⇡⇤p,t (3.12)
w⇤t =  
⇤l⇤t + z
⇤
t +  
⇤
 ,t (3.13)
z⇤t = (1  !⇤)z⇤t 1 + (!⇤/(1  ⌘⇤))⇤
(c⇤t   ⌘⇤c⇤t 1) (3.14)
u⇤t = l
⇤
t   n⇤t (3.15)
⇡⇤w,t =  
⇤
w⇡
⇤
p,t 1 +  [Et⇡
⇤
w,t+1    ⇤w⇡⇤p,t]
  ⇤w ⇤(u⇤t   u⇤,nt ) (3.16)
wt = wt 1 + ⇡w,t   ⇡p,t (3.17)
wt =  lt + zt +   ,t (3.18)
zt = (1  !)zt 1
+ (!/(1  ⌘))(ct   ⌘ct 1) (3.19)
ut = lt   nt (3.20)
⇡w,t =  w⇡p,t 1 +   (Et⇡w,t+1    w⇡pt)
  w (ut   unt ) (3.21)
Market Clearing Market Clearing
y⇤t = c
⇤
t +  
⇤
g,t (3.22) yt = (1  ⌧)ct + ⌧⌫(qt + st) + ⌧c⇤t +  g,t
(3.23)
International Prices
qt = qt 1 + ⇡⇤p,t   ⇡p,t (3.24)
st = st 1 + ⇡m,t   ⇡h,t (3.25)
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{ 1, 2} are non-linear functions of ⇥. ⇠1 is initialized at the observed data for observed
variables and at zero otherwise, with a covariance D being the steady state covariance of the
state vector evaluated at the prior mean of ⇥. Defining the reduced-form errors, ✏˜t =  2✏t
for t > 1 and ✏˜1 = ✏1, and stacking (3.26) across time yields:
266666664
Inq . . . . . . . . .
  1 Inq . . . . . .
. . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .   1 Inq
377777775
266666664
⇠1
⇠2
...
⇠T
377777775 =
266666664
✏˜1
✏˜2
...
✏˜T
377777775 ,
266666664
✏˜1
✏˜2
...
✏˜T
377777775 ⇠ N
0B@0Tnq ,
264D . . .... ⌦⌦ IT 1
375
1CA (3.27)
where ⌦ ⌘  2 02. In matrix notation, the above equation reads as
Z⇠ = ✏˜ , ✏˜ ⇠ N(0Tnq , K 1✏˜ ) (3.28)
where ⇠ ⌘ [⇠01, ⇠02 . . . , ⇠0T ]0 is the (Tnq⇥1) vector of states, ✏˜ ⌘ [✏˜01, ✏˜02 . . . , ✏˜0T ]0 is the (Tnq⇥1)
vector of errors, and K✏˜ is the sparse and block-banded precision of the latter. A change of
variable transformation yields the prior state distribution, P (⇠|⇥), with ⇠|⇥ ⇠ N(⇠0, K 1)
and ⇠0 = 0Tnq . The precision K = Z
0K✏˜Z is also sparse and block-banded [Chan and
Jeliazkov, 2009].
To accommodate the approach of Chan and Jeliazkov, I include white noise measurement
error to all observed series appearing in the observation equation:
Yt = H0⇠t +H1⇠t 1 +Mt , Mt ⇠ N(0m,⌃M) (3.29)
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Yt is the (m ⇥ 1) observation vector, with m > n✏; {H0, H1} are (m ⇥ nq) matrices linking
observables to states; H1⇠t 1 allows for state augmentation; and Mt is a (m ⇥ 1) vector of
measurement errors with diagonal covariance ⌃M . Stacking (3.29) over time yields:
266666664
Y1
Y2
...
YT
377777775 =
266666664
H0 . . . . . . . . .
H1 H0 . . . . . .
. . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . H1 H0
377777775
266666664
⇠1
⇠2
...
⇠T
377777775+
266666664
M1
M2
...
MT
377777775 ,
266666664
M1
M2
...
MT
377777775 ⇠ N (0Tm, IT ⌦ ⌃M) (3.30)
Or, in matrix notation,
Y = H⇠ +M , M ⇠ N(0Tm, IT ⌦ ⌃M) (3.31)
H is (Tm ⇥ Tnq), Y ⌘ [Y 01 , Y 02 , . . . , Y 0T ]0 and M ⌘ [M 01,M 02, . . . ,M 0T ]0 are (Tm ⇥ 1) vectors.
Thus, the likelihood of the data given ⇥ and the hidden states ⇠, is P (Y |⇥, ⇠), where
Y |⇥, ⇠ ⇠ N(H⇠, IT ⌦ ⌃M).
Bayes rule, P (⇠|Y,⇥) / P (Y |⇥, ⇠)P (⇠|⇥), yields the block-banded posterior precision: P =
K +H 0(IT ⌦ ⌃ 1M )H. The posterior state (b⇠) is computed based on the e cient simulation
of Chan and Jeliazkov who use forward and backward substitution in (3.32) exploiting the
nature of P :
P b⇠ = K⇠0 +H 0(IT ⌦ ⌃ 1M )Y (3.32)
The integrated log-likelihood (the likelihood of the data given the parameters but marginally
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of the states) is evaluated at a high density point along the lines of Chib (1995) and, in
particular, at the posterior mean of the hidden states: logP (Y |⇥) = +logP (Y |⇥, b⇠) +
logP (b⇠|⇥)   logP (b⇠|Y,⇥), where all terms can be computed fast using the block-banded
nature of the precision matrices.
The Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to simulate draws from the non-
tractable posterior2. I partition the parameter space into two sets reflecting the two economic
blocks: a set collecting the parameters that pertain to the euro-area block and another one
collecting those that pertain to a small open economy. Since there is no feedback from a
peripheral economy to the Euro Area and in order to guarantee that the euro-area parameters
are the same in all the runs for the small open economies, I estimate the euro-area block in
an independent run.
3.3.2 Observables.
To identify the seven structural shocks in each economy, I use ten quarterly data series
spanning the period 1999Q1–2016Q43, all obtained from the OECD, ECB, and Eurostat – a
detailed description of the data sources and transformations is relegated to the Appx. Nine
series are common to all economies: real private consumption and GDP growth, the unem-
ployment rate, the growth rate of employment, CPI inflation, and four measures of nominal
wage inflation from administrative and survey data, namely (i) economy-wide wages and
salaries; (ii) an hourly compensation index; (iii) compensation per employee; (iv) a survey-
based hourly earnings index in the private sector (not available for Greece). The four mea-
sures are incorporated through a factor specification. The loading factor of wages and salaries
is unity and that of the remaining measures is denoted by {↵hr,↵comp,↵earn} and ordered
according to the order of the presentation of the measures above. All series are entered with
2The covariance of the jumping distribution is initialized at the prior, and updated every 200,000 draws.
3Although the inclusion of the Great Recession in the sample influences the estimates, that period accounts
for an important part of Eurozone’s history. Since Greece enters the Eurozone late, its data start in 2001Q1.
102
a white noise measurement error with associated std denoted by {µwnsw , µhrw , µcompw , µearnw }.
Thus, the present paper includes more wage measures than Justiniano et al. (2013) and Gal´ı
et al. (2012b). For each peripheral economy, I also match the inflation rate of the GDP
deflator. In the Euro Area, I also match the money market interest rate. In the robustness
checks, the set of observables is augmented by the shadow rate of Wu and Xia (2017), and
by the quarterly rolling two-year-ahead private sector unemployment forecasts.
As in Christiano et al. (2011), and in order to avoid imposing a balanced growth path that
would need to be common in all economies and, thus, entail a stringent assumption given
the short sample length, I opt into an empirically oriented approach and allow for di↵erent
trends across variables by detrending the series outside the model. All inflation and growth
rates are demeaned. The interest rate is demeaned instead of subtracting the steady state
interest rate from it, for the latter approach yields a lengthier time period of negative rates
than the former does due to the low interest rates during the Great Recession. As in Gal´ı
et al. (2012b) and Casares et al. (2014), I match the unemployment rate. All measurement
equations are relegated to the Appendix.
3.3.3 Prior.
A conventional prior is considered4 and reported in Table (3.2). Indexation parameters and
autoregressive coe cients are drawn from the Beta distribution (B) centered at 0.5 (0.15
std) and 0.6 (0.2 std), respectively; the std of structural shocks and measurement errors
associated with wages is sampled from the inverse-gamma distribution (IG) centered at 0.15
(1 std)5. The policy responses to inflation and the output gap have a normal (N) prior
centered at 1.5 (0.25 std) and 0.125 (0.05 std), respectively. The interest rate smoothing,
4   is fixed at 0.9995. As in Gal´ı et al.(2012b, 2012a), the persistence of labor disutility shocks (⇢x) is
set at 0.999.
5 The std of all other measurement errors is tight (IG around 0.01; 0.001 std) since they pertain to a
single observable. Their posterior std is shown in the Appendix.
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the habit, and the debt premium elasticity are sampled from B centered at 0.75 (0.1 std),
0.7 (0.1 std), and 1% (0.5% std), respectively. The inverse Frisch elasticity and the loading
factors have disperse N priors centered at 2 (1 std) and 1 (0.5 std), respectively. The wealth
e↵ect follows a B centered at 0.5 (0.15 std). The N prior mean of the elasticity of substitution
across labor types (✏w) is set at 3 (0.5 std), implying a prior steady state wage markup of
1.5. The prior for the trade share is a B centered at 0.3 (0.02 std), which is in the ballpark
of what is considered in calibrations [Adolfson et al. 2005, 2007]. The trade elasticity has a
disperse N prior around 1.2 (0.15 std) since it is notoriously identified. All Calvo parameters
are sampled from B, centered at 0.5 (0.1 std); for ✓w in Spain, Italy, and Greece, however, I
use a tad lower std (0.05)6 because the sampler spends lengthy periods in a region of high
wage stickiness and low persistence of wage markup shocks, demonstrating a swing between
those parameters that is likely influenced by the scaling of shocks discussed below. A tighter
prior avoids that region that is at odds with the evidence of Fabiani et al. (2010) and Lopez-
Villavicencio and Saglio (2017), and speeds up convergence. The markup shocks in prices
(3.6,3.9,3.10) and wages (3.16,3.21), as well as the demand shocks (3.1,3.2), are scaled to
enter with an unitary coe cient. The scaling induces correlated priors and makes easier to
set priors for the disturbances.
3.4 Findings
3.4.1 Posterior.
I discuss below aspects of the estimates reported in Table (3.2), that pertain to wages and
unemployment, while putting less emphasis on estimates that are in line with those in the
literature. In all the economies, the shifts in workers’ market power are highly persistent
6The same tweak is used for ✓h in the case of Spain. The prior std for ✓w in Greece, Italy, and Spain, as
well as that for ✓h in Spain, is 0.05.
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(⇢w is above 0.9) and characterized by a volatility ( w) that is on average smaller than that
of the other disturbances. To facilitate the presentation of several findings, I distinguish two
country groups: Greece and Italy on the one hand, and the Euro Area, Portugal, and Spain
on the other hand.
The volatility of wage markup shocks in the Euro Area, Spain, and Portugal is remarkably
low compared to that in Greece and Italy. The loading factors and the std of the associated
measurement errors, that play a quintessential role in the identification of wage markup
shocks, are heterogeneous across both countries and wage series. In Greece and Italy, the
factors do not move far from unity, mirroring a high correlation among the wage series.
A high correlation implies that an additional wages series does not bring in much novel
information, and that the model might not be able to extract an accurate measure of wage
inflation. In contrast, the factors move away from unity in the Euro Area, Spain, and
Portugal. Thus, in those economies, the alternative wage series are not highly correlated,
and encapsulate novel information that the model incorporates. The three wage series based
on administrative data have a high loading factor in Greece and Italy, but a moderate or low
one elsewhere. In Italy, the survey-based earnings index has an approximately zero loading
factor, suggesting a negligible comovement of that series with the other wage series as well
as with the other observables. In contrast, that factor is moderate in the other economies,
implying that the survey-based index provides useful information on the wage structure.
The std of all measurement errors associated with wage series implies sizable errors that the
models washes out through the factor specification. Despite the calibrated large persistence
of labor disutility shocks, those shocks are volatile ( x). Consistently with the U.S. evidence
of Gal´ı et al. (2012b), weak wealth e↵ects on labor supply are favored according to the
value of !. Contrary to them, however, who find an inverse Frisch elasticity of about 4, the
elasticity ( ) is in the ballpark of 1.75–2.02 in the Euro Area and the peripheral economies –
only in Greece that elasticity is 4.65. Wage stickiness is moderate; in the Euro Area, it is a
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tad lower than what is found in Smets and Wouters (2003). It implies a two-quarter duration
of wage contracts and a certain degree of steepness in the wage Phillips curve. This finding
is corroborated by a reduction in U.S. wage stickiness when unemployment is included in
the observation set [Gal´ı et al., 2012b].
All shock processes and the habit are a tad more persistent than what is usually obtained
in the literature due to the inclusion of the Great Recession. Country heterogeneity is not
pronounced in terms of wage stickiness, price and wage indexation, the debt elastic premium,
the trade share, the trade elasticity, the steady state wage markup, and the highly volatile
import-price shock. The price stickiness is higher in Greece than in the other economies, but
it is associated with a low persistence of price markup shocks. Some country heterogeneity
is detected in terms of the persistence and volatility of the remaining structural shocks.
The implications of that heterogeneity appear in the forecast error variance decomposition
(FEVD) of the following section.
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3.4.2 Business Cycles.
I now turn to the drivers of business cycles over the whole sample; Table (3.3) displays the
FEVD ten quarters and years ahead. Four observations about unemployment fluctuations
emerge. First, in accordance with the U.S. evidence of Gal´ı et al. (2012b), the exogenous
shifts in labor market competitiveness largely account for long-run unemployment cycles:
they explain 80–97% and 65% of those cycles in the periphery and the Euro Area, respec-
tively. Second, the drivers of short-run unemployment cycles di↵er across countries, and
depend on the comovement (correlation) between the latent7 wage series and unemploy-
ment. To shed further light on that link, I plot that correlation against the short- and
long-run share of unemployment fluctuations explained by wage markup shocks in Fig.(3.1).
The correlation is lower (in absolute terms) in Greece and Italy than in the Euro Area, Spain,
and Portugal, and reflects the underlying correlation in the data (see Appx.). The figure
shows that, in the long run, wage markup shocks account for unemployment fluctuations
regardless the underlying wage–unemployment comovement; in contrast, in the short run, in
economies with large wage–unemployment comovement, wage markup shocks are attenuated
and account for a moderate share of unemployment fluctuations. Thus, in Greece and Italy,
that are characterized by a low correlation between wages and unemployment, as well as by
a moderate volatility of wage markup shocks, shifts in labor market competitiveness play the
dominant role in the short-run unemployment cycles by explaining 72% and 88% of them,
respectively. Conversely, in the Euro Area, Spain, and Portugal, that are characterized by a
high correlation between wages and unemployment, as well as by a small volatility of wage
markup shocks, the shifts in labor market competitiveness are attenuated. In particular, the
combination of demand and supply side shocks is about equal to the contribution of wage
markup shocks in Portugal (25% + 20% vs 42%) and Spain (18% + 17% vs 49%), and even
exceeds it in the Euro Area (50% + 26% vs 24%).
7These series constitute the component of the wage data that leads to the highest possible likelihood.
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Third, the periphery di↵ers from the Euro Area in terms of the short-run importance of
the e↵ect of labor market innovations (the combination of wage markup and labor disutility
shocks): that e↵ect is larger in the periphery than in the Euro Area (54-90% vs 25%) where
demand side shocks play the dominant role (50%). Fourth, unemployment cycles in the
periphery are mainly ignited by domestic rather than euro-area disturbances that explain
less than 2% of those cycles.
A few remarks are in order. Despite the persistence and volatility of labor disutility shocks,
those shocks exert a small influence on unemployment, in the range of 1-14%, that is aligned
with the 11% impact of those shocks on the Swedish unemployment found in Christiano
et al. (2011). Technology shocks too exert little influence since they spur a pro-cyclical
unemployment response on impact [Gal´ı et al., 2012b]. The influence of domestic and import
price markup shocks is small.
To what extent, though, are the innovations in labor market competitiveness di↵used to
output? Table (3.3) suggests that those innovations influence output cycles less than unem-
ployment cycles. They account for 6-20% and 28-38% of short- and long-run output cycles,
respectively. In fact, their short-run impact is smaller in the economies with a high corre-
lation between wages and unemployment. Demand side disturbances are the main driver of
short-run output cycles (43-66%), but their e↵ect fades out over time by about half (19-33%).
The Italian economy is an exception to the above, since wage markup shocks are the main
driver of output at any frequency (70/82%). The transmission of euro-area shocks to output,
capturing the connectedness between the periphery and the whole Euro Area, is small and
comparable to the share (less than 5%) of output fluctuations explained by foreign shocks
in Justiniano and Preston (2010).
The decomposition of wage and price inflation reveals di↵erences across countries, but not
between the short and long run. In terms of wage inflation, labor market shocks account for
a larger share of it in the periphery than in the Euro Area (53-85% vs 13%). In contrast,
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both demand side and supply side disturbances have a more pronounced influence in the
Euro Area than in the periphery. In terms of price inflation, supply side shocks are its
main determinant in all the economies (31-67%), while labor market shocks exert a more
pronounced influence in the periphery than in the Euro Area (22-53% vs 7%) where demand
shocks are sizable (26%).
Table 3.3: Business Cycles
Unemployment Output
shock GR IT PT SP EA GR IT PT SP EA
demand side 17/10 4/1 25/8 18/4 50/22 65/26 14/5 55/24 43/19 66/33
demand 13/7 2/1 18/6 10/2 31/14 41/15 3/1 31/12 14/4 32/16
spending 4/2 2/1 6/2 9/2 19/8 24/11 12/4 24/13 29/15 34/17
supply side 8/4 5/1 20/7 17/3 26/12 12/21 9/3 23/12 39/29 27/34
technology 7/4 3/1 13/4 8/2 20/9 5/19 8/2 19/11 2/11 11/16
price markup 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 5/2 4/2 1/0 2/1 34/16 16/18
import markup 1/0 1/0 7/2 8/2 / 2/1 1/0 2/1 3/1 /
labor market 74/86 90/97 54/84 62/93 25/66 22/52 74/91 16/59 7/46 7/33
wage markup 72/85 88/97 42/80 49/90 24/65 20/38 70/82 11/36 6/37 6/28
labor disutility 2/1 3/1 12/4 14/3 1/0 2/14 4/9 4/23 1/10 1/4
euro-area 0/0 1/0 2/1 2/0 100/100 2/1 2/1 7/4 11/5 100/100
Nominal Wage Inflation Price Inflation
shock GR IT PT SP EA GR IT PT SP EA
demand side 17/18 6/6 18/20 9/9 57/57 7/8 3/3 6/7 5/5 26/26
demand 12/13 1/2 10/12 2/3 43/42 3/4 1/1 3/4 1/1 21/20
spending 5/5 4/4 8/8 7/7 15/15 4/4 3/3 3/3 4/4 6/6
supply side 8/8 6/6 21/21 21/21 30/30 64/60 31/31 57/57 49/49 66/67
technology 6/6 3/3 8/8 11/11 18/19 6/6 5/5 9/9 10/10 17/17
price markup 0/0 0/0 1/1 1/1 11/12 21/19 6/6 10/10 14/14 50/50
import markup 2/2 3/3 12/12 9/9 / 37/35 20/20 38/38 25/25 /
labor market 74/74 85/84 55/53 67/66 13/13 22/25 53/53 23/22 39/38 7/7
wage markup 71/71 78/78 33/31 52/51 12/12 19/22 49/49 13/13 30/29 7/7
labor disutility 3/3 7/6 22/21 15/15 1/1 3/4 4/4 9/9 9/8 0/0
euro-area 1/1 3/4 6/7 3/4 100/100 7/7 12/13 14/14 8/8 100/100
Notes: FEVD at the posterior mean 10/40 quarters ahead. EA: Euro Area, GR: Greece, IT: Italy, PT:
Portugal, SP: Spain. Demand shocks in the EA include the impact of monetary policy shocks (1/0 for both
unempl. & output).
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Figure 3.1: The Wage–Unemployment Comovement And Wage Markup Shocks
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Notes: The figure depicts the connection between the unemployment–wage-inflation correlation and the
share of unemployment cycles explained by wage markup shocks. “short-run” and “long-run” pertain to
the FEVD 10 and 40 quarters ahead. *“2009Q1-14Q2” is derived from the historical decomposition and
displays the share of unemployment cycles explained by the sum of the shares explained by wage markup
shocks and by the initial obs.
3.4.3 Unemployment and the Great Recession.
What were the forces – the mix of demand, supply, and labor market disturbances – that led
to an unemployment spike during the Great Recession? To address this question, Fig.(3.2)
displays the contribution of each disturbance to the historical evolution of unemployment
in the Euro Area. Three findings stand out. First, unemployment fluctuations during the
Great Recession are largely attributed to two factors: an exogenous contraction in demand,
and an adversarial shift in wage markups. The other disturbances exert a small influence.
Second, unemployment exhibits two humps during 2008-11 and 2011-16. In fact, those dates
correspond to the onset of the recession and the sovereign debt crisis. Third, comparing
the Great Recession and the pre-2008 period in terms of the factors shaping unemployment
reveals that the influence of wage markup shocks is small in the pre-2008 period where
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demand side fluctuations are the main determinant, and emerges only during the recession8.
The above three findings carry over to the decomposition of the output evolution. More
specifically, the two output troughs are driven by adversarial demand side and wage markup
shocks. The latter shocks obtain a pronounced role only during the Great Recession. Al-
though the exogenous shifts in the euro-area labor market competitiveness worsen unem-
ployment and output, they slow down the fall in wages and prices brought by the demand
side contraction. It is worth mentioning once more that the e↵ect of wage markup shocks
appears during the Great Recession, whereas in the pre-recession period demand side shocks
mainly drive wage and price inflation.
Figure 3.2: Business Cycles in the Great Recession – Euro Area
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Notes: The figure displays the posterior mean contribution of each innovation to the evolution of four series.
Dotted line: actual series. Solid line: actual series minus its part that is explained by the e↵ect of the initial
observation.
8It is not clear whether this is the case in the southern economies; see the Appendix. In those economies,
contrary to the Euro Area, the impact of the initial observation fades out over time. Thus, the increase
in the impact of wage markup shocks in the early part of the sample may indicate either a replacement of
the impact of the initial observation as more data points become available, or a genuine increase in their
influence.
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The evolution of unemployment in the southern periphery during the Great Recession is
displayed in the first row of panels in Fig.(3.3). The figure reveals that adversarial shifts in
the labor market competitiveness contribute to the unemployment spike to a larger extent
than they do in the Euro Area. In fact, they are the main determinant of unemployment.
Two unemployment humps are seen in Italy and Spain but are not as distinguishable as
they are in the Euro Area. They do not appear in Greece and Portugal, because in those
economies the Great Recession had a more prolonged e↵ect than it had in the Euro Area. The
second row of panels in Fig.(3.3) pins down the contribution of the other disturbances. The
two phases of the recession are now visible. During the second phase, 2011-14, an exogenous
contraction in the demand side (a combination of demand and spending shocks), as well as
an abrupt decrease in labor disutility that expanded the labor force, raise unemployment
for a prolonged period in all the economies. During the first phase, 2008-11, unemployment
rises due to di↵erent forces across countries, likely reflecting asynchronous business cycles:
due to negative demand side shocks in Spain and Italy, and due to supply side shocks (the
combination of domestic and import price markup shocks and technology shocks) in Greece
and Portugal. Euro-area shocks have a persistently adversarial, albeit small, contribution.
Fig.(3.1) shows that the large influence of wage markup shocks in both the Euro Area and the
southern economies during that tumultuous period is associated with a sizable decrease in
the comovement between wage inflation and unemployment. In both the Euro Area and the
periphery, the comovement between wage inflation and unemployment drastically weakens.
This weakening suggests a disconnect that possibly mirrors downward wage rigidities and
an adjustment of the extensive margin of labor supply instead of wages to the underlying
economic conditions.
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Figure 3.3: Unemployment in the Great Recession – Southern Periphery
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Notes: The figure displays the posterior mean contribution of each innovation to the unemploy-
ment rate.
3.4.4 The Origins Of Subdued Wage Growth.
A phenomenon observed in advanced economies during the recovery period from the Great
Recession is the subdued nominal wage growth [Hee Hong et al., 2018; Bell and Blanch-
flower, 2018; European Commission, 2017; Ciccarelli and Osbat, 2017]. The present paper
documents that phenomenon in the Euro Area and the southern economies. In Table (3.4),
I shed light on the cumulative (real) wage growth compared to (real) output growth across
three periods; I emphasize real wage growth in order to broaden the understanding of wage
and inflation cycles jointly. During 1999Q2–2007Q4, wages grow more than output in all the
economies but in Greece, where although wage growth is comparable to that in the other
economies, it is lower than the growth rate of output. During 2008Q1–2014Q2, wages fell
by less than output in all economies but in Spain where both wages and output fell by a
large amount. During the recovery period, identified as the 2014Q3–2016Q4 window that
is characterized by a positive detrended real output growth in the Euro Area, the evidence
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Table 3.4: Sluggish Wage Growth, 2014Q3–2016Q4
Greece Italy Portugal Spain Euro Area
dyt dwt dyt dwt dyt dwt dyt dwt dyt dwt
1999Q2-2007Q4 26.6 14.5 9.6 11.1 8.6 13.0 16.9 32.1 8.4 9.9
2008Q1-2014Q2 -28.2 -11.2 -11.2 -9.3 -12.3 -10.3 -20.4 -23.4 -10.1 -7.7
2014Q3-2016Q4 0.3 -4.1 1.1 -0.6 2.5 -1.2 3.2 -3.2 1.2 -0.7
Notes: The table displays the cumulative real growth rates of (smoothed) output and wages.
shows a subdued wage growth: the cumulative growth rate of wage is smaller than that of
output. In fact, that rate is negative and, on average, larger in the southern economies than
in the Euro Area.
In Table (3.5), I pin down the structural forces behind the positive 2014Q3–2016Q4 real
output–wage di↵erential. Despite the fact that the table paints a picture of a certain degree
of country heterogeneity, shifts in labor market competitiveness play a catalytic world in
all economies except for Italy. They do so by having the largest impact in absolute terms.
In Greece and Portugal where the impact of demand side and supply side shocks almost
cancels each other out instead of being aligned to the same direction as in Spain and the
Euro Area, the e↵ect of wage markup shocks determines the output-wage di↵erential. Thus,
the evidence suggests a sizable weakening in workers’ market power as a catalytic factor in
the subdued wage growth, that is is aligned with explanations found in the aforementioned
papers, i.e. a weakened workers’ bargaining power, labor market reforms and compositional
e↵ects in labor force that increase competition among workers.
Shifts in labor disutility trigger changes in the labor force, may incorporate the e↵ect of
factors such as immigration, and have a heterogeneous impact across countries: they favor
output over wage growth in Italy and Portugal; wage over output growth in Greece and
Spain; and have no impact in the Euro Area. Euro-area shocks can potentially capture the
impact of global factors towards competition: they favor output over wage growth in all the
southern economies, but in Greece. Price markup shocks, possibly capturing the impact of
a prolonged low realized and expected inflation, favor output over wage growth in the Euro
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Table 3.5: The Determinants Of The Sluggish Wage Growth, 2014Q3–2016Q4
dyt   dwt
GR IT PT SP EA
2014Q3-2016Q4 4.3 1.7 3.8 6.4 1.9
demand side -6.4 0.2 0.9 2.2 0.0
demand -7.9 -0.2 0.5 0.9 0.2
spending 1.5 0.5 0.4 1.4 -0.2
supply side 6.7 0.4 -1.0 2.4 0.7
technology 6.9 0.1 -1.6 -0.1 0.0
price markup -1.3 -0.0 -0.1 0.9 0.7
import markup 1.2 0.4 0.7 1.6 0.0
labor market 4.7 -0.6 3.0 1.6 1.0
wage markup 11.0 -1.4 2.2 2.5 0.9
labor disutility -6.2 0.8 0.7 -0.8 0.1
euro-area -0.8 1.3 0.8 0.5
initial point 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.1
Notes: Cumulative impact of each shock on the 20014Q3–2016Q4 cumulative real output–wage di↵erential.
Area, but have a small impact (compared to the magnitude of the overall growth di↵erential)
in the periphery9.
3.5 Robustness Analysis
3.5.1 Unemployment Gaps.
Modeling unemployment a` la Gali (2011) provides a definition of natural unemployment
as a function of wage markup shocks. To assess the robustness of the model’s empirical
performance, I investigate the evolution of the model-implied unemployment gap, defined
as the deviation of unemployment from its natural counterpart, that gives inklings on the
resource utilization. I average that gap over quarters to an annual frequency and compare
it to the estimates of both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
9Other explanations involve productivity and part-time employment. Since the data are detrended, the
former explanation cannot be examined in the present paper. The latter explanation does not map to a
single disturbance.
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(OECD) and the European Commission (Ameco) that are derived from reduced-form models.
Those models [Staiger et al., 1997; Watson, 2014] use several indicators with few cross-
equation restrictions, whereas the model-implied gaps are based on the theoretical structure
and the set of observables.
Fig.(3.4) shows that the model-consistent gaps are remarkably well aligned with the empirical
estimates in the Euro Area and Portugal. In Spain and Italy, the alignment is qualitatively
good, but there are some quantitate di↵erences in the magnitude of the 2011-14 spike. In
Greece, the model-implied gap is aligned to the empirical estimates up to 2008, but becomes
at odds with those estimates after that period. Interestingly, the three economies in which
the gap performs well (Euro Area, Portugal, Spain) are those with the highest correlation
between unemployment and wages showed in Fig.(3.1). Despite the case of Greece, all gaps
suggest a lengthy resource underutilization since the onset of the Great Recession, as well
as an economic ”over-heating” in the pre-2008 period.
Figure 3.4: Unemployment Gaps – Model And Empirical Estimates
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(Ameco).
117
3.5.2 Prior.
Crucial it is to understand whether the large influence of wage markup shocks is an artifact
of a dogmatic prior specification? I tackle this question by computing the FEVD at the
prior mean (see Appx.). The prior implies a starkly low influence of wage markup shocks
on unemployment in the periphery (17%) and the Euro Area (13%), and a sizable influence
of demand side shocks. The same implication holds for output. Thus, the prior is non-
dogmatic, and it is the data that favor a set of parameters associated with a large influence
of wage markup shocks.
3.5.3 The Shadow Rate, Time Variation, And Unemployment Fore-
casts.
I examine the sensitivity of the paper’s results across three dimensions in the Euro Area.
Table (3.6) displays the benchmark FEVD along with that stemming from the three modi-
fications. In the interest of space, the posterior is relegated to the Appendix, whereas some
pivotal estimates are discussed below.
First, during the Great Recession, monetary policy was not limited only to interest rate
changes. Instead, it included unconventional measures. To take into account their impact, I
repeat the estimation for the Euro Area by replacing the money market rate with the shadow
rate of Wu and Xia (2017) after 2007. The latter delinks from the former to a sizable extent
only after 2014. The only change detected in the posterior estimates pertains to a small
increase in the policy coe cients and the std of monetary policy innovations. The marginal
log-likelihood deteriorates by 23 points. The FEVD under the inclusion of the shadow rate
is similar to the benchmark one.
Second, is the influence of wage markup shocks derived entirely from the joint properties of
118
unemployment and wages? I address this question by adding the euro-area medium-term
(two-year-ahead) private sector unemployment forecasts in the set of observables. Embedded
in those forecasts is the slowly-evolving part of unemployment. No additional structural
shock is added since the series are loaded with measurement error. The forecasts are linked
to the state via:
uf obst,t+h =
⇥
 1(⇥)
h+1⇠t 1 +  2(⇥)h✏t
⇤
[u⇤,:] (3.33)
where the left-hand-side term denotes the observed h-quarter-ahead forecast, and the right-
hand-side term yields the model-consistent forecast. The inclusion of those forecasts is new
since usually inflation forecasts are considered in structural models [Del Negro and Eusepi,
2011]; Kim and Pruitt (2017) consider such forecasts in a reduced-form model. Changes of
a small magnitude in the posterior mean of several parameters are detected. The change
that plays the most important role pertains to a sizable decrease in parameters associated
with the demand side: the habit decreases from 0.96 to 0.87, and the persistence of demand
shocks drops from 0.38 to 0.19. Those changes attenuate the importance of demand side
shocks for both unemployment (50/22 vs 33/13) and output (66/33 vs 26/6). In terms of
unemployment, wage markup shocks now exert a larger influence compared to that in the
benchmark case (50/80 vs 25/66). In terms of output, the role of supply side shocks (57/75)
increases. Thus, forecasts may be influential in explaining unemployment since they entail
a slowly-evolving part that favors the low-volatility persistent wage markup shocks.
Third, how would the results have looked like if a structural break in the parameters associ-
ated with the wage Phillips curve (3.16) were taken into account? A break could potentially
mirror the e↵ect of structural reforms that took place during that period, or it could indicate
an e↵ect of the Great Recession on the deep parameters. I tackle this question by allowing for
a change in { ⇤w, ✓⇤w, ⇢⇤w,  ⇤w} between the 1999Q1–2008Q4 and 2009Q1–2016Q4 periods. The
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Table 3.6: Euro Area Business Cycles – Robustness Checks
Benchmark Shadow Forecasts pre-08 post-08
shock u⇤t y⇤t u⇤t y⇤t u⇤t y⇤t u⇤t y⇤t u⇤t y⇤t
demand side 50/22 66/33 52/25 73/37 33/13 26/6 25/13 45/23 31/9 48/17
demand 30/14 31/16 32/16 37/18 8/3 6/1 11/6 14/7 14/4 15/5
spending 19/8 34/17 19/9 35/18 22/9 18/4 13/7 29/15 17/5 31/11
mon. policy 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/1 3/1 3/1 1/0 2/1 1/0 2/1
supply side 26/12 27/34 27/13 21/34 17/7 57/75 16/8 29/29 19/6 29/21
price markup 5/2 16/18 6/3 13/19 2/1 16/5 1/1 15/12 2/1 15/9
technology 20/9 11/16 21/10 8/15 15/6 40/70 14/7 14/17 18/5 14/12
labor market 25/66 7/33 21/62 6/30 50/80 17/19 59/79 26/48 49/86 24/62
wage markup 24/65 6/28 20/62 5/26 48/79 14/15 58/79 25/43 48/86 22/58
labor disutility 1/0 1/4 1/0 1/4 2/1 2/4 1/0 1/5 1/0 1/3
Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition at the parameters’ posterior mean 10/40 quarters ahead.
posterior means of { ⇤w, ✓⇤w, ⇢⇤w,  ⇤w} are {0.32, 0.52, 0.953, 0.10} and {0.27, 0.53, 0.997, 0.06}
in those two periods. Thus, wage stickiness and indexation, as well as the volatility of wage
markup shocks, in both periods are higher than the benchmark estimates. The persistence
of the wage markup shock exhibits small di↵erences. The variation in the estimates is rather
small after taking into account that those parameters are tightly related. In addition, the
last two columns of Table (3.6) reveal no sizable di↵erences in terms of the FEVD between
the two windows, and an increase in the importance of wage markup shocks compared to
the benchmark FEVD. Thus, the findings suggest no break and that a flexible parameter
structure may favor the exogenous shifts in worker’s market power. The short time windows,
though, preclude providing a definitive answer.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
The present paper examined unemployment and wages in the Euro Area through the lens
of a structural model and the use of several wage series. It showed that exogenous shifts in
labor market competitiveness determine long-run unemployment fluctuations. Nevertheless,
the short-run impact of those shocks depends on the joint properties of unemployment and
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wages. In the Euro Area, Portugal, and Spain, where the unemployment strongly comoves
with wages, the short-run impact of the above shocks is moderate. In contrast, in Greece
and Italy, where unemployment weakly comoves with wages, the short-run impact of the
above shocks is large. The weakening of the comovement during the Great Recession leads
to wage markups shaping the unemployment spike of that period. Finally, the paper showed
that the nature of wage markup shocks changed during the output recovery: a weakening in
the workers’ market power led to subdued wage growth.
The above findings point towards three avenues for future work. First, the joint properties
of unemployment and wages nest the influence of downward wage rigidities. Thus, empirical
work in non-linear frameworks may shed light on the nature of those rigidities. Second, the
present paper briefly illustrated the usefulness of unemployment forecasts. In future work,
it would be important to draw insights from frameworks where those forecasts are linked to
endogenous unemployment expectations. Third, although the model did not include feedback
e↵ects from the financial sector to the labor market, the study of those e↵ects along with
nominal rigidities, as in Christiano et al. (2011), in the case of the Euro Area is required.
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Chapter 4
Wages During Recoveries in
Euro-Area Economies. A Structural
View
4.1 Introduction
Although unemployment is declining, even to pre-recession levels in some cases, and em-
ployment steeply increases, wages exhibit a sluggish evolution in several economies. The
puzzling phenomenon of subdued wage growth is documented in the U.S. [Hee Hong et al.,
2018, Abdih and Danninger, 2018], the UK [Bell and Blanchflower, 2018], and to some extent
in the Euro Area [ECB, 2018; European Commission, 2017; Ciccarelli and Osbat, 2017] and
in the southern economies [Charalampidis, 2018].
Fig.(4.1) gives a flavor of the puzzling wage development by comparing developments in
a variety of wage indicators1, the change in the unemployment rate, and the change in
1compensation per employee, wages & salaries per employee, hourly compensation, private hourly earnings
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employment after the sovereign debt crisis to their analogues during the recoveries in the
pre-2013 period in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The figure demonstrates that a large
decline in unemployment and a sizable pick up in employment in all the economies in the
post-2013 period are not accompanied by strong wage growth. For instance, in France and
Italy, the post-2013 wage growth remains lower than it was in the previous recoveries.
Several explanations for the puzzling phenomenon of subdued wage growth have been pro-
posed. The declining labor productivity and labor’s share of income, and to some extent
advances in automation, the decline in unionization, and trade globalization, have been
found in empirical studies for the U.S. economy [Abdih and Danninger, 2018]. Du Caju,
Rycx, and Tojerow (2011), too, find international trade influential for wage dispersion in
Belgium. A flattening of the Phillips curve [Leduc and Wilson, 2017] and a problematic
measurement of the economic slackness [Hee Hong et al., 2018; Bell and Blanchflower, 2018;
Smith, 2014] have been proposed in other empirical analyses. Other authors resort to argu-
ments about a non-linear Phillips curve [Donayre and Panovska, 2016; Kumar and Orrenius,
2016] implying that wage growth is going to pick up once unemployment hits a low level.
Structural evidence for the southern euro-area periphery points to a weakening in workers’
market power [Charalampidis, 2018] which is compatible with the idea of monopsonies in
labor markets [Krugman, 2018]. Bulligan, Guglielminetti, and Viviano (2017) highlight the
importance of the intensive margin of labor utilization in the determination of wage growth.
Finally, Faberman and Justiniano (2015) find a strong relationship between job switching
and nominal wage inflation.
Despite the various explanations above, there still are unresolved issues in the existing litera-
ture. We split them in two categories; the first involves the identification of the phenomenon
of subdued wage growth itself, and the second involves the identification of the determinants
of the phenomenon. As for the first category, not all papers use the same wage measure,
the same period of analysis, or the same set of economies. In addition, sometimes even the
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notion of subdued wage growth is not clear: is wage growth subdued compared to its past
experience, compared to what is currently observed in other economies, or compared to what
is expected given the slack in the labor market? As for the second category, almost the en-
tire existing literature – with the exception of Charalampidis (2018) – employs reduced form
studies blurring causality issues and impeding a general equilibrium approach that would
quantify the relative importance of all the driving factors of wage growth.
The present paper contributes in the literature by addressing the above issues. To that
end, it focuses on the behavior of wages during output recoveries, and compares the post-
2013 wage evolution with the wage evolution during the recoveries from previous troughs.
In doing so, it delves into the drivers of wages during those episodes through the lens of
a structural workhorse model, namely Gal´ı, Smets, and Wouters (2012a)2 model. This
approach is applied, in turn, on the big four European economies. It is worth mentioning that
with the exception of Charalampidis (2018), no other paper employs a structural approach
to the determinants of wage growth.
2These authors introduce unemployment following the approach of Gali (2011) in the framework developed
in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
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Figure 4.1: Wages in Recoveries
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The model is estimated with state-of-the-art Bayesian techniques on a set of observables that
includes multiple wage measures to overcome restrictions stemming from the use of a single
wage series. The present paper, thus, builds on the strand of the literature that considers a
factor approach to DSGE models, as in Boivin and Giannoni (2006), as well as multiple wage
indicators in order to strengthen the identification of wage markup shocks. More specifically,
in addition to the two wage indicators used in Gal´ı et al. (2012a), Justiniano et al. (2013),
and Linde´ et al. (2016), the present paper uses up to three more series, as in Charalampidis
(2018), in order to deepen our understanding of wage fluctuations.
4.1.1 Results.
The paper finds a cyclical real wage recovery in Germany and Spain (the average cumulative
eight-quarter-ahead rates are 0.4% and 0.3%, respectively3) after the trough of the sovereign
debt crisis, but a cyclical (real) wage-less output recovery in France and Italy (-1% and -0.6%,
respectively).
The main determinant of real wage growth in Germany and Spain is sizable shifts in the
pricing power of firms and, in particular, a contraction in price markup shocks that leads to
an economic stimulus, rising real wages, and rather small gyrations in price inflation. This
e↵ect dominates a productivity slowdown exerting downward pressure to the real wage. In
France, the e↵ect of the weakened market power of firms does not exceed that from the
productivity slowdown resulting in negative cyclical real wage growth. In Italy, as it is the
case in Spain, more factors are at play. In fact, in Italy, the e↵ect of price markup shocks,
reinforced by a pick up in demand side shocks, does not su ce to overcome the real wage
repression stemming from a weakening in workers’ market power over wages, mirrored in
negative wage markup shocks, and an increase in labor force participation. In contrast, in
Spain, the real wage increases coming from price markup and demand side shocks dominate
3A pro-cyclical real wage in Spain is also found in Font, Izquierdo, and Puente (2015).
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the downward pressures coming from the weakening in workers’ marker power.
Di↵erences in wage developments are observed across recoveries over time. In fact, real
wage growth in Germany, France, and Italy during the period after the sovereign debt crisis
trough is statistically di↵erent from the wage growth during the recoveries over the 1990s-
2013 period. The post-2013 weakening in the pricing power of German firms is statistically
di↵erent from the pricing power observed during past recoveries. A similar result holds for
Italy. In both Germany4 and France, the productivity slowdown is statistically di↵erent from
the strong productivity growth observed during the pre-2013 recoveries. In Spain, the post-
2013 sizable weakening in workers’ market power, possibly capturing some of the structural
reforms that took place during that period, is statically di↵erent from the past power of
workers’ in raising wages above its equilibrium level during output recoveries.
The above picture is compatible with the evidence for the drivers of unemployment and
nominal wage inflation in the post-2013 period. In Germany and France, economies where
price markup and productivity shocks are the main influence of the real wage, wage markup
shocks mainly account for unemployment. In contrast, in Italy and Spain, economies where
all shocks influence the real wage, demand side shocks are highly influential for unemploy-
ment. As for nominal wage inflation, the case of Spain demonstrates the need of jointly
examining price and wage inflation. More specifically, cyclical nominal wage inflation is the
highest in Germany whereas in the other economies it is not only below that of Germany, but
it is also below its past level and negative. Only when price inflation is taken into account
in the case of Spain, the Spanish cyclical real wage growth appears positive and above that
of France and Italy. A di↵erence in the decomposition between nominal and real wages is
that the entire set of innovations determine nominal wage inflation in all the economies of
the sample.
4Interestingly, in Germany, although wage markup shocks have never exerted sizable influence on the
real wage, their influence changes sign after 2003, from boosting wages to negatively a↵ecting them while
pushing unemployment downwards. This sign change likely reflects the implementation of the various waves
of labor market reforms (Hartz reforms) after 2003.
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Despite the statistically di↵erent behavior of wages during recoveries over time, we find no
evidence of a change in the wage evolution during recessions leading to troughs. Furthermore,
the volatility of the real wage and of its determinants during recoveries suggests no di↵erences
over time. Overall, price markup shocks are more volatile than demand side shocks during
recoveries, while wage markup shocks have always been volatile in Spain.
Although the above analysis puts emphasis on structural innovations, we also investigate the
role of the structural characteristics of the sample economies in influencing the transmission
of innovations. More specifically, we assess the structural di↵erences between the German
labor market and the labor markets of the other economies. We find that the structural
di↵erences among the German, French, and Italian labor markets are not enough to generate
a counterfactual real wage growth that would be higher than the realized one. Nonetheless,
if the Spanish labor market were more similar to the German one – if, in particular, it had
a higher inverse Frisch elasticity than the observed one – then the Spanish real wage growth
would be higher during the recovery from the sovereign debt crisis.
Section 2 outlines the structural model. Section 3 briefly presents the estimation and iden-
tification strategy. Section 4 displays the results. Section 5 concludes. A detailed Appendix
includes the full model, the complete estimation approach, and additional results.
4.2 Model
Wage fluctuations are examined through the lens of a medium-scale DSGE model and, in
particular, the Gal´ı, Smets, and Wouters (2012b) model that has also been used in Gal´ı,
Smets, and Wouters (2012a), Linde´, Smets, and Wouters (2016), Linde´, Maih, and Wouters
(2017), and has been extended in an open economy framework in Charalampidis (2018).
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This paragraph sketches the model, while the log-linearized solution5 is relegated to the
Appendix – the next paragraph reports the stochastic sources of fluctuations included in
the model. Capital, produced by units of the final good, is channeled to a continuum
of monopolistically competitive firms. The firms combine capital and labor to produce
intermediate goods, and choose prices in a staggered fashion. Households invest in one-
period risk-less nominal bonds6, consume the final good, and supply labor. Perfect risk
sharing holds. Each household is a large family and consists of a continuum of members
situated in the unit square – the members have heterogeneous labor types and labor disutility.
The di↵erentiated labor is uniformly distributed, indivisible and supplied along the extensive
margin, and priced in a staggered fashion by monopolistically competitive unions.
The model features eight disturbances categorized in three groups: demand side, supply side,
and labor market shocks. Demand side shocks include the risk premium shock altering the
inter-temporal price of consumption, the investment shock altering the conversion of invest-
ment to capital, the government spending shock a↵ecting the allocation of economy wide
resources, and a shock a↵ecting the interest rate paid on bonds. Supply side shocks include a
technology shock a↵ecting labor productivity, and a price markup shock stemming from the
degree of substitutability between goods and mirroring shifts in the degree of competition
in goods markets. Labor market shocks involve a labor disutility shock causing variations
in labor supply and capturing factors such as immigration and the women’s entrance in the
labor force, and a wage markup shock reflecting shifts in the degree of workers’ market power
over wages and, thus, the degree of competition in labor markets [Justiniano et al., 2011,
5 Given the linear solution, the case of downward nominal wage rigidities (DNWR) cannot be examined
and remains outside the scope of the paper. Recent studies using high-quality administrative data find no
DNWR before and during the Great Recession in some euro-area economies [Verdugo, 2016] and Ireland
[Doris et al., 2015] (Kurmann and McEntarfer (2017) and Elsby et al. (2016) find similar evidence for the
U.S.A.), and challenge previous survey-based studies [Fabiani et al., 2010; Babecky´ et al., 2010].
6The determination of the country-specific interest rate is stylized and in response to domestic develop-
ments in inflation, as well as in the level and the growth rate of the output gap. This is a su cient approach
for our purpose which is the study of wage fluctuations. An alternative option would entail a multi-country
framework and a common monetary policy; doing so, though, would make us lose focus by increasing the
model complication without adding any substantial gain from additional observables; in fact, Charalampidis
(2018) shows that open economy shocks have negligible influence on labor market variables.
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Gal´ı et al., 2012b].
4.3 Estimation
The DSGE model is estimated with Bayesian methods, starting in 1991Q2 for Germany
and France, and in 1995Q2 for Italy and Spain, and stoping in 2017Q4. Briefly discussed
below are the data, the measurement equations, and the state space approach – a detailed
discussion is relegated to the Appendix.
4.3.1 Data And A Factor Approach To Wages.
Twelve quarterly series are obtained from ECB, Eurostat, and OECD; a detailed description
appears in the Appendix. The series for nominal GDP, private final consumption, and
investment are divided by aggregate population and the GDP price deflator. The quarterly
log-di↵erence of the latter corresponds to the model’s inflation rate. In addition, the three-
month interbank interest rate, the unemployment rate, and (the log of) employment per
capita enter the observation vector.
Five wage measures are used. First, compensation per employee is the most widely used
wage measure. Second, to exclude the influence of social benefits from compensation, wages
and salaries per employee are included. Third, to incorporate information on remuneration
in the non-public sector (and, thus, attenuating the impact of public sector wage freezes7),
hourly earnings in the private sector8 are used. Fourth, to further incorporate wages in the
7The findings of Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010) suggest a pro-cyclical bias in public wages. Radowski and
Bonin (2008) find wage freezes in the private sector too and, in particular, in services and manufacturing in
Germany.
8The index is available from the mid-90s; it is bridged to hourly earnings in the manufacture for the
countries where the estimation starts earlier than the mid-90s.
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private sector, an index for negotiated wages is included9. Fifth, to take into account the
fluctuations in hours (since, as pointed out by Gal´ı et al. (2012a), the production function
is written in terms of labor hours), we include compensation per hour in the observation
vector. All wage measures are plotted in the Appendix. They are loaded through a factor
specification (the factor for compensation per employee is normalized to one) as in Gal´ı et al.
(2012a), Justiniano et al. (2013), Linde´ et al. (2016), and Charalampidis (2018), and all wage
series include a disperse measurement error.
4.3.2 Priors.
The priors are conventional and reported in Table (D.1). The loading factors are sampled
from a disperse Normal distribution around 1 (0.5 std). The prior for the standard deviation
of the measurement errors associated with the wage measures is as disperse as that for the
standard deviation of the structural shocks. To ease the exploration of the posterior surface,
we set a high prior mean for the autoregressive coe cient of the labor disutility shock (0.8) –
Gal´ı et al. (2012a), in fact, fix it at 0.999. Including in the sample the volatile behavior of the
series during the Great Recession is going to influence the volatility of shocks. This inclusion
along with a relative moderate sample length renders useful to reduce the standard deviation
of a couple of parameters so that they are kept within ranges aligned with economic theory.
For example, the standard deviation of the capital share and of wage stickiness are a tad
lower than what is usually postulated in the literature.
4.3.3 State Space.
As for the Bayesian estimation, the treatment of the state space proceeds as in Charalam-
pidis (2018) who operationalizes the state approach of Chan and Jeliazkov (2009) in a DSGE
9No such index is available for Spain
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context. That approach achieves computational gains and does not require filtering recur-
sions. The Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to simulate draws from the
non-tractable posterior.
4.4 Findings
The presentation of findings begins with real wage growth before moving to nominal wage
inflation and unemployment. After that, I examine, in turn, the drivers of wages during the
downturns before the troughs, the volatility of shocks during recoveries, and the the role
of structural di↵erences in the labor markets of the sample economies in influencing wage
growth.
4.4.1 The Determinants of Cyclical Wage Growth during Recov-
eries.
Real Wage Growth.
Table (4.1) collects the decomposition of real wage growth to trend and cycle, as well as the
structural decomposition of the cyclical component. According to these figures, sizable and
statistically significant di↵erences in the speed of real wage recoveries across countries and
time are observed. In particular, real wage growth in Germany and Spain is about the same,
and faster in the period following the sovereign debt crisis than it was on average during
the recoveries since the 1990s and up to 2013. In contrast, real wage growth in France and
Italy is slower in the former period than it is in the latter. In fact, real wage growth in Italy
is negligible. Furthermore, those di↵erences in wage evolution across time are statistically
significant in Germany, France, and Italy, but not in Spain.
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The above di↵erences are shaped by the cyclical component of real wage growth. More specif-
ically, the evidence of the present paper suggests a cyclical real wage recovery in Germany
and Spain (the average cumulative eight-quarter-ahead rates are 0.4% and 0.3%, respec-
tively10) after the trough of the sovereign debt crisis, and a cyclical (real) wage-less output
recovery in France and Italy (-1% and -0.6%, respectively).
Delving into the determinants of the cyclical component reveals both similarities and dif-
ferences across the economies of the sample. A productivity slowdown putting downward
pressures to wages in the post-2013 period is observed in all the economies – more so in
Germany and France than in Italy and Spain. Moreover, in the post-2013 period, Germany
and Spain – the two economies with sizable real wage growth – are characterized by siz-
able negative price markup shocks elevating the real wage. These shocks imply shifts in the
pricing power of firms and a weakening in the pass-through of production costs tp inflation
during that period.
In Germany, both cyclical components are ultimately determined by the two supply shocks,
namely the competing influence of productivity and price markup shocks, while demand side
and labor market shocks have a negligible influence. In the post-2013 period, the upward
wage pressures stemming from the price markup shocks exceed the negative e↵ect of the
productivity slowdown resulting in a positive real wage growth. In contrast, in the pre-2013
the opposite picture is observed: positive price markup shocks, exerting downward pressure
in the real wage, cannot match the positive wage e↵ect stemming from an acceleration in
productivity.
The underlying forces of real wage growth in France are similar to those in Germany. The
absence of strong negative price markup shocks in the post-2013 period is the only di↵erence
compared to the German case. That absence, in fact, explains why the post-2013 real wage
growth is not stronger than it was in the pre-2013 period. The absence of an influential
10A pro-cyclical real wage in Spain is also found in Font, Izquierdo, and Puente (2015).
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role for those shocks in France in the post-2013 period, is validated by the absence of a
statistically significant di↵erence between the e↵ect of price markup shocks between the two
time windows. In Germany and France, therefore, the size and direction of price markup
shocks are highly influential for real wage growth.
Table 4.1: Real Wage Inflation in Recoveries: A Structural Decomposition
Germany France Italy Spain
pre post di↵ pre post di↵ pre post di↵ pre post di↵
extracted 1.2 2.6 1.4* 2.2 1.0 -1.2** 1.7 -0.1 -1.7** 1.1 2.9 1.8
trend growth 2.2 2.2 0.0 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 2.5 2.5 0.0
cycle -1.0 0.4 1.5* -0.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.8 -0.6 -1.4 -1.8 0.3 2.0
initial obs. 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.2 -0.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.0 -0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.3
supply -0.7 0.5 1.2 0.1 -1.1 -1.2** -0.0 0.3 0.3 -0.6 1.3 1.9
productivity 0.7 -0.8 -1.5* 1.0 -0.7 -1.7** -1.3 0.0 1.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.0
price mkp -1.4 1.3 2.7** -0.9 -0.3 0.5 1.3 0.3 -1.0* -0.3 1.6 1.9
demand -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.5 -0.5 -1.0 1.6 2.6
risk premium -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.3 1.0*** -0.9 1.3 2.3
investment 0.1 -0.1 -0.2** -0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.5** 0.3 -0.2 -0.5
spending 0.0 -0.1 -0.1*** -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.0 0.1
int. rate -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 0.8 -0.2 -1.0 -0.3 0.5 0.8
labor -0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -1.4 -1.2 -0.1 -2.5 -2.5*
wage mkp -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.5 -0.9 -0.4 0.3 -2.7 -3.0**
labor disutility -0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 0.1 0.5
Notes: “Pre”: average eight-quarter-ahead cumulative change after a trough during the pre-2013 recoveries.
“Post”: average eight-quarter-ahead quarterly-rolling cumulative change after the sovereign debt crisis
trough and up to the end of the sample. “di↵”: di↵erence between the pre and post figures. Asterisks
(⇤⇤⇤,⇤⇤ ,⇤) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the cumulative changes during the pre-2013 recoveries
come from a normal distribution with mean equal to the post-2013 average change and unknown variance at
the (1%, 5%, 10%) significance level (one-sample t-test). Data Sources: See text; Authors’ computations.
What do positive and markup shocks imply in terms of real wage growth though? Exogenous
changes in price markup shocks mirror shifts in the competitiveness of goods markets, and
result in a misalignment of prices and production costs: positive/negative price markups
raise/decrease price inflation independently of the evolution of costs. Fig.(4.2) reports the
impulse response functions to price markup and productivity shocks11. In response to a
negative price markup shock, inflation decreases and the real wage rises. Decreasing prices
lower the interest rate paid on bonds, and trigger an economic stimulus: output, the output
11The parameters are set at the posterior mean of Germany.
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gap, investment, and nominal wage inflation are boosted while unemployment falls.
Figure 4.2: Price Markups, Productivity, and the Real Wage
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Notes: Authors’ computations. Impulse Response Functions to a negative price markup shock and a positive
productivity shock, evaluated at the posterior parameter mean of Germany.
Before moving to the analysis of Italy and Spain, it is worth delving into the role of wage
markup shocks in the case of Germany where the implementation of the various waves of
the Hartz labor market reforms started in 2003. According to the evidence of Table (4.1) no
statistically significant or sizable di↵erence is observed between the pre- and post-2013 e↵ect
of wage markup shocks in Germany. Nevertheless, delving into the e↵ect of wage markup
shocks after each trough of the past reveals a richer picture. According to the findings of
Table (4.2), the influence of wage markup shocks on real wages, unemployment, and nomi-
nal wages changes before and after 2003. For real wages and unemployment, in particular,
that influence changes sign. During the pre-2003 recoveries, the real wage increases above
what was justified by the labor market slack. In contrast, during the post-2003 recoveries, a
weakening in workers’ market power over wages leads to a real wage contraction and a steep
decline in unemployment. As for nominal wages, they are boosted by wage markup inno-
vations during the pre-2003 recoveries more than they are during the post-2003 recoveries.
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Labor supply innovations do not reveal a clear pattern of time variation.
Table 4.2: Workers’ Market Power and Adjustment in the German Labor Market
93:2 96:1 03:1 05:1 09:1 13:1
 wrt cycle -0.6 -1.0 -2.6 -2.2 1.2 0.4
labor -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.7 0.0 -0.0
wage mkp -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -0.1
labor disutility -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
 Ut cycle 0.7 1.1 1.3 -1.8 -1.2 -0.8
labor 0.2 0.3 1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5
wage mkp 0.1 0.3 1.1 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5
labor disutility 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.4 0.0
⇡wt cycle -1.3 -5.1 -4.6 -4.3 -0.6 0.1
labor 1.2 1.7 2.9 0.9 1.0 -0.2
wage mkp 1.3 1.9 3.1 0.9 1.0 -0.1
labor disutility -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.0 0.0 -0.1
Notes: Eight-quarter-ahead cumulative change after a trough. Data Sources: See text; Authors’ computa-
tions.  wrt : real wage growth;  Ut: change in the unemployment rate; ⇡
w
t : nominal wage inflation.
Turning to the determinants of the cyclical part of real wage inflation in Italy and Spain,
we observe that all types of innovations are influential. During the post-2013 period, both
countries exhibit similarities in the sense that, in both economies, price markup shocks shape
the overall e↵ect of supply side shocks, and that both supply and demand side shocks boost
real wage growth whereas labor market shocks, driven by a weakening in workers’ market
power exert downward pressures to real wages. In both economies, the pick-up of demand
side shocks is determined by the risk premium shock – a result that is compatible with the
rising role of that shock in the U.S. economy found by Gal´ı, Smets, and Wouters (2012a).
Nevertheless, the -0.6% post-2013 cyclical real wage change in Italy falls below the 0.3%
wage change observed in Spain due to fact that in the latter country the combination of
demand and supply side shocks exceeds the e↵ect of labor market shocks whereas in the
former country it does not. That di↵erence is heavily influence by the sizable price markup
shocks in Spain.
Italy and Spain demonstrate additional di↵erences between their respective pre- and post-
2013 recoveries. More specifically, in Italy risk premium and investment shocks exhibit
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a statistically significant di↵erence across time, implying an increase in the sensitivity of
the real wage to demand conditions. In contrast, in Spain, sizable wage markup shocks
suggest a weakening of workers’ market power and bridge the declining unemployment with
the observed weak wage growth. It is worthwhile to mention that labor supply shocks in
Italy during the post-2013 period exert downward wage pressures. This e↵ect likely implies
an increase in the Italian labor force participation. The origins of the latter could be a
combination of immigration, a decrease in the number of undocumented employees, and an
increase in the participation of workers in the market.
Nominal Wage Growth.
Considering nominal wage growth in Table (4.3) reveals a picture compatible with that
observed for real wage growth. In nominal terms, wage growth during the recovery from the
Great Recession is weaker in France and Italy than it is in Germany and Spain. Nevertheless,
the cyclical component of nominal wage inflation is negative in the post-2013 period in all
the economies but in Germany. This observation for the case of Spain in the post-2013
period highlights the importance of jointly studying wages and inflation: despite the negative
cyclical nominal wage growth(-4.1%), cyclical real wage growth is positive (0.3%).
The decomposition of the cyclical part of nominal wage inflation reveal that the entire
set of innovations influences nominal wages contrary to real wages where only subset of
disturbances matters in some economies. In Germany, no influence of supply side shocks
on nominal wage inflation is found. Instead, the positive cyclical nominal wage growth in
Germany is driven by a demand stimulus that overcomes a small negative e↵ect coming from
labor market shocks. In fact, both e↵ects are statistically di↵erent from the negative e↵ect of
demand side shocks and the positive e↵ect coming from the market power of workers during
the pre-2013 recoveries.
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France and Germany are not as similar in terms of nominal wages as they are in term of the
real wage. In France, sizable supply side shocks, accompanied by demand side shocks and in
particular risk premium innovations, exert downward pressures on nominal wages. In Italy,
sizable downward pressures on nominal wages coming from the supply side and the labor
market dominate the positive, albeit small, e↵ect of rising demand. The cyclical nominal
wage contraction in Spain is driven by demand and labor market shocks.
Table 4.3: Nominal Wage Inflation in Recoveries: A Structural Decomposition
Germany France Italy Spain
pre post di↵ pre post di↵ pre post di↵ pre post di↵
extracted 3.2 5.9 2.7** 4.7 2.3 -2.4* 5.0 1.5 -3.5*** 5.1 3.7 -1.3
trend growth 5.5 5.5 0.0 4.9 4.9 0.0 4.8 4.8 0.0 6.9 6.9 0.0
cycle -3.2 0.1 3.3** -0.9 -2.7 -1.8 -0.7 -3.6 -2.9** -3.9 -4.1 -0.2
initial obs. 0.8 0.2 -0.6* 0.7 0.1 -0.6 0.9 0.3 -0.6 2.1 0.9 -1.1
supply -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.0 -1.0 -1.0** -0.0 -2.3 -2.3** 0.4 0.1 -0.3
productivity -0.0 -0.7 -0.7 0.3 -0.7 -1.0 -2.1 0.1 2.2** -2.3 -1.0 1.3
price mkp -0.2 0.6 0.8 -0.3 -0.3 -0.0 2.1 -2.4 -4.5*** 2.7 1.0 -1.6
demand -4.5 0.5 5.0*** -1.2 -1.7 -0.5 1.1 0.7 -0.4 -1.5 -0.4 1.2
risk premium -4.0 -2.2 1.9** -1.1 -3.0 -1.9** 0.4 1.3 0.9*** -2.9 0.1 3.0
investment -0.1 -1.0 -0.9* -0.4 0.3 0.8* 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2
spending 0.1 0.5 0.5*** 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.3*
int. rate -0.5 3.2 3.6* 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.9 -0.2 -1.1 1.7 -0.2 -1.9
labor 1.5 -0.2 -1.7*** 0.3 0.0 -0.3* -1.8 -2.0 -0.2 -2.8 -3.8 -1.0
wage mkp 1.6 -0.1 -1.7** 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -2.0 -1.5 0.5 -2.8 -4.0 -1.2
labor disutility -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.2 -0.5 -0.7* 0.0 0.2 0.2
Notes: “Pre”: average eight-quarter-ahead cumulative change after a trough during the pre-2013 recoveries.
“Post”: average eight-quarter-ahead quarterly-rolling cumulative change after the sovereign debt crisis
trough and up to the end of the sample. “di↵”: di↵erence between the pre and post figures. Asterisks
(⇤⇤⇤,⇤⇤ ,⇤) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the cumulative changes during the pre-2013 recoveries
come from a normal distribution with mean equal to the post-2013 average change and unknown variance at
the (1%, 5%, 10%) significance level (one-sample t-test). Data Sources: See text; Authors’ computations.
Unemployment.
It is important to investigate how the above findings about the shocks’ influence are reflected
on the unemployment fluctuations. Table (4.4) reports the decomposition for unemployment.
The table reveals that in all economies but in Italy, a weakening in workers’ market power
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is the main determinant of the post-2013 unemployment decline. In Italy, and in Spain to
a some extent, a sizable influence of the post-2013 demand pick up on the unemployment
decline is found.
Table 4.4: The Unemployment Rate in Recoveries: A Structural Decomposition
Germany France Italy Spain
pre post di↵ pre post di↵ pre post di↵ pre post di↵
cycle 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 0.4 -0.4 -0.7* -0.8 -0.8 0.0 1.9 -4.6 -6.5
initial obs. -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0
supply 0.3 -0.2 -0.6*** 0.2 -0.0 -0.2 1.6 0.2 -1.4* -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
technology -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 0.2 1.5 0.1 -1.4** -0.3 0.0 0.3
price mkp 0.4 -0.1 -0.5*** 0.4 0.0 -0.4* 0.1 0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.4
demand -0.3 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 -1.4 -1.1 0.3 0.2 -1.1 -1.3
risk prem. -0.3 -0.1 0.2** 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -1.5 -1.2 0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.3
investment -0.5 -0.0 0.5 -0.3 -0.0 0.3 -0.5 0.3 0.9* -0.2 0.2 0.4
spending -0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.0 0.2
int. rate 0.8 0.0 -0.7*** -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.5 1.0 -0.5 -1.6
labor -0.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.3 -0.8*** -1.0 0.2 1.2 1.8 -3.2 -5.1
wage mkp 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.4 -0.2 -0.6** -0.4 -0.4 -0.0 1.3 -3.4 -4.8
supply -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.2* -0.7 0.5 1.2 0.5 0.2 -0.3
Notes: “Pre”: average eight-quarter-ahead cumulative change after a trough during the pre-2013 recoveries.
“Post”: average eight-quarter-ahead quarterly-rolling cumulative change after the sovereign debt crisis
trough and up to the end of the sample. “di↵”: di↵erence between the pre and post figures. Asterisks
(⇤⇤⇤,⇤⇤ ,⇤) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the cumulative changes during the pre-2013 recoveries
come from a normal distribution with mean equal to the post-2013 average change and unknown variance at
the (1%, 5%, 10%) significance level (one-sample t-test). Data Sources: See text; Authors’ computations.
4.4.2 The Determinants of Cyclical Wage Growth during Reces-
sions.
The present paper has uncovered a statistically di↵erent wage behavior between the output
recoveries in the pre-2013 period and the post-2013 experience. That di↵erence has been
traced out to its origins. Nevertheless, the above analysis does not shed light on whether
the wage developments in the pre- and post-2013 periods di↵er during recessionary episodes
that end up in an economic trough.
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This section tackles this issue by pinning down the determinants of the wage evolution during
recessions that led to a trough in the pre- and post-2013 period. Table (4.5) computes wage
growth during the recessionary episodes and decomposes it in its driving forces – in the
interest of space, only the decomposition to the three categories of shocks is shown; detailed
results are available upon request.
According to the evidence of Table (4.5), three results stand out. First, the evidence does not
suggest statistically significant di↵erences across time in the wage behavior during economic
downturns that lead to a recession. This observation contradicts the statistically di↵erent
wage behavior uncovered during the recoveries. Second, rather surprisingly, in Germany,
wage growth is positive during the eight quarters preceding the sovereign debt crisis trough,
whereas the opposite holds in all other economies. This result entirely stems from the e↵ect
of supply side shocks. Given the positive e↵ect of those shocks on the real wage during the
recovery, this result implies that the positive e↵ect of supply side shocks, and in particular
of the negative price markup shocks, on the German real wage has started well before the
trough and continued after that, and it was not a↵ected by the economic downturn. Third,
demand side shocks are prevalent in the southern economies during the recession of the
sovereign debt crisis, and imply a steep decline in the real wage.
4.4.3 The Determinants of Wage Volatility during Recoveries.
The above analysis has examined the first moments of the stochastic properties of wages
and of their determinants. Thus, it has not been informative about the volatility of the
influence of its shock on wage growth. Hence, we now turn to the volatility of wages and of
their determinants during recoveries – we consider the pre-2009 recoveries, and the recoveries
from the Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis separately to examine whether those
two periods exhibit similar or di↵erent characteristics.
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Table 4.5: Real Wage Growth, Recoveries vs Recessions
Germany France Italy Spain
pre post di↵ pre post di↵ pre post di↵ pre post di↵
recession
cycle -0.3 1.0 1.4 0.4 -0.5 -0.9 -0.8 0.0 0.7 2.5 -5.2 -7.7
supply -0.4 1.0 1.4 0.3 -0.7 -1.1 -0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.7 -0.8
demand -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.3** 0.2 -2.1 -2.3** -0.8 -3.8 -2.9
labor 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 1.9 2.6** 3.3 -0.7 -4.0
recovery
cycle -1.0 0.4 1.5* 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.8 -0.6 -1.4 -1.8 0.3 2.0
supply -0.7 0.5 1.2 0.1 -1.1 -1.2** 0.0 0.3 0.3 -0.6 1.3 1.9
demand -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.5 -0.5 -1.0 1.6 2.6
labor -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -1.4 -1.2 -0.1 -2.5 -2.5*
Notes: “Pre”: average eight-quarter cumulative change before a trough during the pre-2013 recoveries.
“Post”: average eight-quarter cumulative change before the sovereign debt crisis trough. “di↵”: di↵erence
between the pre and post figures. Asterisks (⇤⇤⇤,⇤⇤ ,⇤) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the
cumulative changes during the pre-2013 recoveries come from a normal distribution with mean equal to
the post-2013 average change and unknown variance at the (1%, 5%, 10%) significance level (one-sample
t-test). Data Sources: See text; Authors’ computations.
Table (4.6) reveals sizable time di↵erences neither in wage volatility nor in the volatility of
the drivers of real wage growth. Price markup shocks are one of the most volatile shocks
contradicting the low volatility of demand side shocks. Wage markup shocks too exhibit low
volatility, with Spain being an exception where these shocks have been volatile across time.
Table 4.6: Wage Volatility In Recoveries
Germany France Italy Spain
pre GR SD pre GR SD pre GR SD pre GR SD
cycle 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
productivity 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
price mkp 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4
risk premium 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
investment 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
spending 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
int. rate 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1
wage mkp 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4
labor disutility 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Notes: “Pre”: average eight-quarter volatility after a trough during the pre-2009 recoveries. “GR”: average
eight-quarter volatility after the trough of the Great Recession. “SD”: average eight-quarter volatility after
the trough of the sovereign debt crisis. Data Sources: See text; Authors’ computations.
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4.4.4 Wages and the Role of Structures during Recoveries.
The present study has so far investigated the stochastic properties of the disturbances across
time, but has remained silent about structural di↵erences across the economies that may
influence the transmission of shocks and, in turn, wage growth. To that end, we now look
at the role of structural di↵erences in the labor markets of the sample economies. Table
(4.7) presents a subset of the posterior parameter estimates that includes only those that are
directly associated with the labor market. The table reveals some di↵erences across the four
economies – the di↵erences are rather sizable in terms of the inverse Frisch elasticity and the
volatility of wage and labor disutility shocks. Both Germany and France suggest high inverse
Frisch elasticity estimates compared to the estimates for Italy and Spain. The volatility of
wage markup shocks is the highest in Germany, whereas the volatility of exogenous shifts in
the labor force is the largest in Spain.
Table 4.7: Parameter Estimates associated with the Labor Market
Posterior Mean [5-95%]
Germany France Italy Spain
wage mkp  w 0.33 [0.26, 0.40] 0.43 [0.32, 0.54] 0.27 [0.18, 0.38] 0.33 [0.23, 0.47]
inv. Frisch   5.73 [4.69, 6.95] 3.99 [3.11, 4.90] 2.18 [1.46, 3.00] 1.37 [1.00, 1.89]
wage Calvo ⇣w 0.42 [0.31, 0.56] 0.48 [0.40, 0.55] 0.54 [0.45, 0.63] 0.40 [0.31, 0.51]
wage index. ◆w 0.33 [0.15, 0.53] 0.23 [0.11, 0.37] 0.14 [0.07, 0.22] 0.40 [0.18, 0.65]
wealth e↵ect ⌫ 0.04 [0.00, 0.14] 0.04 [0.00, 0.10] 0.01 [0.00, 0.02] 0.00 [0.00, 0.01]
AR wage mkp ⇢w 0.86 [0.68, 0.95] 0.91 [0.85, 0.96] 0.93 [0.86, 0.97] 0.85 [0.76, 0.91]
std wage mkp  w 8.83 [4.62, 18.46] 2.28 [1.57, 3.27] 1.58 [0.74, 3.10] 4.60 [2.73, 7.53]
AR labor dis. ⇢  1.00 [0.99, 1.00] 0.99 [0.97, 1.00] 0.94 [0.89, 0.97] 0.92 [0.90, 0.95]
std labor dis.    1.62 [1.31, 1.99] 0.79 [0.61, 1.00] 1.74 [1.22, 2.38] 2.49 [1.78, 3.44]
Notes: The table reports a subset of the posterior distribution of all the parameters estimates of the model.
The complete set is relegated to the Appendix. Data Sources: See text; Authors’ computations.
To understand the influence of the above structural di↵erences on wage growth, we conduct
the following experiment. We ask, how would the post-2013 real wage growth have looked
like, if the labor markets of all the economies had been similar to the German labor market ?
To answer this question, the posterior mean estimates of the parameters associated with the
German labor market are substituted in the model for each of the economies of the sample –
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the latter model is then simulated on the set of extracted innovations for the period after the
sovereign debt crisis trough. The eight-quarter-ahead quarterly rolling cumulative change in
the real wage is then computed and displayed in Table (4.8).
The evidence of the table suggests no sizable di↵erences when all the parameters associated
with the labor market are similar to those in Germany. Thus, in the sample economies, the
structural di↵erences in the labor market are not su cient to generate sizable di↵erences in
terms of the wage evolution. An exception is the case of Spain, where the simulated cyclical
real wage growth is higher than its observed counterpart. The entire e↵ect in that case
comes from replacing the low Spanish inverse Frisch elasticity (1.4) with the much higher
German one (5.7): the higher that elasticity, the higher the response of wages to labor market
aggregates. Hence, the steep unemployment decline in Spain would translate to strong wage
growth for a high inverse Frisch elasticity.
Table 4.8: Post-2013 Real Wage Growth, The Role of Structural Di↵erences
actual simulated di↵.
Germany 0.4 0.4 -0.1
France -1.0 -1.1 -0.1
Italy -0.6 -0.8 -0.2
Spain 0.4 2.7 2.3
Notes: The table reports the simulated real wage growth in each economy when the posterior mean of the
parameters associated with the labor market in Germany replaces the same parameters of each economy,
and simulation takes place in the time period after the sovereign debt crisis trough.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
The present paper contributes in the literature that studies the driving factors of wage growth
after the Great Recession in two ways. First, it provides a structural interpretation of the
driving factors of wage growth and, thereby, quantifies the relative importance of a variety
of factors. Second, it emphasizes the wage evolution during output recoveries since the 1990s
to today. In doing so, it sheds light on an unexplored aspect of business cycle fluctuations.
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The present paper documents the phenomenon of a cyclical real wage recovery in Germany
and Spain, and of a cyclical wage-less output recovery in France and Italy during the period
after the sovereign debt crisis. In terms of the underlying forces of those phenomena, this
paper finds a weakening in the pass-through of production costs to inflation, as well as a
productivity slowdown, in all the economies of the sample to some extent. Those phenomena
are prevalent in Germany and France and influential in Italy and Spain. In the last two
economies, however, both a pick up in demand and a weakening in workers’ market power
are highly influential on wage growth as well.
This study provided a versatile platform to further build upon it. Further explorations to be
undertaken involve digging deeper on the role of structural di↵erences in the labor markets
of the sample economies, understanding better the post-2013 wage experience compared to
previous recoveries in terms of changes in the structural features of the sample economies,
and connecting the results of the post-2013 period to the structural reforms that took place
in those economies.
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Appendix A
Distributional Imbalances, Monetary
Policy, and the U.S. Business Cycle
A.1 Model
A.1.1 Nonlinear.
This section collects the nonlinear non-stationary equilibrium equations.
Households.
The first order equilibrium conditions for µ family read as follows:
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{⌅µt ,⇤µt } are the multipliers associated with the budget constraints. (A.1) pins down the
multiplier, (A.2) describes the inter-temporal consumption substitution, and (A.3) governs
the inter-temporal wealth accumulation. The marginal rate of substitution between j-type
labor and consumption is:
W i,h,rt (j) = ✓(L
i
t(j))
 /⌅it = ✓(Lt(j))
 /⌅µt (A.4)
The first order equilibrium conditions for ⌧ family read as follows:
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⇥
C⌧t   ⌘C⌧t 1
⇤
(A.5)
⌅⌧t = Et 
⌧⌅⌧t+1e
 btRt/⇧t+1 (A.6)
⌅⌧tQt

1 + S 0!
✓
⌦⌧t
⌦⌧t 1
◆ 
=  ⌧Et⌅
⌧
t+1Qt+1

1  S!
✓
⌦⌧t+1
⌦⌧t
◆
+
⌦⌧t+1
⌦⌧t
S 0!
✓
⌦⌧t+1
⌦⌧t
◆ 
+
 ⌧ !t
⌦⌧t
+ ⌅⌧t Vt (A.7)
where {⌅⌧t } is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The marginal rate of
substitution between labor and consumption for labor type “j” of family i is given by:
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Capital Production.
The optimization problem of the capital producing firm (1.8) pins down the equilibrium
rental rate of capital:
Rk,rt ⌘ Rkt /Pt = a0(ut) (A.9)
The price of capital, Qkt , is determined by
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Investment dynamics are pinned down by
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Intermediate Good Firms.
Maximization of (2.6) yields the optimal price for an optimizing firm as the weighted average
of current and future marginal costs:
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Taking into account the infrequent price adjustment and that all optimizing firms choose
the same price P  t , the evolution of the aggregate price index (2.2) is described by
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Labor Unions.
Maximization of (2.12) yields the optimal wage, W  t , chosen by all re-optimizing unions:
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The aggregate wage is given by:
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A.1.2 Stationary Model.
Trend growth is given by Zt = Zt 1e . I render the model stationary before estimating it.
Small letters denote stationary real variables, e.g. cjt = C
j
t /Zt, b
j
t = B
j
t /(PtZt) for j 2 {µ, ⌧},
yt = Yt/Zt, kt = Kt/Zt, vt = Vt/Zt, divt = Divt/Zt, ⇡intt = ⇧
int
t /Zt. The multipliers read
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as: ⇠jt = ⌅
j
tZt for j 2 {µ, ⌧}, and  µt = ⇤µt Zt. The real price of equity is qt = Qt/Zt; the
real rental rate of capital is rk,rt = R
k
t /Pt. The real capital price is: q
k
t = Q
k
t /Pt. The equity
shares are stationary by construction and re-expressed with small letters: !jt ⌘ ⌦jt/1.
Households.
The first order conditions (A.1-A.3) for the middle class become:
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while those for the top (A.5–A.7) read as:
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⇠⌧t = Et 
⌧⇠⌧t+1
1
e 
e 
b
tRt
⇧t+1
(A.20)
⇠⌧t qt

1 + S 0!
✓
!⌧t
!⌧t 1
◆ 
=  ⌧Et⇠
⌧
t+1qt+1

1  S!
✓
!⌧t+1
!⌧t
◆
+
!⌧t+1
!⌧t
S 0!
✓
!⌧t+1
!⌧t
◆ 
+
+
 ⌧ !t
!⌧t
+ ⇠⌧t vt (A.21)
The budget constraints (2.14) and (1.7) for the bottom become:
cµt  
bµt
e 
b
tRt
+ qt
⇥
!µt  
 
1  S!
 
!µt /!
µ
t 1
  
!µt 1
⇤
+ tµt =
StwrtLt
nµ
  b
µ
t 1
e ⇧t
+ !µt vt (A.22)
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and
bµt /[e
 btRt]  mtEt
⇣
qt+1!
µ
t ⇧t+1e
 /[e 
b
tRt]
⌘
(A.23)
Capital Producers.
The e↵ective capital and the rental rate read as
kt = utk¯t 1
1
e 
and Rk,rt = a
0(ut) (A.24)
Period-t (real) dividends (1.8) are given by
divt ⌘ Rk,rt kt   a(ut)k¯t 1
1
e 
  it    k (A.25)
The law of capital accumulation (2.9) becomes:
k¯t = (1   )k¯t 1 1
e 
+  it
✓
1  S
✓
it
it 1
e 
◆◆
it (A.26)
The dynamics of the price of capital (A.10) are pinned down by the following condition:
qkt = Et
✓
⇠avgt+1
⇠avgt
1
e 
◆h
Rr,kt+1ut+1   a(ut+1) + (1   )qkt+1
i
(A.27)
Investment dynamics are governed by
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1 = qkt  
i
t

1  S
✓
it
it 1
e 
◆
  it
it 1
e S 0
✓
it
it 1
e 
◆ 
+ Et
⇠avgt+1
⇠avgt e 
qkt+1 
i
t+1
✓
it+1
it
e 
◆2
S 0
✓
it+1
it
e 
◆
(A.28)
Average Stochastic Discount Factor.
The stationary factor reads as
⇠avgt+s/⇠
avg
t ⌘ ( ⌧ )s[n⌧⇠⌧t+s + nµ⇠µt+s]/[n⌧⇠⌧t + nµ⇠µt ] (A.29)
Intermediate Good.
The production function (2.3) reads as:
yt(i) = e
bztk↵t (i)Lt(i)1 ↵    y (A.30)
The capital-labor ratio reads as
kt(i)/Lt(i) = [↵/(1  ↵)](Wt/PtZt)/(Rkt /Pt) = [↵/(1  ↵)](wrt /Rk,rt ) (A.31)
and the (real) marginal cost (2.5) as:
mcrt ⌘MCt/Pt = (↵) ↵(1  ↵) (1 ↵)(wrt )(1 ↵)(Rk,rt )↵e bzt (A.32)
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Aggregate (real) profits in the intermediate good sector are:
⇡intt ⌘ ⇧intt /Zt = yt   wrtLt  Rk,rt kt (A.33)
The optimal price for optimizing firms (A.12) is determined by
Et
+1X
s=0
(⇣p)
s [⇠avgt+s/⇠
avg
t ] (X
p
t,s/Pt+s)
  p,t+syt+s
1
 pt+s

P  ,rt X
p
t,sQs
l=1⇧t+l
  (1 +  pt+s)mcrt+s
 
= 0
(A.34)
where P  ,rt ⌘ P  t /Pt and the time-varying price markup is redefined as (1+ pt ) ⌘  pt/( pt 1),
that is,  pt = 1 + 1/ 
p
t . The evolution of the aggregate price index (A.13) is described by
1 = (1  ⇣p)(P  ,rt )1  
p
t + ⇣p
 
⇧◆pt 1⇧
1 ◆p/⇧t
 1  pt (A.35)
Labor Demand.
Labor demand for type “j” workers and the aggregate wage (2.11) are given by:
Lt(j) =
✓
wt(j)
wt
◆  wt
Lt and wt =
✓Z
wt(j)
1  wt dj
◆1/(1  wt )
(A.36)
The labor disutility (1.14) expressed in terms of the final good is given by
wht (j) = W
h
t (j)/Zt = ✓(Lt(j))
 [nµ/⇠µt + n
⌧/⇠⌧t ] (A.37)
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The first order condition determining the (real) optimal wage (A.14) w t = w
 
t (j) is given by
Et
+1X
s=0
(⇣w)
s [⇠avgt+s/⇠
avg
t ]
1
 wt+s

w ,rt Xwt,s
e
Ps
l=1( )
Qs
l=1⇧t+l
  (1 +  wt+s)wht+s(j)
 
Lt+s(j) = 0
(A.38)
The gross time-varying wage markup is redefined as (1 +  wt ) ⌘  wt /( wt   1). The (real)
aggregate wage reads as:
wrt =
h
(1  ⇣w)(w ,rt )1  w,t + ⇣w
 
e ⇧◆wt 1⇧
1 ◆wwrt 1/[e
 ⇧t]
 1  w,ti1/(1  w,t) (A.39)
Policy.
The following equation describes the policy rule (2.16) in the stationary model
Rt
R
=
✓
Rt 1
R
◆⇢r 24✓⇧t
⇧
◆ ⇡ ✓ yt
yft
◆ y  yt/yt 1
yft /y
f
t 1
!  y351 ⇢r e mp,t (A.40)
Aggregation.
Aggregate consumption is the weighted sum of type-specific consumption profiles: ct = n⌧c⌧t+
nµcµt . The labor and capital aggregates are given by Lt =
R 1
0 Lt(i)di and kt =
R 1
0 kt(i)di,
respectively. Market clearing in the debt market dictates n⌧b⌧t = n
µbµt , and in the equity
market: n⌧!⌧t + n
µ!µt = !t ⌘ 1, where the sum of all equity shares is normalized to unity.
Aggregate output is given by Yt = ebztk↵t L1 ↵t    y. Aggregate profits in the intermediate
good sector are {⇡intt ⌘ yt   wrtLt   Rk,rt kt}. The period-t dividends of the fund managing
capital production are given by {divt ⌘ Rk,rt kt   a(ut)k¯t 1/e    it    k}. Thus, economy
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wide profits are: vt = ⇡intt + divt. The resource constraint (2.17) becomes:
yt = ct + it + gt + act +  k (A.41)
act = a(ut)k¯t 1e   + qt
⇥
nµ!µt 1S!
 
!µt /!
µ
t 1
 
+ n⌧!⌧t 1S!
 
!⌧t /!
⌧
t 1
 ⇤
(A.42)
A.1.3 Steady State
Economy wide variables.
Examining the solution of the steady state reveals that the steady state of economy wide
aggregates coincides with that derived from the representative agent model. The following
normalizations are considered: u = 1, a(1) = 0, S(e ) = S 0(e ) = 0, S 00(e ) ⌘ S 00,   = 0.025,
g/y = 0.18. The (net) markups  p and  w are estimated in this paper. The real marginal
cost is given by eq.(A.34): mcr = 1/(1+ p), with eq.(A.35) implying P  ,r = P  /P = 1. The
price of capital in (A.28) becomes qk = 1, and the real rental rate of capital in (A.27) and
(A.24) reads as: Rk,r = (e / )  (1   ) = a0(1). The e↵ective and raw capital are connected
through eq.(A.24): k = k¯/e . The latter combined with the capital accumulation equation
(A.26) yields the investment-to-output ratio: i/y = (k/y)(e  (1  )). Fixed costs in capital
production (A.25) are set in order to yield zero steady state dividends:  k/y = Rk,rk/y i/y.
Eq.(A.32) pins down the steady state real wage: wr = [mcr(↵)↵(1  ↵)(1 ↵)(Rk,r) ↵]1/(1 ↵).
The capital-to-labor ratio is given by (A.31): k/L = [↵/(1   ↵)](wr/Rk,r). After using
the steady state analogues of equations (A.30, A.31, A.32), the aggregate profits in the
intermediate good sector (A.33) become: ⇧ft = y wrL Rk,rk = [(wrL)/(1 ↵)][(1/mcr) 
1]   y. The fixed cost term is, then, set in order to yield zero profits. The labor-to-output
ratio is then given using (A.30): L/y = (1 +  y/y)/(k/L)↵. The resource constraint (A.41)
pins down the aggregate consumption-to-output ratio: c/y = 1   (g/y)   (i/y)   ( k/y).
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The government budget constraint is described by g = t = tµ = t⌧ .
The discounting between two consecutive periods is: ⇠avg+1 /⇠
avg =  ⌧ according to (A.29).
The latter coincides with the discounting of the representative agent specification given the
particular definition of the average discount factor. The risk-free rate is given by the Euler
equation for the top (A.20):
R = ⇧e / ⌧ (A.43)
It coincides with the risk-free rate in the representative agent model given that the discount
factor of the top ( ⌧ ) is equal to the single discount factor of the representative agent model
(both are fixed at 0.9995). The inverted multipliers (A.16, A.19) read as: 1/⇠µ = [1 ⌘/e ]cµ
and 1/⇠⌧ = [1  ⌘/e ]c⌧ . Equations (A.38) and (A.39) link the real wage with the marginal
disutility of work expressed in terms of the final good and with the optimal wage: wr =
w ,r = (1+  w)wh. Plugging the expressions for the multipliers in the labor disutility (A.37)
implies wh = ✓L [nµ/⇠µ + n⌧/⇠⌧ ] = ✓L [1   ⌘/e ][nµcµ + n⌧c⌧ ] = ✓L [1   ⌘/e ]c. The
latter condition coincides with the analogous condition of the representative agent model
and allows to pin down the level of L and that of all the real variables from thereon.
Family-specific variables.
The Euler equation for the middle class (A.17) combined with the risk free rate (A.43) yields:
 µ = ( ⌧    µ)⇠µ/ ⌧ (A.44)
which is positive for  ⌧ >  µ, implying that the middle class borrows from the top at the
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steady state. After using (A.17), the Euler equations (A.21) and (A.18) yield the share
holdings across agents:
!⌧q =

 ⌧ (1  ⌘/e )
1   ⌧
 
c⌧ and !µq =

 µ(1  ⌘/e )
1   µ   ( ⌧    µ)m
 
cµ (A.45)
The last two equations suggest that the top-to-middle-clss wealth ratio (!⌧q/!µq) depends
on three factors: i) the ratio of the strength of wealth consideration in the utility function of
the top and the middle class ( ⌧/ µ); ii) the consumption ratio c⌧/cµ; and iii) the di↵erence
in the magnitudes between  ⌧ and  µ. The debt limit (m) also influences the top-to-middle-
class ratio of ownership shares. The constraint (A.23) pins down the intra-household debt
at the steady state:
bµ = m⇧e !µq (A.46)
Then, the market clearing condition pins down b⌧ : n⌧b⌧ = nµbµ. The budget constraint
(A.22) for an agent in the middle class reads as:
cµ + bµ

1
⇧e 
  1
R
 
= swrL/nµ   g (A.47)
Plugging (A.45) in (A.46), and the result in (A.47) yields a solution for the consumption
of the middle class (cµ) as a function of aggregate variables already pinned down and of
parameters. Then, the consumption of the top (c⌧ ) can be pinned down either from the
definition of aggregate consumption (c = n⌧c⌧ + nµcµ) or the steady state expression of the
budget constraint of the top. Equipped with {cµ, c⌧}, I work backwards and find {⇠µ, ⇠⌧}
from (A.16, A.19), {!µq,!⌧q} from (A.45), and  µ from (A.44). Given the equity levels, the
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intra-household debt (bµ) is determined by (A.46), and the equity price (q) is found from
the equity market clearing condition: n⌧!⌧q + nµ!µq = 1 ⇥ q. Working backwards again,
one pins down {!µ,!⌧}.
A.1.4 Log-linearized Equilibrium.
This section provides the equilibrium conditions that are log-linearized around the above
steady state of deterministic growth. The log-deviation of a generic stationary variable (xt)
from its steady state (x) is denoted as bxt ⌘ ln(xt/x). Additionally, brk,rt ⌘ ln(Rk,rt /Rk,r),b⇡t ⌘ ln(⇧t/⇧), and brt ⌘ ln(Rt/R). Since the intermediate good (⇡intt ) and aggregate (vt)
profits, as well as the dividends (divt), have a zero steady state value, I define their log-
linearized analogues as a ratio to final output, i.e. bvt = vt/y = b⇡intt + cdivt = ⇡intt /y + divt/y.
Households.
The first order conditions for the middle class (A.16-A.18) yield
  (1  ⌘/e )b⇠µt = bcµt   (⌘/e )bcµt 1 (A.48)b⇠µt = ✓ µR⇧e 
◆
Et
⇣b⇠µt+1 + b bt + brt   b⇡t+1⌘+ ✓1   µR⇧e 
◆b µt (A.49)
b!µt 1 +  µ +  µ!µq⇠µS 00!
 
+
✓
1
S 00!
◆
(b⇠µt + bqt) = b!µt 1 +  µEtb!µt+1 + ( µ/S 00!)Etb⇠µt+1+
+

 µ
S 00!
+
 µ
⇠µ
e m⇧
S 00!R
 
Etbqt+1 + ✓  µ
!µq⇠µS 00!
◆ b !t + ✓ yS 00!q
◆bvt
+

 µ
⇠µ
e m⇧
S 00!R
 
Et
⇣b µt + bmt + b⇡t+1   brt   b bt⌘ (A.50)
where b bt ⌘ ln( bt ) and b !t ⌘ ln( !t ).
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The conditions for the top (A.19-A.21) imply
  (1  ⌘/e )b⇠⌧t = bc⌧t   (⌘/e )bc⌧t 1 (A.51)b⇠⌧t = Et ⇣b⇠⌧t+1 + b bt + brt   b⇡t+1⌘ (A.52)
b!⌧t 1 +  ⌧ +  ⌧!⌧q⇠⌧S 00!
 
+
✓
1
S 00!
◆
(b⇠⌧t + bqt) = b!⌧t 1 +  ⌧Etb!⌧t+1 + ( ⌧/S 00!)Etb⇠⌧t+1+
+

 ⌧
S 00!
 
Etbqt+1 + ✓  ⌧
!⌧q⇠⌧S 00!
◆ b !t + ✓ yS 00!q
◆bvt (A.53)
The two budget constraints for the bottom (A.23, A.22) read as:
bbµt = bmt + Etbqt+1 + b!µt + Etb⇡t+1 (A.54)
cµbcµt   (bµ/R)(bbµt   brt   b bt ) + (!µq)(b!µt   b!µt 1) = (swrL/nµ)( bwrt + bLt) + (swrL/nµ)bst
  (bµ/[⇧e ])(bbµt 1   b⇡t) + (!µy)bvt   gbgt (A.55)
where (A.55) uses the government budget constraint: t = tµ = t⌧ = g and btt = btµt = bt⌧t = bgt.
The deviation of the income share from its steady state value is defined as: bst ⌘ ln(st/s).
Capital Production.
The e↵ective capital and the rental rate (A.24) read as
bkt = but + b¯kt 1 and brk,rt = [ /(1   )]but (A.56)
Period-t (real) dividends (A.25) are given by
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cdivt ⌘ (Rk,rk/y) brk,rt + bkt   but   ✓ e    1 +  e / ⌧   1 +  
◆bit  (A.57)
The law of capital accumulation (A.26) becomes:
b¯kt = [(1   )/e ](b¯kt 1) + [1  (1   )/e ](b it +bit) (A.58)
where b it ⌘ ln( it). The dynamics of the price of capital (A.27) are pinned down by:
bqkt = Et ⇣b⇠avgt+1   b⇠avgt ⌘+ ✓ Rk,rRk,r + 1   
◆
Etbrr,kt+1 + ✓ 1   Rk,r + 1   
◆
Etbqkt+1 (A.59)
Investment dynamics (A.28) are governed by
bit = ✓ 1
1 +  ⌧
◆
(bit 1) + ✓  ⌧
1 +  ⌧
◆
(Etbit+1) + ✓ 1
1 +  ⌧
◆✓
1
e2 S 00
◆ 
(bqkt + b it) (A.60)
Discounting.
The average discounting (A.29) between two consecutive periods reads as
b⇠avgt+1   b⇠avgt = ✓ n⌧⇠⌧n⌧⇠⌧ + nµ⇠µ
◆
(b⇠⌧t+1   b⇠⌧t ) + ✓ nµ⇠µn⌧⇠⌧ + nµ⇠µ
◆
(b⇠µt+1   b⇠µt ) (A.61)
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Intermediate Good.
Log-linearizing the aggregate production function yields
byt = (1 +  y/y)[↵bkt + (1  ↵)bLt + bzt] (A.62)
The linearized equation for the capital-labor ratio(A.31) reads as
bkt = bwrt   brk,rt + bLt (A.63)
and the (real) marginal cost (A.32) as
cmcrt = (1  ↵) bwrt + ↵brk,rt   bzt (A.64)
The linearized aggregate (real) profits (A.33) in the intermediate good sector are:
b⇡intt ⌘ ⇡intt /y = byt   ✓wrLy
◆
( bwrt + bLt)  ✓Rk,rky
◆
(brk,rt + bkt) (A.65)
Linearizing and combining equations (A.34) and (A.35) yields the Phillips curve:
b⇡t = ✓  ⌧
1 + ◆p ⌧
◆
Etb⇡t+1 + ✓ 1
1 + ◆p ⌧
◆b⇡t 1 (A.66)
+

(1  ⇣p)(1  ⇣p ⌧ )
⇣p(1 + ◆p ⌧ )
 ✓cmcrt + ✓  p1 +  p
◆ b pt◆ (A.67)
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Labor Demand.
Linearizing the labor demand and the wage aggregator in (A.36), the labor disutility (1.14),
and the aggregate wage dynamics (A.39) and, then, plugging all those equations in the
linearized condition for the optimal wage (A.38) yields:
bwrt   bwrt 1 + b⇡t   ◆wb⇡t 1 =  ⌧ ⇥Et bwrt+1   bwrt + Etb⇡t+1   ◆wb⇡t⇤+
+

(1  ⇣w)(1  ⇣w ⌧ )
⇣w(1 +  ✏w)
  
 bLt   (nµ⇠⌧ )b⇠µt + (n⌧⇠µ)b⇠⌧t
nµ⇠⌧ + n⌧⇠µ
!
  bwrt + ✓  w1 +  w
◆ b wt
!
(A.68)
The latter is similar to the analogous condition of the representative agent model (A.85) with
the di↵erence been detected in the average discount factor of the right-hand-side expression.
Policy.
The linearized policy rule is derived from (A.40):
brt = ⇢rbrt 1 + (1  ⇢r) h ⇡b⇡t +  y(byt   byft ) +   y (byt   byft )i+ ✏mpt (A.69)
where   stands for the first-di↵erence operator.
Aggregation & Market Clearing.
Equity and bonds market clearing imply:
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(n⌧!⌧ )b!⌧t + (nµ!µ)b!µt = 0 (A.70)bb⌧t = bbµt (A.71)
Aggregate consumption is the weighted sum of family-specific consumptions:
bct = [nµcµ/c]bcµt + [n⌧c⌧/c]bc⌧t (A.72)
The log-linearized resource constraint (A.41) reads as:
(c/y)bct + (i/y)bit + (g/y)bgt + (Rk,rk/y)but = byt (A.73)
Finally, the aggregate period-t profits distributed back to households are given by
bvt = b⇡intt + cdivt (A.74)
Equilibrium Definition.
The eight equations (D.19)–(A.53), (A.54), and (A.55) of the household side determine a
solution for eight variables: {b⇠µt , b⇠⌧t , b µt ,bcµt ,bc⌧t ,bbµt , b!µt , b!⌧t }. The bond holdings of the top
{bb⌧t } are, then, pinned down by the bonds market clearing condition (A.71). The price
of equity {bqt} is pinned down by the equity market clearing condition (A.70). Aggregate
consumption {bct} is given by (A.72). The six equations (D.5)–(D.8) in the capital production
side determine a solution for the following six variables: {b¯kt,bkt, brk,rt , bqkt ,bit, cdivt}. Equation
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(A.61) yields the average discount factor {b⇠avgt }. The five equations (A.62)–(D.9) pin down
the following five variables: {byt, bLt, b⇡intt , b⇡t, cmcrt}. Equation (D.10) determines the real wage
{ bwrt }. The nominal interest rate {brt} is found by (D.17). A solution for the utilization rate
{but} stems from the resource constraint (D.18). Aggregate profits {bvt} are given by (A.74).
Dimensionality Reduction.
To reduce the state dimensionality, {⇠⌧t , ⇠µt , b⇠avgt } are substituted out of the system using
equations (D.19, A.51, A.61). Similarly, the bonds and equity market clearing conditions
(A.71, A.70) are used to eliminate {bbµt } and {b!µt }. {bkt} is eliminated using (A.24). {cmcrt} is
substituted out using (A.64). {b⇡intt , cdivt, bvt} are eliminated using (A.65, A.57, A.74).
Shocks.
All the shock processes are collected in Table (A.1). Aggregate shocks (risk premium, in-
vestment, price and wage markup) are scaled exactly in the same way as in the canonical
model described in Appendix A.2 in order to preserve comparability across the two specifica-
tions. It is worth pointing out that scaling the risk premium requires making an additional
adjustment at the observation equation for the top wealth share (??). Some distributional
shocks are also scaled. In particular, income shocks (bst) entering in the budget constraint
(A.55) are scaled to enter with a coe cient of one; they are then properly adjusted in the
observation equation for the top income share. Wealth shocks (b !t ) are scaled to enter with
a unitary coe cient in (A.53) and with a properly adjusted coe cient in (D.20). The shock
to the debt limit (bmt) is not scaled.
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Table A.1: Shock Processes
Demand Side
1. Risk Premium b bt = ⇢bb bt 1 + ✏bt ✏bt ⇠ N(0,  2b )
2. Investment Adjustment Cost b it = ⇢ib it 1 + ✏it ✏it ⇠ N(0,  2i )
3. Government Spending bgt = ⇢gbgt 1 + ✏gt + ⇢gz✏zt ✏gt ⇠ N(0,  2g)
4. Monetary Policy Innovation ✏mpt ⇠ N(0,  2mp)
Supply Side
5. Technology bzt = ⇢zbzt 1 + ✏zt ✏zt ⇠ N(0,  2z)
6. Price Markup b pt = ⇢pb pt 1 + ✏pt ✏pt ⇠ N(0,  2p)
7. Wage Markup b wt = ⇢wb wt 1 + ✏wt ✏wt ⇠ N(0,  2w)
Distributional
8. Income Shock bst = ⇢sbst 1 + ✏st ✏st ⇠ N(0,  2s)
9. Wealth Shock b !t = ⇢!b !t 1 + ✏!t ✏!t ⇠ N(0,  2!)
10. Credit Shock bmt = ⇢m bmt 1 + ✏mt ✏mt ⇠ N(0,  2m)
A.2 Representative Agent Model
The representative agent specification of the present paper is essentially the Smets and
Wouters (2007) model with the addition of measurement errors in the estimation, and the
estimation of steady state price and wage markups. Contrary to Smets and Wouters (2007),
I consider AR(1) instead of ARMA(1,1) processes for the price and wage markup shocks.
The representative agent model is derived from the distributional model for n⌧ = 1 and
 ⌧ = 0. The steady state economy wide aggregates coincide across the two models. The
complete set of log-linearized equations is reported below.
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Inter-Temporal Consumption
bct = ✓ 1
1 + ⌘/e 
◆⇥
Etbct+1 + (⌘/e )(bct 1)  (1  ⌘/e )  brt   Etb⇡t+1    bt ⇤ (A.75)
Capital Accumulation
b¯kt = ✓1   
e 
◆
(b¯kt 1) + ✓1  1   
e 
◆⇣bit +  it⌘ (A.76)
Capital Price
bqkt =    brt   Etb⇡t+1 +  bt + ✓ Rk,rRk,r + 1   
◆
Etbrk,rt+1 + ✓ 1   Rk,r + 1   
◆
Etbqkt+1 (A.77)
Investment Dynamics
bit = ✓  
1 +  
◆
(Etbit+1) + ✓ 1
1 +  
◆
(bit 1) + ✓ 1
1 +  
◆✓
1
e2 S 00
◆   bqkt +  it  (A.78)
Capital Rental Rate
brk,rt = ( /(1   )) but (A.79)
E↵ective Capital
bkt = but + b¯kt 1 (A.80)
Capital Demand
bkt = bwrt   brk,rt + bLt (A.81)
Production Function
byt = (1 +  y/y)⇣↵bkt + (1  ↵)bLt + bzt⌘ (A.82)
Marginal Cost
cmcrt = (1  ↵) bwrt + ↵brk,rt   bzt (A.83)
Inflation
b⇡t = ✓  
1 + ◆p 
◆
Etb⇡t+1 + ✓ 1
1 + ◆p 
◆b⇡t 1 + (1  ⇣p)(1  ⇣p )
⇣p(1 + ◆p )
 ✓cmcrt + ✓  p1 +  p
◆ b pt◆
(A.84)
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Wage Dynamics
bwrt   bwrt 1 + b⇡t   ◆wb⇡t 1 =   ⇥Et bwrt+1   bwrt + Etb⇡t+1   ◆wb⇡t⇤+
+

(1  ⇣w)(1  ⇣w )
⇣w(1 +  ✏w)
 ✓
 bLt + ✓ 1
1  ⌘/e 
◆
(bct   (⌘/e )(bct 1))  bwrt + ✓  w1 +  w
◆ b wt ◆
(A.85)
Market Clearing
(c/y)bct + (i/y)bit + (g/y)bgt +  Rk,rk/y  but = byt (A.86)
Monetary Policy
brt = ⇢rbrt 1 + (1  ⇢r) h ⇡b⇡t +  y(byt   byft ) +   y (byt   byft )i+ ✏mpt (A.87)
A.2.1 Shocks.
A few shocks are scaled to enter with a coe cient of one; the risk premium shock is scaled
in eq.(A.75) and adjusted accordingly in eq.(A.77); the investment adjustment cost is scaled
in eq.(A.78) and adjusted accordingly in eq.(A.76); the price and wage markup shocks are
scaled in equations (A.84) and (A.85), respectively; the government spending shock is scaled
in eq.(A.86). These adjustments improve the converge of the sampler, introduce correlated
priors, and illustrate the impact of the disturbances’ prior standard deviation.
A.3 Flexible Price And Wage Equilibrium
The flexible price and wage equilibrium is the same in both the benchmark and the repre-
sentative agent models. It is derived from the above set of equations for flexible prices and
wages. The variables associated with that equilibrium are denoted with the superscript “f”.
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A.4 Observation Equations For Inequality Measures
In this section, I derive the observation equations (1.19) and (1.23) for the top income and
wealth shares. The annual top income share (TIST ) is given by:
P3
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= . . . (first order expansion around the steady state) (A.92)
⇡ (1  s) +
✓
n⌧b⌧
e ⇧wrL
  n
⌧b⌧
RwrL
◆
+ (A.93)
+
3X
j=0
⌫j
2666664
 sbst j +   n⌧ b⌧e ⇧wrL  ⇣bb⌧t j 1   b⇡t j   bwrt j   bLt j⌘+
    n⌧ b⌧RwrL  ⇣bb⌧t j   brt j   b bt j   bwrt j   bLt j⌘+
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3777775 (A.94)
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= tis+
3X
j=0
⌫j
2666666664
 sbst j   tisb ⇣bwrt j + bLt j⌘
+
 
n⌧ b⌧
e ⇧wrL
  ⇣bb⌧t j 1   b⇡t j⌘
+
 
n⌧ b⌧
RwrL
  ⇣bb⌧t j   brt j   b bt j⌘
+bvt j   ywrL   n⌧!⌧   tis 
3777777775
(A.95)
where the weights are given by: ⌫j ⌘ e(3 j) /[e3  + e2  + e1  + 1], and tis ⌘ (1   s) + 
n⌧ b⌧
e ⇧wrL   n
⌧ b⌧
RwrL
 
= (1  s) + tisb, and tisb ⌘
⇣
n⌧ b⌧ (R e ⇧)
e ⇧RwrL
⌘
.
The annual wealth share (1.23) of the top includes the equity shares and the outstanding
household debt measured at the end of each period, where in the denominator the assets of
the top cancel out with liabilities of the middle class (n⌧B⌧t = n
µBµt ) and the total ownership
shares in the economy are equal to one (n⌧⌦⌧t + n
µ⌦µt = 1):
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A.5 Data Overview
In Tables (A.2) and (A.3), I report the first and second moments in the inequality, debt
and the main aggregate series (in an annual frequency to ease the exposition). Table (A.2)
suggests that both the top income and wealth deciles exhibit a positive growth rate over
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the sample. The growth rate for the top wealth decile (0.16) is smaller than that of the
top income decile (0.40). For the top income decile, in particular, positive growth takes
place during the sup-period after 1983. During the post-1983 period, both income and
wealth inequality exhibit strong growth, whereas the growth rates for the economy, personal
consumption, and prices slowdown. Along with rising inequality, household debt in the form
of home mortgages rises as well during that period.
According to the unconditional correlations of Table (A.3), the top income decile is strongly
pro-cyclical whereas the top wealth decile is mildly counter-cyclical. Both income and wealth
top deciles are negatively correlated with inflation. During the 1984-2009, however, the
top income decile becomes positively correlated with inflation. Both debt measures, home
mortgages and consumer credit, are positively correlated with the top income decile. The
top wealth decile is positively correlated with debt during 1954-1983, but that correlation
weakens and, in fact, becomes negative during 1984-2009.
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics, First Moments
Growth (real) 1954-2009 1954-1983 1984-2009
Top Income Decile 0.40 -0.01 0.86
Top Wealth Decile 0.16 -0.24 0.62
Output 1.8 1.8 1.7
Consumption 2.0 2.1 1.9
Inflation 3.4 4.4 2.4
Home Mortgages 4.7 3.9 5.5
Consumer Credit 3.2 3.0 3.5
Notes: Annual Frequency. Average (real per capita) growth rates of out-
put and consumption. Top 10% income and wealth shares. Data sources:
FRED. World Inequality Database.
Figure (A.1) plots the evolution of the series for household debt: outstanding consumer credit
debt and home mortgage debt, both downloaded from FRED. The series are converted in
real per capita terms using the GDP implicit price deflator. Their log-di↵erence is displayed.
After the early 1980s, the two series exhibit distinct di↵erences in their evolution.
Fig.(A.2) plots the evolution of the top income and wealth deciles and of the (log-) real per
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics, Correlations
Y C ⇡ HM CC
1954-2009
TIS -0.07 -0.01 -0.33 0.02 -0.07
TWS 0.49 0.46 -0.16 0.34 0.32
1954-1983
TIS -0.01 0.09 -0.27 0.21 0.08
TWS 0.43 0.46 -0.19 0.37 0.43
1984-2009
TIS -0.22 -0.24 -0.21 -0.56 -0.47
TWS 0.68 0.56 0.37 0.23 0.19
Notes: Annual Frequency. Real per capita growth rates. Correla-
tions. Top 10% income and wealth shares. Data sources: FRED.
World Inequality Database.
capita household debt in terms of home mortgages and consumer credit. After the early
1980s, all the series exhibit an upward trend.
Fig.(A.3) reports the actual evolution of the top income and wealth deciles along with their
cyclical components and the associated measurement errors of the observation equations.
The cyclical top income decile is more volatile than the cyclical top wealth share. Further-
more, the cyclical component of the top income decile clearly exceeds its trend starting from
the 1990s.
A.6 Additional Results
A.6.1 Measurement Errors.
Tables (D.2) and (A.5) display the posterior standard deviation (std) of the measurement
errors (m.e.) for the variables that are matched to a single observable. Their priors are tight
and imply negligible measurement errors in order to preserve comparability with traditional
estimated DSGE models that do not include measurement errors for those observables.
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Figure A.1: Outstanding Household Debt
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Notes: Real per capita household debt growth in the form of home mortgages and consumer
credit. Source: FRED.
Figure A.2: Inequality And Household Debt
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Notes: Logarithm of real per capita home mortgage debt and consumer credit (left axis). Top 10% income
and wealth shares (right axis). Data sources: FRED, World Inequality Database.
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Figure A.3: Income and Wealth Inequality: Trends, Cycles, Measurement Errors, and Data
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Notes: Logarithm of real per capita home mortgage debt and consumer credit (left axis). Top 10% income
and wealth shares (right axis). Data sources: FRED, World Inequality Database.
Table A.4: Posterior Distribution – Common Measurement Errors
Prior Posterior Mean [5-95%]
Rep. Agent D. Imbalances
µw IG(0.01,0.001) 0.0101[0.0085,0.0118] 0.0101[0.0085,0.0119]
µy IG(0.01,0.001) 0.0100[0.0085,0.0116] 0.0101[0.0086,0.0120]
µc IG(0.01,0.001) 0.0100[0.0085,0.0117] 0.0100[0.0085,0.0119]
µi IG(0.01,0.001) 0.0100[0.0085,0.0117] 0.0100[0.0085,0.0119]
µ⇡ IG(0.01,0.001) 0.0100[0.0085,0.0117] 0.0101[0.0086,0.0118]
µr IG(0.01,0.001) 0.0100[0.0085,0.0116] 0.0100[0.0086,0.0118]
µl IG(0.01,0.001) 0.0100[0.0085,0.0118] 0.0099[0.0085,0.0116]
Notes: Author’s computations. “Rep. Agent” refers to the Smets and
Wouters (2007) model estimated over the 1954Q3-2009Q4 period.
A.6.2 Prior.
Table (A.6) displays the forecast error variance decomposition of the benchmark model at
the prior mean 8/40 quarters ahead. The findings are considerably di↵erent from those at
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Table A.5: Posterior Distribution – Distributional Measurement Errors
Prior Posterior
Mean [5-95%]
std m.e. income inequality µtis IG(0.01, 0.001) 0.01002 [0.00846, 0.01185]
std m.e. wealth inequality µtws IG(0.01, 0.001) 0.01004 [0.00852, 0.01183]
Notes: Author’s computations. Estimates from the benchmark model.
the posterior mean, suggesting that the postulated prior is not dogmatic. In other words,
the results found in the paper do not depend on the prior specification.
Table A.6: Business Cycles – The Role of the Prior
variable
shock byt bit bwrt b⇡t brt bb⌧t ctist dtwst
income 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/1 1/1 66/66 1/2
wealth 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
credit 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 0/0
distributional 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/1 2/2 67/67 1/2
technology 15/15 2/3 2/2 1/1 1/1 2/3 1/1 3/3
price markup 9/9 8/7 75/63 31/31 10/10 4/4 6/6 4/4
wage markup 9/10 14/15 14/13 9/9 4/4 5/9 1/1 1/2
supply side 34/34 24/25 91/78 42/42 15/15 11/16 7/7 8/9
risk premium 56/54 41/40 7/11 49/49 74/73 73/53 24/24 84/82
investment 5/6 30/30 1/9 3/3 4/5 9/25 1/1 1/2
govt spending 1/1 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/0 0/0
policy 4/4 4/4 1/1 6/6 6/6 5/4 2/2 5/5
demand side 66/66 76/74 9/21 58/58 85/84 87/83 26/26 90/89
Notes: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 8/40 quarters ahead, computed at the
prior mean.
A.6.3 Representative Agent Model.
Table (A.7) shows the FEVD in the representative agent model. Figures (A.4, A.5, A.6)
display a comparison of the IRFs of aggregate variables in response to aggregate shocks
between the present model and the representative agent model. Fig.(A.7) compares the
output gaps in the present model and the representative agent model.
Comparing the FEVD for the economy wide variables of the benchmark model with that
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of the representative agent model reveals that the two have some di↵erences implying that
introducing inequality and debt in the model has indirect implications for the influence of
demand supply side shocks on economy wide variables. The influence of demand side shocks
on output in the benchmark model is smaller in the short run (46% vs 67%) and larger in
the long run (57% vs 36%) than it is in the representative agent model. The influence of
demand shocks on inflation in the present model (22/27%) is higher than that in the RA
model (1/2%). This result is also reflected in a higher inflation responsiveness to demand
shocks in the benchmark model than in the representative agent model as it is seen in
Fig.(A.5). As for the entire set of impulse response functions, those for the economy wide
variables in the benchmark model are in line with those in the RA model. Their cumulative
di↵erences are described in the paper.
Finally, Fig.(A.7) displays the small implications of including heterogeneous agents and
distributional imbalances for the evolution of the output gap (the largest deviation in the
output gap between the representative agent model and the model of the present paper is at
about 1%). It is worth pointing out that since the structure of the flexible equilibrium is the
same in both the representative agent and the benchmark model, and features the same set
of shocks, the small di↵erence between the two model-implied output gaps emanates from
the interaction of distributional imbalances with nominal price and wage rigidities.
A.6.4 Quantifying the E↵ect of Imbalances on Inflation.
Figures (A.8) and (A.9) display a graphical depiction of the influence of endogenous and
exogenous distributional imbalances on aggregate demand and inflation described in detail
in the paper. The figures corroborate that the distributional shocks as well as the channels
of MPC di↵erentials and imperfect insurance have a more profound influence on aggregate
demand than on inflation.
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Table A.7: Business Cycles – Representative Agent Model
variable
shock byt bit bwrt b⇡t brt
technology 25/56 3/13 7/45 7/9 4/7
price markup 8/6 6/6 26/20 81/74 22/19
wage markup 0/2 0/2 64/30 11/15 4/9
supply side 33/64 9/21 98/95 99/98 31/35
risk premium 38/18 12/7 1/1 0/0 20/26
investment 14/10 74/67 1/4 0/1 1/3
govt spending 3/1 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/1
policy 11/6 5/4 0/1 0/0 48/36
demand side 67/36 91/79 2/5 1/2 69/65
Notes: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 8/40 quar-
ters ahead, computed at the posterior mean.
Figure A.4: Demand Side Innovations: A Comparison Across Models
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Notes: Impulse Response Functions (posterior mean). Black: benchmark model with Distributional Imbal-
ances. Green: Representative Agent model.
Nevertheless, including inequality and debt series in the estimation attenuates to some degree
the general equilibrium e↵ects on inflation. The latter are reflected in an elevated indexation,
a weakened price stickiness, an elevated volatility of price markup shocks, and an attenuated
persistence of price markup shocks. They are observed in the bottom right panel of Fig.(A.9)
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where the shocks of the benchmark model are fed in the representative agent model and result
in inflation series that deviate from the observed ones.
A.6.5 Marginal Propensity to Consume and Wealth Preferences.
Fig.(A.10) plots the di↵erence in the MPC between the benchmark model with  ⌧ 6=  µ and
an alternative model featuring  ⌧ =  µ. According to the evidence displayed in the figure,
the MPC di↵erence in all panels has a moderate non-zero value suggesting that imposing
homogeneous preferences over wealth attenuates the heterogeneity in the consumption re-
sponses in the population.
A.6.6 Five Decades of Business Cycles and Inequality Swings.
What is the historical influence of demand, supply, and distributional shocks on the swings
of the top income and wealth shares across U.S. business cycles? Fig.(A.11) and (A.12) cope
with that question. Fig.(A.11) suggests that the relative stability of the top 10% income
share from the 1950s to the mid-80s is attributed to all shocks balancing out on aggregate.
The rise of the top income share since the mid-80s is mainly explained by wage polarization,
supply side shocks, wealth shocks, credit relaxation, and demand shocks to some extent.
The post-1990 rise of wealth inequality is driven by wage polarization, credit relaxation,
wealth shocks. In contrast, in the pre-1990 period, worth mentioning are the inequality-
increasing e↵ect of technology shocks during the 1970s-80s, and the sizable influence of
wealth shocks during the fluctuations of the top wealth share on the 1960s-70s.
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Figure A.5: Policy Innovations: A Comparison Across Models
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Figure A.6: Supply Side Innovations: A Comparison Across Models
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Notes: Impulse Response Functions (posterior mean). Black: benchmark model with Distributional Imbal-
ances. Green: Representative Agent model.
178
Figure A.7: U.S. Output Gap Fluctuations
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Notes: Author’s computations. Output Gap. Black: benchmark model with Distributional
Imbalances. Blue: Representative Agent model.
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Figure A.8: Quantifying the E↵ect of Imbalances on Aggregate Demand
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Figure A.9: Quantifying the E↵ect of Imbalances on Inflation
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Figure A.10: MPC Di↵erentials and Preferences over Wealth
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Notes: Posterior distribution of the di↵erence between the consumption responses across variables and
sources of stochastic variation (shown in each panel’s title) for top and middle-class households in the
benchmark estimation and in the simulation featuring  ⌧ =  µ.
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Figure A.11: Cyclical Swings in the Top 10% Income Share, 1954–2009
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Figure A.12: Cyclical Swings in the Top 10% Wealth Share, 1954–2009
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Notes: Historical decomposition of cumulative cyclical annual change (shown on top of each column) over a
U.S. business cycle (trough to trough). Cumulative e↵ect of each shock. Demand side shocks: risk premium,
investment, interest rate, and government spending. Supply side shocks: technology, price markup, wage
markup shocks. All figures are in %.
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Appendix B
The U.S. Labor Income Share and
Automation Shocks
B.1 Model Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions, log-linearized around the balanced growth steady state path, are
collected here. Small letters denote non-stationary variables (expressed in capital letters)
normalized with the composite technology. The log-deviation of a generic stationary variable
(xt) from its steady state (x) is denoted as bxt ⌘ ln(xt/x).
Aggregate Production Function1
byt = (1 +  y/y)[↵bkt + (1  ↵)bLt + ↵ln(k/L)b↵t] (B.1)
Capital-To-Labor Ratio
1 log(k/L) > 0, since in the steady state wr/rk,r > (1 ↵)/↵ and k/L = ↵wr/[(1 ↵)rk,r] from eq.(2.4).
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bkt = bwrt   brk,rt + bLt + [1/(1  ↵)]b↵t (B.2)
Marginal Cost
cmcrt = (1  ↵) bwrt + ↵brk,rt   ↵ln (k/L) b↵t (B.3)
Rental Rate of Capital
brk,rt = [ /(1   )]but (B.4)
E↵ective Capital
bkt = but + b¯kt 1   bzt   [1/(1  ↵)]b !t (B.5)
Capital Accumulation
b¯kt = k1(b¯kt 1   bzt   [1/(1  ↵)]b !t ) + (1  k1)(b it +beit) (B.6)
where k1 = (1   )/e + ! .
Price of Capital
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bqkt = Et ⇣b⇠t+1   b⇠t   bzt+1   [1/(1  ↵)]b !t+1⌘+ q1Etbrr,kt+1 + (1  q1)Etbqkt+1 (B.7)
where q1 =
 
rk,r/[rk,r + 1   ] .
Investment
beit = i1(beit 1   bzt   1
1  ↵b !t ) + (1  i1) (Etbeit+1 + Etbzt+1 + 11  ↵b !t+1) + i2(bqkt + b it)
(B.8)
where i1 = 1/[1 +  ] and i2 = i1/
⇥
e2( + !)S 00
⇤
.
Relative Investment Price
  d(pI/p)t =  b !t (B.9)
Price Inflation
b⇡t = (⇡1 )Etb⇡t+1 + (⇡1◆p)b⇡t 1 + p (cmcrt + ( p/[1 +  p]) b pt ) (B.10)
where p = (1  ⇣p)(1  ⇣p )/ [⇣p(1 + ◆p )] and ⇡1 = 1/[1 + ◆p ].
Wage Inflation
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bwrt   bwrt 1 + b⇡t + bzt + [↵/(1  ↵)]b !t   ◆wb⇡t 1   ◆wbzt 1   ◆w[↵/(1  ↵)]b !t 1 =
 
⇥
Et bwrt+1   bwrt + Etb⇡t+1 + Etbzt+1 + [↵/(1  ↵)]Etb !t+1   ◆wb⇡t   ◆wbzt   ◆w[↵/(1  ↵)]b !t ⇤
+ w
⇣
 bLt   b⇠t   bwrt + ( w/[1 +  w]) b wt ⌘ (B.11)
where w = (1  ⇣w)(1  ⇣w )/ [⇣w(1 +  ✏w)].
Monetary Policy2
rot = max{0, r + brt} (B.12)
brt = ⇢rbrt 1 + (1  ⇢r) h ⇡b⇡t +  y(byt   byft ) +   y (byt   byft )i+ ✏mpt (B.13)
Resource Constraint
(c/y)bct + (i/y)beit + (g/y)bgt + (rk,rk/y)but = byt (B.14)
Lagrange Multiplier
 (1  ⌘/e )b⇠t = bct   (⌘/e )bct 1 + (⌘/e )bzt + (⌘/e )[↵/(1  ↵)]b !t (B.15)
Inter-Temporal Consumption Dynamics
2The steady state net interest rate is given by r = e ⇧/    1, where ⇧ stands for gross inflation.
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b⇠t = Et ⇣b⇠t+1   bzt+1   [↵/(1  ↵)]b !t+1 + b bt + brt   b⇡t+1⌘ (B.16)
Labor Share
blst = bwrt + bLt   byt (B.17)
B.1.1 Equilibrium Definition.
Equations (D.19, D.20) of the household side determine {b⇠t,bct}. Equations (D.4)–(D.8) in
capital production determine: {b¯kt,bkt, brk,rt , bqkt ,beit}. Equations (D.10) and (D.9) determine the
real wage, bwrt , and inflation, b⇡t, respectively. Equations (D.1)–(D.3) pin down the following
variables: {byt, bLt, cmcrt}. The relative investment price, d(pI/p)t, is given in (B.9). The policy
rate in normal times and during the zero lower bound is found by (B.12) and (D.17). A
solution for the utilization rate {but} is obtained from the resource constraint (D.18). (D.21)
determines the labor income share (blst).
The flexible price and wage equilibrium is obtained from the above set of equations (D.1–
D.20) for zero price and wage stickiness. Automation shocks appear in that equilibrium.
The stochastic structure of the disturbances is described in the paper. A few shocks are
scaled: the risk premium shock is scaled in (D.20) after substituting in (D.19), and adjusted
accordingly in (D.7) after substituting in (D.20); the price and wage markup shocks are
scaled in equations (D.9) and (D.10), respectively; the government spending shock is scaled
in (D.18). These adjustments improve the convergence of the sampler, introduce correlated
priors, and illustrate the impact of the disturbances’ prior standard deviation.
187
B.2 Additional Results
B.2.1 Measurement Errors.
Table (D.2) reports the standard deviation of measurement errors for variables with a single
observable series. Those are tightly estimated with a low prior mean.
Table B.1: Posterior Distribution – Standard Deviation Of Measurement Errors
Prior Posterior Mean [5-95%]
Without LS With LS
std m.e. compensation µw IG (0.01, 0.001) 0.0101 [0.0085, 0.0118] 0.0101 [0.0085, 0.0119]
std m.e. output µy IG (0.01, 0.001) 0.0100 [0.0085, 0.0116] 0.0101 [0.0086, 0.0120]
std m.e. consumption µc IG (0.01, 0.001) 0.0100 [0.0085, 0.0117] 0.0100 [0.0085, 0.0119]
std m.e. investment µi IG (0.01, 0.001) 0.0100 [0.0085, 0.0117] 0.0100 [0.0085, 0.0119]
std m.e. inflation µ⇡ IG (0.01, 0.001) 0.0100 [0.0085, 0.0117] 0.0101 [0.0086, 0.0118]
std m.e. interest rate µr IG (0.01, 0.001) 0.0100 [0.0085, 0.0116] 0.0100 [0.0086, 0.0118]
std m.e. labor hours µl IG (0.01, 0.001) 0.0100 [0.0085, 0.0118] 0.0099 [0.0085, 0.0116]
Marginal Likelihood -1484 -1863
Notes: “Without/With LS”: without/with multiple labor income share observables.
B.2.2 Prior.
I investigate the robustness of the results to the prior specification. Table (B.2) displays
the forecast error variance decomposition at the prior mean, and shows that the influence of
automation shocks is much smaller than that obtained at the posterior mean.
B.2.3 Real Wage.
Fig.(B.1) displays the extracted wage from the model with and without the LS series, and
overlaps both of them with the data series. The extracted wages demonstrate a substantially
di↵erent evolution. The wage in the model with the LS is more volatile than the wage in
the model without the LS, and on average follows more closely the compensation index than
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Table B.2: FEVD – With LS – Prior Mean
variable
shock yt it ⇡t rt Lt wrt lst
technology 14/18 12/12 5/6 1/6 36/38 41/42 26/27
price markup 13/11 7/7 54/52 24/21 7/6 24/13 44/43
wage markup 10/10 15/17 14/14 11/10 11/9 5/3 16/15
IST 16/21 41/41 1/3 1/7 3/15 28/40 4/6
supply side 53/59 76/77 74/75 37/45 57/67 98/99 90/90
risk premium 36/31 13/12 17/17 38/33 32/25 1/1 0/0
MEI 1/1 7/7 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/0
govt spending 3/3 0/0 0/0 0/0 3/2 0/0 0/0
policy 6/5 3/3 7/6 23/21 5/4 0/0 0/0
demand side 46/40 23/23 24/24 62/55 41/32 1/1 0/0
automation 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 2/1 0/0 10/10
Notes: Computations at the prior mean 8/80 quarters ahead.
the wage in the model without the LS does.
Figure B.1: Real Wage Growth
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Notes: Observed real wage growth in earnings and compensation index series. Posterior mean of smooth
real wage growth in the estimation with/without LS observables.
B.2.4 Capital Intensity.
Fig.(B.2) reports the comovement between automation shocks and the unexplained part of
the growth rate of three capital intensity indices for the 1988-2008 period that corresponds
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to the time period of the estimation of the model. The figure shows a positive comovement.
Nevertheless, the comovement is smaller than that obtained when the extracted automation
shocks for the 2009-2016 period are included. This result may in fact reflect that during
that period automation shocks play a large role in explaining the swings in the labor share
according to the historical decomposition shown in the paper.
Figure B.2: Capital Intensity and Automation Shocks, 1988-2008
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Appendix C
On Unemployment And Wage Cycles:
Euro Area, 1999–2016
C.1 Model Overview
I present the model derivation for a small open economy. The euro-area block is obtained
for a zero trade share (⌧).
Households. A continuum of representative households populates the economy. The house-
hold is a large family of individuals who di↵er in terms of their labor type (“i”), situated
in the unit interval, and disutility of work given by j , should the household member is
employed, and by zero otherwise, where “j” is an index uniformly distributed in the unit
interval, and   governs the curvature of the labor disutility. Thus, household members
are situated in the unit square and indexed by (i, j) 2 [0, 1] ⇥ [0, 1]. Labor is indivisible.
Individual period-t preferences are given by
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u (Ct(i, j), j, Ct 1,   ,t,⌦t,  d,t, ) =
⇥
log
 
Ct(i, j)  ⌘Ct 1
   1e  ,t⌦tj ⇤ e d,t (C.1)
where 1 is an indicator function that equals to unity when the individual is employed and
zero otherwise. The CRRA is set to unity. ⌦t is defined below.   ,t is the AR(1) disutility
of work shock. ⌘ captures the strength of external habit formation. Perfect consumption
insurance (Ct(i, j) = Ct 8i, j) and a common discount factor ( ) are postulated across
household members. Household preferences are the equally weighted average of individual
utilities:
E0
1X
t=0
 t
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
u(·)djdi = E0
1X
t=0
 t

log
 
Ct   ⌘Ct 1
   e  ,t⌦t Z 1
0
Nit
1+ 
(1 +  )
di
 
e d,t
(C.2)
Nit denotes the period-t employment rate among workers of type “i”.   has now the inter-
pretation of a Frisch elasticity along the extensive margin.  d,t is an AR(1) demand shock.
⌦t is an endogenous shifter that allows the parameterization of the strength of wealth e↵ects
on labor supply and helps the model match the cyclical properties of labor force in response
to monetary policy shocks. It preserves additive separability in the preferences between
consumption and the aggregate disutility of employment across occupations, and reconciles
the existence of a balanced growth path with an arbitrarily small wealth e↵ect. The shifter
is defined as
⌦t = Zt
 
Ct   ⌘Ct 1
  1
where Zt = Z
1 !
t 1
 
Ct   ⌘Ct 1
 !
(C.3)
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! governs the strength of the wealth e↵ects of consumption to labor supply. Zt is a distributed
lag of consumption and evolves according to a first-order di↵erence equation.
The household chooses consumption (Ct) at price Pt, and savings across domestic (Bt) and
euro-area bonds (Dt). Both bonds are nominal one-period risk-less securities denominated
in the same union currency with interest rates it and i⇤t , respectively. Nevertheless, trading
on the euro-area bond is subject to a debt elastic premium over the risk-less euro-area
nominal interest rate that guarantees stationarity in the foreign debt position and constitutes
a reduced-form representation of financial intermediation costs. The premium depends on
the debt-to-income ratio (dt ⌘ Dt/Y¯ Pt), and is given by  
 
Dt/Y¯ Pt ; 
 
= exp
   Dt/Y¯ Pt ,
where   is the debt premium elasticity, and Dt captures the foreign position (Dt < 0 denotes
debt). The flow budget constraint is given by
PtCt +Bt +Dt =
= Bt 1(1 + it 1) +Dt 1(1 + i⇤t 1)  (·) +
Z 1
0
(1 + ◆w)WitNitdi+ ⇧H,t + ⇧M,t   Tt
(C.4)
Tt stands for taxes/transfers and “◆w” is a labor subsidy correcting the market power of labor
unions at the steady state. The two resulting Euler equations read as:
(Ct   ⌘Ct 1) 1 =
=  Et
⇥
(Ct+1   ⌘Ct) 1 [(1 + i⇤t )/(1 + ⇡t+1)]exp(  (Dt/Y Pt) +  d,t+1    d,t)
⇤
(C.5)
(Ct   ⌘Ct 1) 1 =
=  Et
⇥
(Ct+1   ⌘Ct) 1 [(1 + it)/(1 + ⇡t+1)]exp( d,t+1    d,t)
⇤
(C.6)
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Their combination yields the uncovered interest parity (UIP):
Et (Ct+1   ⌘Ct) 1 e d,t+1  d,t/(1 + ⇡t+1)
⇥
(1 + i⇤t )e
  (Dt/Y Pt)   (1 + it)
⇤
= 0 (C.7)
In addition, the household allocates consumption expenditure across domestic (CH,t) and im-
ported (CM,t) goods, at prices PH,t and PM,t, respectively, where the consumption aggregate
measure has a Dixit-Stiglitz CES structure:
Ct =
h
(1  ⌧) 1⌫CH,t ⌫ 1⌫ + ⌧ 1⌫CM,t ⌫ 1⌫
i ⌫
⌫ 1
(C.8)
(1   ⌧) 2 [0, 1] is the share of domestic goods in the consumption basket. ⌫ is the trade
elasticity. Domestic and imported good aggregates, CH,t and CM,t, respectively, are defined
via the CES aggregators:
CH,t =
✓Z 1
0
CH,t(j)
(⇣h,t 1)/⇣h,tdj
◆⇣h,t/(⇣h,t 1)
, (C.9)
CM,t =
✓Z 1
0
CM,t(j)
(⇣m,t 1)/⇣m,tdj
◆⇣m,t/(⇣m,t 1)
(C.10)
⇣h,t, ⇣m,t are the substitution elasticities within domestic and imported goods, respectively.
The aggregate price is given by:
Pt =
⇥
(1  ⌧)P 1 ⌫H,t + ⌧P 1 ⌫M,t
⇤1/(1 ⌫)
(C.11)
PH,t and PM,t are the prices required to obtain a unit of the domestic and imported con-
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sumption aggregates, respectively, and are defined by
PH,t =
✓Z 1
0
PH,t(j)
1 ⇣h,tdj
◆1/(1 ⇣h,t)
and PM,t =
✓Z 1
0
PM,t(j)
1 ⇣m,tdj
◆1/(1 ⇣m,t)
(C.12)
Thus, the household chooses a sequence {Ct, Bt, Dt, CH,t, CM,t, {CH,t(j), CM,t(j)}8j2[0,1]}1t=0
to maximize the expected present discounted value of inter-temporal utility, while taking as
given prices {PH,t, PM,t, Pt, it, i⇤t}1t=0, firms’ profits {⇧H,t,⇧M,t}1t=0, and taxes {Tt}1t=0.
Labor Market. All type“i” workers, for every type i 2 [0, 1], form a monopolistically
competitive coalition, and set wages in a staggered fashion while seeking to maximize the
inter-temporal household utility taking into account the labor demand function emanating
from a labor aggregator that operates in a perfectly competitive environment. Aggregate
labor, used by domestic producers, is given by
Nt =
Z 1
0
N (✏w,t 1)/✏w,tit di
 ✏w,t/(✏w,t 1)
(C.13)
✏w,t is the time-varying elasticity of substitution across labor types. Labor demand for type
“i” is
Nit = (Wit/Wt)
 ✏w,t Nt (C.14)
and the wage index is Wt =
⇣R 1
0 W
1 ✏w,t
it di
⌘1/(1 ✏w,t)
. The real average wage is
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W rt = Wt/Pt (C.15)
The marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption for the type “i” workers
that are employed reads as mrsit ⌘ e  ,t⌦tN it(Ct   ⌘Ct 1). The individual (i,j) is willing to
participate in the market when the real wage exceeds his/her marginal rate of substitution:
Wit/Pt   e  ,t⌦tj (Ct  ⌘Ct 1). The latter condition at the symmetric equilibrium becomes
Wit/Pt = e
  ,t⌦tL
 
it(Ct   ⌘Ct 1) = e  ,tZtL it (C.16)
where Lit denotes the marginal worker who is indi↵erent between participating in and staying
out of the labor market. Hence, Lit denotes the mass of workers participating in the market.
Each union resets wages with probability 1 ✓w, ✓w 2 [0, 1]. In the periods in which wages are
not reset, they are partially updated according to the price inflation and the wage indexation
parameter  w. The period-T wage for labor type workers “i” and a wage that was lastly reset
in period t at W  it, is given by WiT |t = W
 
it (PT 1/Pt 1)
 w . Union’s optimization, constrained
by the type-specific labor demand, yields the optimal wage (for 1 +  w,t = ✏w,t/(✏w,t   1))
Et
1X
s=0
( ✓w)sNit,t+s
Ct+s   ⌘Ct+s 1

Wit+s|t
Pt+s
  (1 +  w,t)
(1 + ◆w)
e  ,t+s⌦t+sN
 
it,t+s(Ct+s   ⌘Ct+s 1)
 
= 0
(C.17)
International Prices. The real exchange rate is given by the cross-country price ratio,
Qt = P ⇤t /Pt. The terms of trade are given by the ratio of import to export prices, St =
PF,t/PH,t.
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Domestic Intermediate Good Firms indexed by i 2 [0, 1], operate under monopolistic
competition. Each firm hires Nt(i) units of labor at the wage Wt, and produces YH,t(i)
according to a linear production function:
YH,t(i) = e
 a,tNt(i) (C.18)
where  a,t is an AR(1) neutral technology shock. The firm receives a subsidy ◆h over the mar-
ket wage, that yields a real marginal cost in terms of output,MCt = (1 ◆h)Wt/[PH,texp( a,t)],
that is independent of firm-specific characteristics.
Each firm chooses price P  t (i) in a staggered fashion with ✓h governing the price stickiness,
and sells both domestically and abroad at that price since the domestic economy is small
relative to the union. The period-t demand schedule faced by a firm is given by
YH,t(i) = CH,t(i) + C
⇤
H,t(i) , 8i 2 [0, 1] and 8t (C.19)
where it is postulated that the foreign demand for domestic variety “i”, C⇤H,t(i), has the same
functional form as the domestic demand for that variety, that is,
C⇤H,t(i) =
 
P ⇤H,t(i)/P
⇤
H,t
  ⇣h,t C⇤H,t (C.20)
Partial price indexation to one-period lagged inflation for non-optimizing firms, governed
by the parameter  h, implies that the period-T (nominal) price of firm “i” that has not
reset prices since period t is: PH,T |t(i) = P  H,t(i) (PH,T 1/PH,t 1)
 h . The associated demand
schedule and real profits can then be written as
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YH,T |t(i) =
 
PH,T |t(i)/PH,T
  ⇣h,t (CH,T + C⇤H,T ) (C.21)
and
⇧H,T |t = YH,T |t(i)
⇥
PH,T |t(i)/PH,T  MCT
⇤
(C.22)
Hence, each firm that is allowed to reset its period-t price, maximizes the present discounted
value of future profits, Et
P1
T=t( ✓h)
T t⇤t,T⇧H,T |t, subject to the demand schedule, by choos-
ing a price that is the weighted sum of current and future marginal costs1:
P  H,t(i) = (1 +  h,t)Et
1X
T=t
24 (✓h )T t⇤t,TYH,T |t(i)
Et
P
J=t(✓h )
J t⇤t,JYH,J |t(i)
⇣
1
PH,J
⇣
PH,J 1
PH,t 1
⌘ h⌘
35MCT
(C.23)
Intermediate Good Importers indexed by j 2 [0, 1], operate under monopolistic compe-
tition. They purchase goods from abroad at the euro-area price (the law of one price holds
at the docks) which is subsidized at rate ◆m in order to consider an e cient steady state
production. Each importer chooses domestic price P  M,t(j) in a staggered fashion governed
by the parameter ✓m, in order to maximize the present discounted value of future profits:
Et
P1
T=t( ✓m)
T t⇤t,T⇧M,T |t, where period-T profits for an importer who has not reset prices
since period t, are given by
1⇤t,T stands for the ratio of period-T to period-tmarginal utility of consumption, and 1+ h,t = ⇣h,t/(⇣h,t 
1).
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⇧M,T |t = YM,T |t(j)
⇥
P  M,t(j) (PM,T 1/PM,t 1)
 m   (1  ◆m)P ⇤M,T
⇤
(C.24)
The behavior of an importing firm is constrained by the downward sloping demand CM,t(j).
Those who do not reset prices, are able to automatically update prices according to the
one-period-lagged imported-good inflation and the parameter  m that governs the strength
of indexation. Thus, the constraint for a producer who has not reset prices for T periods
reads as
YM,T |t(j) ⌘ CM,T |t(j) =
 
P  M,t(j) (PM,T 1/PM,t 1)
 m /PM,T
  ⇣m,t CM,T (C.25)
The resulting optimal price (for 1 +  m,t = ⇣m,t/(⇣m,t   1)) is given by:
P  M,t(j) = (1 +  m,t)Et
1X
T=t
24 (✓m )T t⇤t,TYM,T |t(j)
Et
P
J=t(✓m )
J t⇤t,JYM,J |t(j)
⇣
PM,J 1
PM,t 1
⌘ m
35 (1  ◆m)P ⇤M,T
(C.26)
Government. The government levies lump sump taxes from households, while it subsidizes
intermediate producers, importers, and the unions. Government spending is subject to an
exogenous AR(1) spending shock  g,t. The government does not borrow or lend funds and,
thus, keeps a balanced budget at all times:
Tt = ◆w
Z 1
0
Wi,tNi,tdi+ ◆hWt
Z 1
0
Nt(i)di+ ◆mP
⇤
M,t
Z 1
0
CM,t(j)dj +  g,t (C.27)
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Market Clearing And Aggregation. Market clearing for domestically produced goods
requires total production to be equal to domestic consumption plus exports and government
spending: Yt ⌘ YH,t = CH,t+C⇤H,t+ g,t. After using the euro-area market clearing condition
(Y ⇤t = C
⇤
t + 
⇤
g,t), the LOOP for domestic goods sold abroad (P
⇤
H,t = PH,t), the real exchange
rate, and some algebra, aggregate demand reads as
Yt = (PH,t/Pt)
 ⌫ [(1  ⌧)Ct + ⌧Q⌫tC⇤t ] +  g,t (C.28)
Aggregate production, in turn, is given by:
Yt ⌘ YH,t =
Z 1
0
YH,t(i)di = exp( a,t)Nt (C.29)
At the symmetric equilibrium, the profits of domestic-good firms are:
⇧H,t =
Z 1
0
⇧H,t(i)di = PH,tYH,t   (1  ◆h)WtNt (C.30)
The profits of importers are:
⇧M,t =
Z 1
0
⇧M,t(j)dj =
⇥
PM,t   (1  ◆m)P ⇤M,t
⇤
⌧ (PM,t/Pt)
 ⌫ Ct (C.31)
After recognizing that P ⇤M,t = P
⇤
t , and plugging the above in the budget constraint, I obtain
Ct
⇥
Pt   (PM,t   P ⇤M,t)⌧ (PM,t/Pt) ⌫
⇤
+Dt = Dt 1(1 + i⇤t 1)  (·) + PH,tYt    g,t (C.32)
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Euro Area. The euro-area block is the closed economy analogue of the above model (for
⌧ = 0) with two di↵erences: monetary policy is conducted at the euro-area level and euro-
area variables are not a↵ected by the small economy’s aggregates.
Steady State. The zero growth deterministic steady state considered is symmetric with
zero inflation (⇡ = ⇡⇤ = ⇡H = ⇡M = 0). Domestic and foreign bond holdings are zero,
the premium is  (0; ) = 1, and the uncovered interest rate parity along with the Euler
equation yield i = i⇤ =   1 1. Employment equals output (Y = N , Y ⇤ = N⇤), and unitary
real marginal costs appear in production. Distortionary markups are removed thanks to the
subsidies. International prices are given by: S = Q = 1. The euro-area market clearing yields
Y ⇤ = C⇤ since the postulated exogenous government spending shock has a zero steady state.
The budget constraint (C.32) yields Y = C, again because of the zero steady state spending
shock ( g = 0). The demand functions for the product varieties imply: CH = (1   ⌧)C
and CM = ⌧C. Domestic market clearing (C.28) yields Y = CH + C⇤H . Equation (C.3)
yields Z = U 1c , and ⌦ = 1. After using the wage subsidy (◆w) to eliminate the distortion
in the labor market, the real wage equals the marginal rate of substitution, W/P = N U 1c ,
where employment is equal to the labor force and is the same for each labor type; there is
no unemployment in the steady state.
Log-linearization. The Euler (C.5) yields (3.2). The UIP (C.7) yields (3.4). Labor sup-
ply (C.16) becomes (3.18). The pricing conditions for wages, domestically produced and
imported goods prices (C.17, C.23, C.26) result in (3.21, 3.9, 3.10). The market clearing
condition (C.28) and the budget constraint (C.32) become (3.23) and (3.5), respectively, af-
ter scaling the government spending shock as  g,t ⌘  g,t/Y . First-di↵erencing the logarithm
of international prices yields (3.24) and (3.25). Log-linearizing the preference shifter (C.3)
yields (3.19). The price aggregator (C.11) yields the log-linearized inflation in the periphery
(3.8). Aggregate production (C.29) becomes (3.11). The real wage (C.15) yields (3.17).
Unemployment is defined in (3.20).
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C.2 Data Overview
C.2.1 Data Sources.
The sample period is 1999Q1–2016Q4 and consists of 10 quarterly data series for the Euro
Area (19 economies, fixed composition) and the four southern peripheral economies. Two
additional quarterly series are used for the Euro Area in the robustness analysis.
Nine series are common in the Euro Area and the peripheral economies: 1) Real Private
Consumption Growth, constant prices, seasonally adjusted (s.a.), from OECD: [cot/c
mu,o
t ]; 2)
Real GDP growth, s.a. & working day adj., chain linked volume, from ECB: [yot /y
mu,o
t ]; 3)
Percent Change in the CPI, not s.a., from OECD: [⇡ot /⇡
mu,o
t ]; 4) Unemployment rate (above
15 years old), s.a., from OECD: [uot ] for the peripheral economies, and from ECB for the Euro
Area [umu,ot ]; 5) Employment series, s.a. for all economies but Greece, from ECB: [n
o
t/n
mu,o
t ];
6) Aggregate wages: GDP and main components, wages and salaries, current prices, in mil.,
s.a., from Eurostat: [⇡wns,ow,t /⇡
mu,wns,o
w,t ]; 7) Labor Costs, Compensation per unit of labor,
Hourly Compensation, Total Economy, Total – All Activities, Index (a few series are not
s.a.), from ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse: [⇡hr,ow,t /⇡
mu,hr,o
w,t ]; 8) Labor Costs, Compensation
per unit of labor, Compensation per employee, Total Economy, Total – All Activities, Index
(a few series are not s.a.), from ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse: [⇡comp,ow,t /⇡
mu,comp,o
w,t ]; 9)
Private sector, hourly earnings index compiled from surveys, from OECD: [⇡earn,ow,t /⇡
mu,earn,o
w,t ].
No data for Greece. Italy’s series start in 2000Q1; I replace the four missing observations
(1999Q1-1999Q4) with the growth rate of the s.a. hourly earnings index for manufacture from
the same source. 10) in the periphery, the percent change in the GDP Deflator, s.a., from
OECD: [⇡oh,t]; 10) in the Euro Area, the money market interest rate (percent per annum),
from OECD: [imu,ot ]. The two additional series used in the robustness are: 11) the two-year-
ahead unemployment forecasts, survey of professional forecasters, from ECB: [uf ot,t+h]; 12)
the monthly euro-area shadow rate of Wu and Xia (2017) averaged to a quarterly frequency.
202
All seasonal e↵ects are removed using the S3x3 filter.
It is worth pointing out that compensation of employees equals to the sum of wages and
salaries and employers’ social contributions, and serves in the income approach to GDP.
Measures 6), 7), and 8) are compiled from administrative data, whereas 9) is compiled from
survey data.
The unemployment series are plotted in Fig.(C.2). Nominal wage inflation series are shown in
Fig.(C.1), and suggest a degree of country heterogeneity since the series are more correlated
in Greece and Italy than in the Euro Area, Portugal, and Spain. The bivariate correlations
among those series, and of each of those series with unemployment, are reported in Table
(C.1). Three observations associated with the findings of the paper are drawn. First, that
correlation varies across wage series. It is higher among the administrate wage measures than
between any of those measures and the survey-based earnings. Second, a high correlation
between the unemployment rate and a wage series suggests a strong comovement. That
comovement plays a pivotal role in the magnitude of the short-run impact of wage markup
shocks. In the Euro Area, Portugal, and Spain, unemployment is considerably correlated
with wages. In Greece, the correlation is a tad weakened across all wage measures. In
contrast, in Italy, the correlation is small or moderate across all measures. Third, although
the correlation among the wage series does not change considerably when focusing on the
2009Q1–16Q4 period, the correlation of all wage series with the unemployment rate weakens.
This weakening suggests a disconnect that possibly mirrors downward wage rigidities and
an adjustment of the extensive margin of labor supply instead of wages to the underlying
economic conditions. The Italian economy constitutes an exception that involves a low
correlation of unemployment with all wage series at all times – though, the correlation with
earnings becomes moderate during the above time window.
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Figure C.1: Measures of Wage Inflation
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Notes: The figure depicts four seasonally adjusted measures of wage inflation during 1991Q1–2016Q4:
(i) economy wide wages and salaries in millions; (ii) hourly compensation index; (iii) compensation per
employee; (iv) hourly earnings, private sector index. Sources: OECD, Eurostat, ECB.
Table C.1: Measures of Wage Inflation – Correlations
⇡wnsw ,⇡
hr
w ⇡
wns
w ,⇡
comp
w ⇡wnsw ,⇡
earn
w u,⇡
wns
w u,⇡
hr
w u,⇡
comp
w u,⇡earnw
1999Q1-2016Q4
Greece 0.8 0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.0
Spain 0.6 0.7 0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6
Portugal 0.4 0.7 0.1 -0.5 -0.0 -0.4 -0.3
Euro Area 0.2 0.7 0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6
Italy 0.7 0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.3
2009Q1-2016Q4
Greece 0.8 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Spain 0.6 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4
Portugal 0.5 0.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Euro Area -0.3 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2
Italy 0.1 0.6 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.5
Notes: u: unemployment; ⇡wnsw : economy wide wages and salaries in millions; ⇡
hr
w : hourly compensation
index; ⇡compw : compensation per employee; ⇡
earn
w : hourly earnings, private sector index. Sources: OECD,
Eurostat, ECB.
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Figure C.2: Unemployment Rates
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Notes: The figure depicts the 1991Q1–2016Q4 unemployment rate of the southern euro-area economies and
the Euro Area, and the two-year-ahead private sector forecasts for the euro-area unemployment. Sources:
ECB, OECD.
C.2.2 Observation equations.
Since the euro-area block is nested in a small open economy model, the observation equations
need to incorporate the fact that the euro-area series stem from the sum of the country-
specific series. This is taken into account by introducing the parameter   that is fixed to
the sample average ratio of the output of a peripheral economy to the euro-area output.
Ultimately,   accounts for the size of each of the peripheral economies in the Euro Area.
The data are obtained from Eurostat. That parameter is 1.8% for Greece, 17% for Italy,
1.8% for Portugal, and 10.5% for Spain. The observation linking the detrended data to the
latent states are shown below. When I estimate the euro-area block in an independent run,
I only use equations (C.33)–(C.42) and set   = 0.
205
Table C.2: Observation Equations
imu,ot = i
⇤
t (C.33)
 ymu,ot = (1   ) y⇤t +   yt (C.34)
 cmu,ot = (1   ) c⇤t +   ct (C.35)
umu,ot = (1   )u⇤t +  ut (C.36)
 nmu,ot = (1   ) nt +   nt (C.37)
⇡mu,ot = (1   )⇡⇤p,t +  ⇡p,t (C.38)
⇡mu,wns,ow2,t = (1   )⇡⇤w,t +  ⇡w,t (C.39)
⇡mu,earn,ow2,t = ↵
earn,⇤ ⇥(1   )⇡⇤w,t +  ⇡w,t⇤
(C.40)
⇡mu,hr,ow,t = ↵
hr,⇤ ⇥(1   )⇡⇤w,t +  ⇡w,t⇤
(C.41)
⇡mu,comp,ow2,t = ↵
comp,⇤ ⇥(1   )⇡⇤w,t +  ⇡w,t⇤
(C.42)
 cot = ct   ct 1 (C.43)
 yot = yt   yt 1 (C.44)
uot = ut (C.45)
 not =  nt (C.46)
⇡oh,t = ⇡h,t (C.47)
⇡ot = ⇡p,t (C.48)
⇡hr,ow,t = ↵
hr⇡w,t (C.49)
⇡wns,ow2,t = ⇡w,t (C.50)
⇡comp,ow2,t = ↵
comp⇡w,t (C.51)
⇡earn,ow2,t = ↵
earn⇡w,t (C.52)
C.3 Additional Results
The following figure and tables collect various results that complement the benchmark anal-
ysis, and are briefly mentioned in the paper.
Table (C.3) displays the posterior std of the measurement errors for series with a single
observable. A tight prior keeps the posterior close to it, and is justified because of the use
of a single observable. In that way, the incorporation of such series is equivalent to the
traditional way observables are introduced in DSGE models without measurement error.
Fig.(C.3) depicts the historical decomposition of unemployment in the southern economies
across the whole sample. It shows that, contrary to the Euro Area, the impact of the initial
observation fades out over time, while the impact of wage markup shocks increases as more
data points become available.
Table (C.4) reports the FEVD at the prior mean that is discussed in the Robustness Analysis
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of the paper. It shows that the prior favors demand shocks, and only assigns a small role to
wage markup shocks in unemployment fluctuations.
Finally, Table (C.5) provides the posterior estimates for all parameters that pertain to the
alternative specifications for the Euro Area in the Robustness Analysis.
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Figure C.3: Unemployment – Southern Periphery
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Notes: The figure displays the posterior mean contribution of each innovation in the unemploy-
ment rate.
Table C.4: The role of the Prior
Unempl. Output
shock SOE EA SOE EA
demand side 69/68 85/85 35/31 82/75
demand 68/67 84/84 32/28 79/72
spending 1/1 1/1 3/3 3/3
supply side 4/4 2/2 11/9 6/5
technology 1/1 1/1 2/2 2/1
price markup 2/2 1/1 8/7 4/4
import markup 0/0 / 0/0 /
labor market 17/17 13/13 18/23 13/20
wage markup 17/17 13/13 15/13 10/9
labor disutility 0/0 0/0 2/10 2/10
euro-area 10/11 100/100 36/37 100/100
Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition at the prior mean 10/40 quarters ahead. Mnemonics: EA:
Euro Area, SOE: Small Open Economy. Demand shocks in the Euro Area include the impact of monetary
policy shocks.
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Appendix D
Wages During Recoveries in
Euro-Area Economies. A Structural
View
D.1 Model Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions, log-linearized around the balanced growth steady state path, are
collected here. The log-deviation of a generic non-stationary variable (Xt) from its steady
state (x), after rendering the former stationary, is denoted by bxt ⌘ ln(Xt/e t/x).
D.1.1 Sticky Price and Wage Equilibrium.
.
Aggregate Production Function
211
byt = (1 +  y/y)[↵bkt + (1  ↵)bLt + bzt] (D.1)
Capital-To-Labor Ratio
bkt = bwrt   brk,rt + bLt (D.2)
Marginal Cost
cmcrt = (1  ↵) bwrt + ↵brk,rt   bzt (D.3)
Rental Rate of Capital
brk,rt = [ /(1   )]but (D.4)
E↵ective Capital
bkt = but + b¯kt 1 (D.5)
Capital Accumulation
b¯kt = k1(b¯kt 1) + (1  k1)(b it +beit) (D.6)
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where k1 = (1   )/e .
Price of Capital
bqkt = Et ⇣b⇠t+1   b⇠t⌘+ q1Etbrr,kt+1 + (1  q1)Etbqkt+1 (D.7)
where q1 =
 
rk,r/[rk,r + 1   ] .
Investment
bit = i1(bit 1) + (1  i1) (Etbit+1) + i2(bqkt + b it) (D.8)
where i1 = 1/[1 +  ] and i2 = i1/ [e2 S 00].
Price Inflation
b⇡t = (⇡1 )Etb⇡t+1 + (⇡1◆p)b⇡t 1 + p (cmcrt + (1/ p) b pt ) (D.9)
where p = (1  ⇣p)(1  ⇣p )/ [⇣p(1 + ◆p )], ⇡1 = 1/[1 + ◆p ], b pt ⌘ log( pt / p), and 1 +  pt ⌘
 pt/( 
p
t   1).
Wage Inflation
b⇡wt   ◆wb⇡t 1 =   ⇥Etb⇡wt+1   ◆wb⇡t⇤  w (bµwt   bµw,nt ) (D.10)
where w = (1  ⇣w)(1  ⇣w )/ [⇣w(1 +   w)].
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Real Wage
bwrt   bwrt 1 = b⇡wt   b⇡t (D.11)
Endogenous Wage Markup,
bµwt =  bUt (D.12)
Exogenous Wage Markup,
bµw,nt = (1/ w) b wt (D.13)
where b wt ⌘ log( wt / w), and 1 +  wt ⌘  wt /( wt   1).
Natural Unemployment,
bµw,nt =  bUnt (D.14)
Unemployment,
bUt = cLF t   bLt (D.15)
Labor Supply,
214
bwrt = b t + b✓t +  cLF t (D.16)
Interest Rate Determination,
brt = ⇢rbrt 1 + (1  ⇢r) h ⇡b⇡t +  y(byt   byft ) +   y (byt   byft )i+ ✏mpt (D.17)
Resource Constraint
(c/y)bct + (i/y)bit + (g/y)bgt + (rk,rk/y)but = byt (D.18)
Lagrange Multiplier
 (1  ⌘/e )b⇠t = bct   (⌘/e )bct 1 (D.19)
Inter-Temporal Consumption Dynamics
b⇠t = Et ⇣b⇠t+1 + b bt + brt   b⇡t+1⌘ (D.20)
Shifter
b✓t = (1  ⌫)b✓t 1   ⌫b⇠t (D.21)
215
D.1.2 Flexible Price and Wage Equilibrium.
The solution of the model in the flexible price and wage equilibrium (variables associated
with that equilibrium are denoted with a superscript “f”) is obtained from the above set of
equations (D.1–D.21) for zero price and wage stickiness.
D.1.3 Stochastic Structure.
The disturbances follow AR(1) processes. A few shocks are scaled: the risk premium shock
is scaled in (D.20) after substituting in (D.19), and is adjusted accordingly in (D.7) after
substituting in (D.20); the price and wage markup shocks are scaled in equations (D.9)
and (D.13), respectively; the government spending shock is scaled in (D.18); the investment
shock is scaled in (D.8) and adjusted accordingly in (D.6).
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D.2 Observation Equations, State Space, And Data
Sources
The observation equations are shown below.
dln(GDPt/ImplicitPriceDeflatort/Popt) =   + byt + µyt (D.22)
dln(PrivateConst/ImplicitPriceDeflatort/Popt) =   + bct + µct (D.23)
dln(GrossF ixedInvestmentt/ImplicitPriceDeflatort/Popt) =   + bit + µit (D.24)
dln(ImplicitPriceDeflatort) = ⇡ + b⇡t + µ⇡t (D.25)
InterestRatet = r + brt + µrt (D.26)
UnemploymentRatet = u+ but + µut (D.27)
ln(Employmentt/Popt) = l + blt + µlt (D.28)
The mean of the latter’s left hand side is normalized to zero.
dln
266666666664
Compensationt/ImplicitPriceDeflatort/Employmentt
WagesAndSalariest/ImplicitPriceDeflatort/Employmentt
NegotiatedWagesIndext/ImplicitPriceDeflatort
PrivateEarningsIndext/ImplicitPriceDeflatort/Employmentt
HourlyCompensationIndext/ImplicitPriceDeflatort
377777777775
=
=
266666666664
 cpe
 wnspe
 neg
 priv
 cph
377777777775
+
266666666664
1
 wnspe
 neg
 priv
 cph
377777777775
  bwt +
266666666664
µcpet
µwnspet
µnegt
µprivt
µcpht
377777777775
(D.29)
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The approach to the state space follows Charalampidis (2018).
The data sources are explained below.
• Germany (1991Q1-2017Q4):
1. Gross Domestic Product, current prices, s.a., Euro, millions, OECD Quarterly
National Accounts
2. GDP Price Deflator, index (2010=100), s.a., OECD Quarterly National Accounts
3. Gross Capital Formation, current prices, s.a., Euro, millions, OECD Quarterly
National Accounts
4. Private Final Consumption Expenditure, current prices, s.a., Euro, millions, OECD
Quarterly National Accounts
5. 3-Month or 90-day Rates and Yields: Interbank Rates for Germany, Percent,
Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted, FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data
6. Total Population, persons, thousands, s.a., OECD Quarterly National Accounts
7. Total Employment, persons, thousands, s.a., OECD Quarterly National Accounts
8. Harmonized Unemployment Rate: Total: All Persons for Germany, Percent,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted, Labour Force Survey, OECD, Key Short-Term
Economic Indicators
9. Compensation of employees, total, current prices, s.a., Euro, millions, OECD
Quarterly National Accounts
10. Wages and Salaries, total, current prices, s.a., Euro, millions, OECD Quarterly
National Accounts
11. Hourly Earnings, index, s.a., Manufacturing (1991Q1-1996Q1), Private Sector
(1996Q2-2017Q4), OECD
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12. Hourly Compensation, Domestic (home or reference area), Total economy, Total
- All activities, Index, Current prices, Non transformed data, s.a., not calendar
adjusted, SDW
13. Negotiated wages, Total - Index. Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted,
retrieved from SDW. Seasonality is removed with the Census X13 filter.
• France (1991Q1-2017Q4): as above; the unempl. rate is obtained from FRED.
• Italy (1995Q1-2017Q4): as above; 6 from Eurostat and is not seasonally adjusted.
• Spain (1995Q1-2017Q4): as above; no negotiated wages index is available.
• Euro Area 19 (1995Q1-2017Q4): as above; no negotiated wages index is available.
The series matched in the estimation are shown below for each economy.
D.3 Posterior
Table (D.1) collects the posterior distribution of the parameters. The parameters are in
general aligned with that is usually obtained in the literature.
Table (D.2) reports the standard deviation of measurement errors for variables with a single
observable series. Those are tightly estimated with a low prior mean.
A few parameters are calibrated since they are not identified in the data.   and g are set at
the values chosen in Gal´ı et al. (2012a).   is fixed at 0.998.
In Table (D.1), the prior means for { , ⇡,  cpe,  wnspe,  neg,  priv,  cph} are their sample aver-
ages:
• {.31, .37, .19, .18, .28, .28, .32} for DE,
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Figure D.1: Observables, Germany
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Figure D.2: Observables, France
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• {.27, .25, .25, .31, .21, .28, .32} for FR,
• {.08, .01, .05, .08, .04, .01, .51} for IT,
• and {.36, .13, .13, .21, ;, .07, .53} for ES.
220
Figure D.3: Observables, Italy
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Figure D.4: Observables, Spain
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Table D.1: Posterior Distribution (Mean [5-95%])
Prior Germany France Italy Spain
capital share ↵ N (0.30, 0.02) 0.15 [0.13, 0.17] 0.15 [0.14, 0.17] 0.19 [0.16, 0.21] 0.22 [0.20, 0.25]
habit ⌘ B (0.70, 0.10) 0.36 [0.28, 0.44] 0.45 [0.39, 0.52] 0.79 [0.67, 0.87] 0.46 [0.37, 0.54]
util. cost elast.  B (0.50, 0.10) 0.30 [0.14, 0.52] 0.44 [0.29, 0.60] 0.67 [0.54, 0.78] 0.51 [0.39, 0.64]
adj. cost elast. S N (4.00, 1.00) 3.67 [1.57, 5.60] 4.19 [2.70, 5.69] 5.50 [4.26, 6.85] 4.89 [3.59, 6.27]
price indexation ◆p B (0.50, 0.15) 0.13 [0.05, 0.24] 0.23 [0.11, 0.39] 0.17 [0.07, 0.30] 0.17 [0.07, 0.32]
resp. to int.rate ⇢r B (0.75, 0.10) 0.90 [0.87, 0.92] 0.83 [0.80, 0.86] 0.92 [0.90, 0.94] 0.92 [0.90, 0.94]
resp. to inflation  ⇡ N (1.70, 0.25) 2.13 [1.82, 2.43] 2.54 [2.24, 2.84] 1.51 [1.18, 1.87] 1.93 [1.61, 2.26]
resp. to growth   y N (0.12, 0.05) 0.05 [0.01, 0.10] 0.03 [-0.03, 0.08] 0.19 [0.13, 0.25] 0.07 [0.04, 0.11]
resp. to gap  y N (0.12, 0.05) 0.16 [0.08, 0.24] 0.16 [0.08, 0.25] 0.13 [0.05, 0.21] 0.08 [0.01, 0.15]
growth   N (*, 0.03) 0.27 [0.23, 0.30] 0.26 [0.23, 0.28] 0.06 [0.03, 0.09] 0.31 [0.28, 0.35]
inflation ⇡ N (*, 0.03) 0.42 [0.37, 0.47] 0.35 [0.30, 0.40] 0.54 [0.49, 0.58] 0.55 [0.50, 0.60]
price stickiness ⇣p B (0.50, 0.10) 0.65 [0.56, 0.77] 0.61 [0.53, 0.70] 0.95 [0.92, 0.97] 0.84 [0.80, 0.90]
st.st. net P mkp  p N (0.30, 0.03) 0.34 [0.29, 0.39] 0.35 [0.30, 0.39] 0.33 [0.28, 0.38] 0.27 [0.22, 0.32]
st.st. net W mkp  w N (0.50, 0.10) 0.33 [0.26, 0.40] 0.43 [0.32, 0.54] 0.27 [0.18, 0.38] 0.33 [0.23, 0.47]
inv. Frisch elast.   N (2.00, 1.00) 5.73 [4.69, 6.95] 3.99 [3.11, 4.90] 2.18 [1.46, 3.00] 1.37 [1.00, 1.89]
wage stickiness ⇣w B (0.50, 0.05) 0.42 [0.31, 0.56] 0.48 [0.40, 0.55] 0.54 [0.45, 0.63] 0.40 [0.31, 0.51]
wage indexation ◆w B (0.50, 0.15) 0.33 [0.15, 0.53] 0.23 [0.11, 0.37] 0.14 [0.07, 0.22] 0.40 [0.18, 0.65]
wealth e↵ect ⌫ B (0.20, 0.20) 0.04 [0.00, 0.14] 0.04 [0.00, 0.10] 0.01 [0.00, 0.02] 0.00 [0.00, 0.01]
st.st. labor l¯ N (0.00, 0.10) -0.06 [-0.21, 0.09] -0.33 [-0.49, -0.18] -0.15 [-0.33, 0.01] -0.10 [-0.26, 0.07]
AR risk premium ⇢b B (0.60, 0.20) 0.96 [0.92, 0.98] 0.95 [0.91, 0.98] 0.35 [0.14, 0.65] 0.93 [0.86, 0.97]
std risk premium  b IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.06 [0.04, 0.07] 0.06 [0.05, 0.07] 0.29 [0.20, 0.38] 0.07 [0.04, 0.10]
AR technology ⇢z B (0.60, 0.20) 0.99 [0.99, 1.00] 0.99 [0.99, 1.00] 0.97 [0.96, 0.99] 0.94 [0.92, 0.96]
std technology  z IG (0.15, 0.20) 0.58 [0.52, 0.65] 0.29 [0.25, 0.33] 0.84 [0.74, 0.96] 1.58 [1.40, 1.80]
AR investment ⇢i B (0.60, 0.20) 0.73 [0.36, 0.94] 0.79 [0.68, 0.88] 0.32 [0.17, 0.46] 0.70 [0.49, 0.85]
std investment  i IG (0.15, 1.00) 1.14 [0.83, 1.65] 0.66 [0.55, 0.79] 1.35 [1.10, 1.63] 0.53 [0.40, 0.72]
AR price markup ⇢p B (0.50, 0.20) 0.86 [0.69, 0.96] 0.88 [0.78, 0.95] 0.11 [0.03, 0.24] 0.90 [0.77, 0.97]
std price markup  p IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.21 [0.16, 0.29] 0.13 [0.10, 0.17] 0.49 [0.42, 0.56] 0.08 [0.06, 0.11]
AR wage markup ⇢w B (0.60, 0.20) 0.86 [0.68, 0.95] 0.91 [0.85, 0.96] 0.93 [0.86, 0.97] 0.85 [0.76, 0.91]
std wage markup  w IG (0.15, 1.00) 8.83 [4.62, 18.46] 2.28 [1.57, 3.27] 1.58 [0.74, 3.10] 4.60 [2.73, 7.53]
std int rate  r IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.14 [0.11, 0.16] 0.16 [0.14, 0.19] 0.12 [0.10, 0.13] 0.11 [0.09, 0.13]
AR spending ⇢g B (0.60, 0.20) 0.98 [0.96, 1.00] 0.98 [0.97, 0.99] 0.86 [0.76, 0.96] 1.00 [0.99, 1.00]
std spending  g IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.51 [0.45, 0.57] 0.32 [0.28, 0.36] 0.51 [0.45, 0.59] 0.59 [0.53, 0.67]
tech. resp. to govt ⇢gz B (0.50, 0.20) 0.27 [0.18, 0.36] 0.07 [0.03, 0.11] 0.09 [0.03, 0.17] 0.20 [0.10, 0.31]
AR labor disutility ⇢  B (0.80, 0.15) 1.00 [0.99, 1.00] 0.99 [0.97, 1.00] 0.94 [0.89, 0.97] 0.92 [0.90, 0.95]
std labor disutility    IG (0.15, 1.00) 1.62 [1.31, 1.99] 0.79 [0.61, 1.00] 1.74 [1.22, 2.38] 2.49 [1.78, 3.44]
LF wages & sal.  wnspe N (1.00, 0.50) 1.17 [1.05, 1.29] 0.96 [0.83, 1.09] 0.34 [0.14, 0.53] 1.18 [1.13, 1.23]
LF priv. earnings  priv N (1.00, 0.50) 0.39 [0.21, 0.61] 0.91 [0.67, 1.16] 1.18 [0.96, 1.41] 0.23 [0.11, 0.34]
LF negot. wages  neg N (1.00, 0.50) 0.66 [0.50, 0.82] 0.52 [0.39, 0.64] 0.93 [0.83, 1.03] [, ]
LF hourly comp.  cph N (1.00, 0.50) 1.00 [0.82, 1.19] 1.11 [0.94, 1.29] 0.20 [-0.05, 0.45] 0.87 [0.67, 1.07]
std me comp. µcpe IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.23 [0.20, 0.28] 0.14 [0.12, 0.17] 0.94 [0.83, 1.06] 0.14 [0.07, 0.17]
std me wages & sal. µwnspe IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.17 [0.10, 0.23] 0.13 [0.10, 0.15] 0.66 [0.58, 0.75] 0.09 [0.03, 0.17]
std me priv. earnings µpriv IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.65 [0.58, 0.73] 0.32 [0.28, 0.36] 0.64 [0.56, 0.74] 0.52 [0.46, 0.59]
std me negot. wages µneg IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.46 [0.41, 0.52] 0.17 [0.15, 0.19] 0.18 [0.11, 0.23] [, ]
std me hourly comp. µcph IG (0.15, 1.00) 0.56 [0.50, 0.63] 0.22 [0.19, 0.25] 0.79 [0.70, 0.89] 0.82 [0.73, 0.93]
trend comp.  cpe N (*, 0.03) 0.20 [0.17, 0.24] 0.26 [0.23, 0.28] 0.01 [-0.04, 0.05] 0.13 [0.10, 0.17]
trend wages & sal.  wnspe N (*, 0.03) 0.20 [0.17, 0.24] 0.26 [0.23, 0.29] 0.05 [0.01, 0.09] 0.14 [0.10, 0.17]
trend priv. earnings  priv N (*, 0.03) 0.28 [0.23, 0.33] 0.31 [0.27, 0.35] 0.08 [0.03, 0.12] 0.21 [0.17, 0.26]
trend negot. wages  neg N (*, 0.03) 0.28 [0.24, 0.32] 0.21 [0.19, 0.24] 0.04 [0.00, 0.07] [, ]
trend hourly comp.  cph N (*, 0.03) 0.33 [0.28, 0.37] 0.29 [0.26, 0.32] 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06] 0.07 [0.03, 0.12]
logL -1156 -427 -1301 -1216
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Table D.2: Posterior Distribution
Prior Posterior Mean [5-95%]
Germany France Italy Spain
std me output µy (IG, 0.01) 0.001 [0.0100, 0.0086] 0.0116 [0.0100, 0.0084] 0.0117 [0.0100, 0.0085] 0.0119 [0.0100, 0.0085]
std me cons. µc (IG, 0.01) 0.001 [0.0101, 0.0085] 0.0118 [0.0101, 0.0085] 0.0121 [0.0100, 0.0084] 0.0118 [0.0100, 0.0085]
std me inv. µi (IG, 0.01) 0.001 [0.0099, 0.0083] 0.0118 [0.0100, 0.0085] 0.0119 [0.0100, 0.0084] 0.0119 [0.0100, 0.0085]
std me int. µr (IG, 0.01) 0.001 [0.0102, 0.0085] 0.0120 [0.0101, 0.0085] 0.0119 [0.0100, 0.0083] 0.0118 [0.0099, 0.0084]
std me unemp. µu (IG, 0.01) 0.001 [0.0100, 0.0085] 0.0119 [0.0100, 0.0085] 0.0118 [0.0100, 0.0085] 0.0117 [0.0101, 0.0084]
std me labor µl (IG, 0.01) 0.001 [0.0099, 0.0085] 0.0115 [0.0100, 0.0084] 0.0117 [0.0101, 0.0085] 0.0118 [0.0100, 0.0085]
std me infl. µ⇡ (IG, 0.01) 0.001 [0.0100, 0.0083] 0.0117 [0.0099, 0.0084] 0.0116 [0.0101, 0.0085] 0.0120 [0.0100, 0.0083]
logL -1156 -427 -1301 -1216
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